Rearming For The Cold War 1945 1960

Book Description: The first publication in a multivolume series on the history of the acquisition of major weapon systems by the Department of Defense, author Elliott Converse presents a meticulously researched overview of changes in acquisition policies, organizations, and processes within the United States military establishment during the decade and a half following World War II. Many of the changes that shaped the nature and course of weapons research and development, production, and contracting through the end of the century were instituted between 1945 and 1960; many of the problems that have repeatedly challenged defense policymakers and acquisition professionals also first surfaced during these years. This study is the first to combine the histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services into one account. The volume is organized chronologically, with individual chapters addressing the roles of OSD, the Army, Navy and Air Force in two distinct periods.

World War II was one of history's watersheds—an event of such great consequence that it destroyed or dramatically altered political, economic, and social structures and patterns in place when the conflict began, setting most of the earth's nations and peoples on new courses. Worldwide, for example, the war hastened the end of Western colonialism. At its founding in 1945, the United Nations comprised 51 nations. By 1961, membership had more than doubled to 104 nations; two-thirds of the new arrivals were former colonies of the European states.1 In the United States, the war was the catalyst for far-reaching economic and social changes, including the industrialization of the South and the West and equality for women and blacks. But most immediate and significant was that it revolutionized the nation's role in international affairs. Following the war, the United States turned away from its traditional isolationism and took up leadership of the world's democracies. To fulfill this responsibility and to preserve the nation's security, American leaders felt compelled to maintain powerful military forces. This conviction, coupled with the decision to anchor military strength in advanced weapons technologies, meant that the acquisition of materiel, a function that had also been transformed by the war, would assume unprecedented importance even in peacetime. Until 1945, except in wars, the United States had followed an “isolationist” foreign policy. This did not mean that the nation cut itself off from the world; Americans had traded continuously with other nations since colonial times. Rather, the United States shied away from making formal, peacetime political and military commitments with other nations, particularly in Europe. Thus, after World War I, the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, strongly supported by President Woodrow Wilson, that would have made the United States a member of the League of Nations.

This volume is a history of the acquisition of major weapon systems by the United States armed forces from 1945 to 1960, the decade and a half that spanned the Truman and Eisenhower administrations following World War II. These instruments of warfare--aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, guided missiles, naval vessels, and supporting electronic systems--when combined with nuclear warheads, gave the postwar American military unprecedented deterrent and striking power. They were also enormously expensive. A Brookings Institution study estimated that from the end of World War II through the mid-1990s the United States spent over $5 trillion (including the cost of the wartime atomic bomb project) on the development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, and on the systems for delivering and defending against them. Twenty percent of that sum was expended between 1945 and 1960.Although there is a large body of published literature on specific aspects of weapons acquisition, primarily studies of individual systems, no in-depth analysis has yet appeared that combines the histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services into one account. Such a study is badly needed. World War II was a watershed for acquisition. The postwar defense environment was dramatically different from that existing before the war. So too were the policies, organizations, and processes that governed the acquisition of new weapons. Many of the changes that shaped the nature and course of acquisition through the end of the century were instituted between 1945 and 1960. Additionally, many of the problems that have repeatedly challenged defense policymakers and acquisition professionals since World War II first surfaced during those years. History does not repeat itself exactly; but by revealing long-term trends and the reasons for past choices, it can help illuminate the path forward for those who must grapple with the complex issues surrounding the development, production, and deployment of major weapon systems.The volume is organized chronologically, with individual chapters addressing the roles of OSD, the Army, Navy, and Air Force in two distinct periods. The first, roughly coinciding with President Truman's tenure, covers the years from the end of World War II through the end of the Korean War in 1953. The second spans the two terms of the Eisenhower presidency from 1953 through early 1961. The year 1953 marked a natural breakpoint between the two periods. The Korean War had ended. President Eisenhower and his defense team began implementing the "New Look," a policy and strategy based on nuclear weapons, which they believed would provide security and make it possible to reduce military spending. The New Look's stress on nuclear weapons, along with the deployment of the first operational guided missiles and the rapid advances subsequently made in nuclear and missile technology, profoundly influenced acquisition in the services throughout the 1950s and the remainder of the century.I. WORLD WAR II: A WATERSHED * II. ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: OSD AND ACQUISITION, 1945-1949 * Coordination of Research and Development Prior to the National Security Act * The Research and Development Board * Coordination of Procurement Prior to the National Security Act * The Munitions Board * III. THE RESPONSE TO WAR: OSD AND ACQUISITION, 1950-1953 * Rearmament: Purposes and Organization * Requirements Estimates and Production Schedules * Production Difficulties * The Attack on Production Delays * Production Priorities * Research and Development

