Regulation And Economic Analysis

Regulation and Economic Analysis: A Critique Over Two Centuries argues that long experience with the practice of regulation creates a broad anti-intervention consensus among economists. This consensus is based on comparison of real intervention to real markets rather than an ideological preconception. It is shown that economic theory can support all possible positions on intervention. Much theory is too abstract to support any policy position; many arguments about how intervention might help contain qualifications expressing doubts about whether the potential can be realized; many theories illustrate the drawbacks of intervention. The vast literature on these issues concentrates either on specific cases or polemics that exaggerate both sides of the argument. Regulation and Economic Analysis seeks to show the depth of the discontent, develop interpretations of economic theory that follow from skepticism about statism and provide selected illustrations. The discussion begins with examination of general equilibrium theory and proceeds to discuss market failure with stress on monopoly and particularly what is deemed excessive concern with predatory behavior. International trade issues, transaction costs, property rights, economic theories of government, the role of special institutions such as contracts, the defects of macroeconomic and equity arguments for regulating individual markets, environmental economics and the defects of public land management policies are examined.

This book explores current issues regarding the regulation of various economic sectors, theoretically and empirically, discussing both neoclassical and behavioural economics approaches to regulation. Regulation has become one of the main determinants of modern economies, and virtually every sector is subject to general laws and regulations as well as specific rules and standards. A traditional argument to justify regulatory interventions is the promotion of public interests. Fixing markets that lack competition, balancing information asymmetries, internalising externalities, mitigating systemic risks, and protecting consumers from irrational behaviour are frequently invoked to complement the invisible hand of the market with the visible hand of the state.However, regulations can lead to unintended consequences, and serve the interests of powerful private interest groups rather than the public interest and social welfare. In addition, new insights from behavioural economics question the traditional regulatory approaches, most prominently in attitudes towards consumers. Furthermore, digitalisation and technological innovation in general present new challenges in terms of both the type of regulation and the regulatory process.Part I of this book discusses various theoretical approaches to the economic analysis of regulations, while Part II looks at specific applications of the law and economics of regulation.

Several scholars are highly skeptical of the use of cost-benefit analysis and other economic tools in regulatory decision making. Recently, these critics have focused on debunking economic summaries of regulatory activity, sometimes referred to as regulatory scorecards. The critics generally support less quantitative economic analysis of regulations. This monograph addresses the analytical concerns raised by the critics. It makes four points: First, summary measures of the impact of regulations have made important contributions to our understanding of the regulatory process, a point often overlooked by the critics; second, many of the critics' concerns could be addressed by making refinements to scorecards rather than wholly rejecting them as an analytical tool; third, some of the suggestions made by the critics are legitimate, but many are not; and finally, the solution to legitimate concerns raised by the critics is not to eliminate quantitative economic analysis but to gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses and to use it wisely.

Tackles the important issue of how to regulate firms with market power.

"This monograph addresses the analytical concerns raised by the critics. It makes four points: First, summary measures of the impact of regulations have made important contributions to our understanding of the regulatory process, a point often overlooked by the critics; second, many of the critics' concerns could be addressed by making refinements to scorecards rather than wholly rejecting them as an analytical tool; third, some of the suggestions made by the critics are legitimate, but many are not; and finally, the solution to legitimate concerns raised by the critics is not to eliminate quantitative economic analysis but to gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses and to use it wisely."--BOOK JACKET.

This book, from a top international group of scholars, explores the ways in which economic tools can be used to improve the quality of regulation in general and legislative tools in particular. As the role of law becomes increasingly important in China, the question arises of how effective regulatory and legislative tools can be developed to accompany the Chinese evolution towards a welfare state. China therefore provides a unique case study for scholars and policymakers interested in examining how regulation can play a role in promoting sustainable development. Economics and Regulation in China goes beyond traditional economic analysis of law by focusing specifically on the question of how economic tools can guide the quality of legislation. To this end, the book centres in on three areas: regulation as a tool of economic growth, competition policy and environmental policy. Not only are these three domains of great importance for China, but they are also relevant for a broad scholarship interested in the economic analysis of law. This volume contributes to discussions on how ex-ante evaluation of legislative proposals and ex-post analysis can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation, using economic tools, offering insights that go beyond the particular case of China. The analysis offered by this book makes it an invaluable resource for academics and policymakers alike.

That America's natural environment has been degraded and despoiled over the past 25 years is beyond dispute. Nor has there been any shortage of reasons why-short-sighted politicians, a society built on over-consumption, and the dramatic weakening of environmental regulations. In Retaking Rationality, Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore argue convincingly that one of the least understood-and most important-causes of our failure to protect the environment has been a misguided rejection of reason. The authors show that environmentalists, labor unions, and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations. As a result of this vacuum, industry groups have captured cost-benefit analysis and used it to further their anti-regulatory ends. Beginning in 1981, the federal Office of Management and Budget and the federal courts have used cost-benefit analysis extensively to determine which environmental, health, and safety regulations are approved and which are sent back to the drawing board. The resulting imbalance in political participation has profoundly affected the nation's regulatory and legal landscape. But Revesz and Livermore contend that economic analysis of regulations is necessary and that it needn't conflict with-and can in fact support-a more compassionate approach to environmental policy. Indeed, they show that we cannot give up on rationality if we truly want to protect our natural environment. Retaking Rationality makes clear that by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis, and by joining reason and compassion, progressive groups can help enact strong environmental and public health regulation.