Regaining Security

First published in 1997, this volume observes that of all the materials, systems and facilities that designed and operated nuclear weapons, the most readily available assets for reuse are often identified as the highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from warheads. However, proliferation concerns the reuse of much of this material unlikely. This book explores the economic issues surrounding the major expenditures facing the US as it attempts to dispose of weapon-grade nuclear materials in a proliferation-resistant manner. The book discusses the economic values of plutonium and HEU, the economic nature of the nuclear industry, reprocessing and operations costs, the economics of ‘burning’ plutonium to generate electrical power, the economics of down-blending and ‘burning’ HEU, military conversion as a rationale for selecting plutonium disposition options, the economics of transmutation, and the economics of other proposals ranging from monitored surface storage to vitrification. The book concludes by identifying the major cost drivers affecting all disposition options.

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents. Because insurgency and counterinsurgency involve a battle for the allegiance of a population between a government and an armed opposition movement, the key to exploiting information power is to connect with and learn from the population itself, increasing the effectiveness of both the local government and the U.S. military and civilian services engaged in supporting it. Utilizing mostly available networking technology, the United States could achieve early, affordable, and substantial gains in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency by more open, integrated, and inclusive information networking with the population, local authorities, and coalition partners. The most basic information link with the population would be an information technology (IT)-enhanced, fraud-resistant registry-census. The most promising link would come from utilizing local cell phone networks, which are proliferating even among poor countries. Access to data routinely collected by such networks can form the basis for security services such as enhanced-911 and forensics. The cell phones of a well-wired citizenry can be made tantamount to sensor fields in settled areas. They can link indigenous forces with each other and with U.S. forces without interoperability problems; they can also track the responses of such forces to emergencies. Going further, outfitting weaponry with video cameras would bolster surveillance, provide lessons learned, and guard against operator misconduct. Establishing a national Wiki can help citizens describe their neighborhoods to familiarize U.S. forces with them and can promote accountable service delivery. All such information can improve counterinsurgency operations by making U.S. forces and agencies far better informed than they are at present. The authors argue that today?s military and intelligence networks-being closed, compartmentalized, controlled by information providers instead of users, and limited to U.S. war fighters-hamper counterinsurgency and deprive the United States of what ought to be a strategic advantage. In contrast, based on a review of 160 requirements for counterinsurgency, the authors call for current networks to be replaced by an integrated counterinsurgency operating network (ICON) linking U.S. and indigenous operators, based on principles of inclusiveness, integration, and user preeminence. Utilizing the proposed ways of gathering information from the population, ICON would improve the timeliness, reliability, and relevance of information, while focusing security restrictions on truly sensitive information. The complexity and sensitivity of counterinsurgency call for vastly better use of IT than has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here is a practical plan for just that.

Providing a unified introduction to the underlying ideas of the Psychology of Security, Emergency and Risk (PSER), this book highlights the usefulness of a basic psychological knowledge for all those working in this field and summarizes the main dynamic processes associated with the helping relationship: from the neurological pathway of the emotions to the entirely virtual functions of the real Ego, all of these estimable by the oneiric test contained in the appendix. The authors include, in each of the dedicated chapters, the current theories and worked examples to reinforce every argument: from communications rules to the knowledge of terrorism’s cultural background, in its psychological, biological and environmental component. The last important goal at the end of each chapter is to offer the reader, by confronting their own experiences with analysed realities, the possibility to discover the sense of one’s personal identity.

The CRYPTO ’94 conference is sponsored by the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), in co-operation with the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Security and Privacy. It has taken place at the Univ- sity of California, Santa Barbara, from August 21-25,1994. This is the fourteenth annual CRYPTO conference, all of which have been held at UCSB. This is the first time that proceedings are available at the conference. The General Chair, Jimmy R. Upton has been responsible for local organization, registration, etc. There were 114 submitted papers which were considered by the Program Committee. Of these, 1 was withdrawn and 38 were selected for the proce- ings. There are also 3 invited talks. Two of these are on aspects of cryptog- phy in the commercial world. The one on hardware aspects will be presented by David Maher (AT&T), the one on software aspects by Joseph Pato (Hewlett- Packard). There will also be a panel discussion on “Securing an Electronic World: Are We Ready?” The panel members will be: Ross Anderson, Bob Blakley, Matt Blaze, George Davida, Yvo Desmedt (moderator), Whitfield Diffie, Joan Feig- baum, Blake Greenlee, Martin Hellman, David Maher, Miles Smid. The topic of the panel will be introduced by the invited talk of Whitfield Diffie on ”Securing the Information Highway. ” These proceedings contain revised versions of the 38 contributed talks. Each i paper was sent to at least 3 members of the program committee for comments.

This interdisciplinary volume aims to understand the linkages between the origins and aftermaths of genocide. Exploring social dynamics and human behaviour, this collection considers the interplay of various psychological, political, anthropological and historical factors at work in genocidal processes.

The European Union (EU) faces many crises and risks to its security and existence. While few of them threaten the lives of EU citizens, they all create a sense of anxiety and insecurity about the future for many ordinary Europeans. This comprehensive volume explores the concept of ‘ontological security’ which was introduced into international relations over a decade ago to better understand the ‘security of being’ found in feelings of fear, anxiety, crisis, and threat to wellbeing. The authors make use of this concept to explore how narratives of European integration have been part of public discourses in the post-war period and how reconciliation dynamics, national biographical narratives and memory politics have been enacted to create ontological security. Within this context, they also discuss the anxiety of the ‘remainers’ in the Brexit referendum and the consequences of its failure to address the ontological anxieties and insecurities of remain voters. The book also explores: how European security firms market ontological security and provide an ontological security-inspired reading of the EU’s relations with post-communist states; the EU and NATO’s engagement with hybrid threats; and the EU as an anxious community. This book was originally published as a special issue of the journal European Security.