This volume is a history of the acquisition of major weapon systems by the United States armed forces from 1945 to 1960, the decade and a half that spanned the Truman and Eisenhower administrations following World War II. These instruments of warfare—aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, guided missiles, naval vessels, and supporting electronic systems—when combined with nuclear warheads, gave the postwar American military unprecedented deterrent and striking power.1 They were also enormously expensive. The volume is organized chronologically, with individual chapters addressing the roles of OSD, the Army, Navy, and Air Force in two distinct periods. The first, roughly coinciding with President Truman’s tenure, covers the years from the end of World War II through the end of the Korean War in 1953. The second spans the two terms of the Eisenhower presidency from 1953 through early 1961. The year 1953 marked a natural breakpoint between the two periods. The Korean War had ended. President Eisenhower and his defense team began implementing the “New Look,” a policy and strategy based on nuclear weapons, which they believed would provide security and make it possible to reduce military spending. The New Look’s stress on nuclear weapons, along with the deployment of the first operational guided missiles and the rapid advances subsequently made in nuclear and missile technology, profoundly influenced acquisition in the services throughout the 1950s and the remainder of the century. As used in this study, the term “acquisition” encompasses the activities by which the United States obtains weapons and other equipment. In surveying the history of acquisition between 1945 and 1960, this study discusses or refers in passing to many of the hundreds of weapon system programs initiated by the services in that period, but it is not a weapons encyclopedia. Instead, it investigates a few major programs in depth in the belief that such detailed examination best reveals the evolution of acquisition policies, organizations, and processes, and the various forces influencing weapons programs.

Book Description: The first publication in a multivolume series on the history of the acquisition of major weapon systems by the Department of Defense, author Elliott Converse presents a meticulously researched overview of changes in acquisition policies, organizations, and processes within the United States military establishment during the decade and a half following World War II. Many of the changes that shaped the nature and course of weapons research and development, production, and contracting through the end of the century were instituted between 1945 and 1960; many of the problems that have repeatedly challenged defense policymakers and acquisition professionals also first surfaced during these years. This study is the first to combine the histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services into one account. The volume is organized chronologically, with individual chapters addressing the roles of OSD, the Army, Navy and Air Force in two distinct periods.

In the Fall of 1949, a series of international events shattered the notion that the United States would return to its traditional small peacetime military posture following World War II. Autumn of our Discontent chronicles the events that triggered the wholesale review of United States national security policies. The review led to the adoption of recommendations advanced in NSC-68, which laid the foundation for America’s Cold War activities, expanded conventional forces, sparked a thermonuclear arms race, and, equally important to the modern age, established the national security state—all clear breaks from America’s martial past and cornerstone ideologies. In keeping with the American military tradition, the United States dismantled most of its military power following World War II while Americans, in general, enjoyed unprecedented post-war and peacetime prosperity. In the autumn of 1949, however, the Soviet’s first successful test of their own atomic weapon in August was followed closely by establishment of the communist People’s Republic of China on October 1st shattered the illusion that American hegemony would remain unchallenged. Combined with the decision at home to increase the size of the atomic stockpile on and the on-going debate regarding the “Revolt of the Admirals,” the United States found itself facing a new round of crisis in what became the Cold War. Curatola explores these events and the debates surrounding them to provide a detailed history of an era critical to our own modern age. Indeed, the security state conceived of in the events of this critical autumn and the legacy of the choices made by American policymakers and military leaders continue to this day.