Red Army And Society

This book, first published in 1985, is the first full-length study of the Soviet Armed Forces as a social institution. Using military manpower as a substantive focus, it identifies those characteristics that the Soviet military shared with counterparts in non-communist systems and those that were unique to the society and political culture in which it was embedded. The discussion encompasses defence policy-making as a whole and focuses on conscription policy, the characteristics of the professional military, the role of the political officer, the mechanics of political socialization within the Red Army, and the experience of ethnic minorities in the armed forces. This analysis provides a window through which we can observe the broader military system at work; how that system affects, and in turn is affected by, the economic, social and political life of the Soviet Union. It contributes to our understanding of civil-military relations in communist systems and to our knowledge of Soviet political and social trends.

The Red Army in Romania is the first comprehensive study of the Soviet occupation of Romanian territory in 1940-1941, and its occupation of the country at the end of World War II, which lasted until Soviet troops withdrew from the country in 1958. Based on previously unavailable archival sources, it sheds light on the occupation policies of the Red Army and Soviet policy in Eastern Europe generally at the end of World War II. The authors, both well-known historians, discuss the geopolitical and historical conditions that allowed the Red Army to occupy Romania. They analyze the consequences of the occupation on the country, particularly on political life, as it led to the establishment of a Communist regime in Romania. The Red Army in Romania is a valuable book for students and researchers alike. Constantin Hlihor is a professor of history at the University of Bucharest and a researcher at the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies and at the Academy for Military Studies in Bucharest. Ioan Scurtu is a professor of history at the University of Bucharest and former director of the Romanian National Archives.

The Stuff of Soldiers uses everyday objects to tell the story of the Great Patriotic War as never before. Brandon Schechter attends to a diverse array of things—from spoons to tanks—to show how a wide array of citizens became soldiers, and how the provisioning of material goods separated soldiers from civilians. Through a fascinating examination of leaflets, proclamations, newspapers, manuals, letters to and from the front, diaries, and interviews, The Stuff of Soldiers reveals how the use of everyday items made it possible to wage war. The dazzling range of documents showcases ethnic diversity, women's particular problems at the front, and vivid descriptions of violence and looting. Each chapter features a series of related objects: weapons, uniforms, rations, and even the knick-knacks in a soldier's rucksack. These objects narrate the experience of people at war, illuminating the changes taking place in Soviet society over the course of the most destructive conflict in recorded history. Schechter argues that spoons, shovels, belts, and watches held as much meaning to the waging of war as guns and tanks. In The Stuff of Soldiers, he describes the transformative potential of material things to create a modern culture, citizen, and soldier during World War II.

A major new account of the Soviet Union at war which charts the development, successes and failures of the Red Army.

This social and institutional history of the Red Army during the critical first decade of the Soviet Union was originally published (cloth) in 1990. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Fortæller om opbygningen af den tidligere Sovjetunions militære styrker herunder doktriner, uddannelse, våbensystemer m.m.

Most military historians have difficulty comprehending the miracle that took place in late 1941 and early 1942 in the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1941, the German Army routed the Red Army as it had routed the Polish, British, French and other armies in 1939, 1940, and early 1941. None had been able to withstand German might more than a few weeks. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, his legions quickly overcame the Soviet divisions they met, and it appeared to most that Hitler would succeed as he had before. A major portion of the prewar Red Army had been completely annihilated, millions of prisoners taken, and the most populous and developed provinces of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans and their allies. In September, the Germans surrounded and captured a huge bag of divisions east of Kiev, only to encounter a flood of new Red Army divisions when they redirected their intentions on Moscow. In short order the Wehrmacht broke through this line, and approached within sight of the outskirts of the capital. There, they were surprised by a massive offensive mounted by even more new divisions. Other countries had surrendered after losing one army, let alone two. The Soviets came back with a third—which sent the Germans reeling to the rear. How was this possible? Dunn's detailed examination shows that, far from carelessly throwing thousands of disorganized, untrained men into battle, the Soviets wisely used the resources at hand to resist and drive back the invaders once the initial shock had been absorbed. He reveals how the Soviets systematically trained men as replacements for casualties in existing units, often renaming the unit (a move that confused German intelligence then and continues to confound historians today). Unit integrity was as significant in the Red Army as in other armies. Men were not robotic clones, and each had strengths and weaknesses. Knowing this led to unit integrity and success on the battlefield. Tracing the formation and commitment to battle of Soviet units, regardless of the changes of designation, is crucial to understanding the success and failure of Soviet operations—and Stalin's keys to victory.