Religious Fictionalism

This book provides a coherent and systematic analysis of Miguel de Unamuno’s notion of religious faith and the reasoning he offers in defense of it. Unamuno developed a non-cognitivist Christian conception of religious faith, defending it as being something which we are all naturally lead to, given our (alleged) most basic and natural inclination to seek an endless existence. Illuminating the philosophical relevance this conception still has to contemporary philosophy of religion, Oya draws connections with current non-cognitivist notions of religious faith in general, and with contemporary religious fictionalist positions more particularly. The book includes a biographical introduction to Miguel de Unamuno, as well as lucid and clear analyses of his notions of the ‘tragic feeling of life’, his epistemological paradigm, and his naturally founded religious fictionalism. Revealing links to current debates, Oya shows how the works of Unamuno are still relevant and enriching today

Atheism is a familiar kind of skepticism about religion. Moral error theory is an analogous kind of skepticism about morality, though less well known outside academic circles. Both kinds of skeptic face a "what next?" question: If we have decided that the subject matter (religion/morality) is mistaken, then what should we do with this way of talking and thinking? The natural assumption is that we should abolish the mistaken topic, just as we previously eliminated talk of, say, bodily humors and unicorns. The fictionalist, however, offers a less obvious recommendation. According to the fictionalist, engaging in the topic in question provides pragmatic benefits that do not depend on its truth-in a way roughly analogous to engaging with a novel or a movie. The religious fictionalist maintains that even if we were atheists, we should carry on talking, thinking, and acting as if religion were true. The moral fictionalist maintains a similar view regarding moral talk, thought, and action. Both forms of fictionalism face serious challenges. Some challenges can be levelled at either form of fictionalism (or at any form of fictionalism), whereas others are problems unique to moral fictionalism or to religious fictionalism. There are important questions to be asked about the relationship between these two kinds of fictionalism. Could moral fictionalism be plausible even if religious fictionalism is not (or vice versa)? This is a volume of thirteen previously unpublished papers on the topics of religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views.

This Element is an introduction to contemporary religious fictionalism, its motivation and challenges. Among the issues raised are: can religion be viewed as a game of make-believe? In what ways does religious fictionalism parallel positions often labelled 'fictionalist' in ethics and metaphysics? Does religious fictionalism represent an advance over its rivals? Can fictionalism provide an adequate understanding of the characteristic features of the religious life, such as worship, prayer, moral commitment? Does fictionalism face its own version of the problem of evil? Is realism about theistic (God-centred) language less religiously serious than fictionalism?

"Within contemporary, analytic philosophy, "Fictionalism"-broadly understood as a view that uses a notion of fiction in order to resolve certain philosophical problems that do not necessarily have anything to do with fiction-has been on the scene for some time. There is a well-known collection, Fictionalism in Metaphysics (OUP, 2005), which provided a good indication of the scope of the view (and its problems) as things stood in the early 2000's. But more than a decade has passed since the appearance of that volume, and much has happened in philosophy, including in the area of fictionalism. In addition to the fact that fictionalism in philosophy appears to be more popular than ever, there are now competing views about how to tackle some of the issues that fictionalists aim to address. Moreover, fictionalism has branched out into many more areas, and there is a continuing debate about what fictionalism in philosophy actually amounts to, and about how precisely it ought to be pursued. There is thus a pressing need for a volume such as Fictionalism in Philosophy. After a detailed discussion in the book's introductory chapter of how, in the light of these ongoing debates, philosophers should think of fictionalism and its connection to metaontology more generally, the remaining chapters provide readers with some of the most current and up-to-date work on fictionalism, both for and against. As such, the volume will be of interest to professional philosophers, as well as to graduate students in philosophy and to advanced undergraduates"--

Philosophy of religion has experienced a renaissance in recent times, paralleling the resurgence in public debate about the place and value of religion in contemporary Western societies. The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into seven parts: theoretical orientations conceptions of divinity epistemology of religious belief metaphysics and religious language religion and politics religion and ethics religion and scientific scrutiny. Within these sections central issues, debates and problems are examined, including: religious experience, religion and superstition, realism and anti-realism, scientific interpretation of religious texts, feminist approaches to religion, religion in the public square, tolerance, religion and meta-ethics, religion and cognitive science, and the meaning of life. Together, they offer readers an informed understanding of the current state of play in the liveliest areas of contemporary philosophy of religion. The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion is essential reading for students and researchers of philosophy of religion from across the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Atheism is a familiar kind of skepticism about religion. Moral error theory is an analogous kind of skepticism about morality, though less well known outside academic circles. Both kinds of skeptic face a “what next?” question: If we have decided that the subject matter (religion/morality) is mistaken, then what should we do with this way of talking and thinking? The natural assumption is that we should abolish the mistaken topic, just as we previously eliminated talk of, say, bodily humors and unicorns. The fictionalist, however, offers a less obvious recommendation. According to the fictionalist, engaging in the topic in question provides pragmatic benefits that do not depend on its truth-in a way roughly analogous to engaging with a novel or a movie. The religious fictionalist maintains that even if we were atheists, we should carry on talking, thinking, and acting as if religion were true. The moral fictionalist maintains a similar view regarding moral talk, thought, and action. Both forms of fictionalism face serious challenges. Some challenges can be levelled at either form of fictionalism (or at any form of fictionalism), whereas others are problems unique to moral fictionalism or to religious fictionalism. There are important questions to be asked about the relationship between these two kinds of fictionalism. Could moral fictionalism be plausible even if religious fictionalism is not (or vice versa)? This is a volume of thirteen previously unpublished papers on the topics of religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views.

Exploring alternative conceptions of the divine, Jessica Eastwood considers the ways of believing in God that are authentic and sincere, moving beyond traditional metaphysical structures that many find difficult to accept. In this study, she examines a unique branch of religious non-realism known as religious fictionalism, making the case for its ability to resonate on an intellectual and emotional level. Considering the extent to which fictionalism allows us to make sense of the role of religion in our spiritual lives, she presents its limitations on adhering to what might be an attractive contemporary model for philosophy of religion called 'the humane turn'. Articulating an alternative conception of God that we can relate to in an intellectual, emotional and spiritual way, Eastwood sheds light on a minimalist form of religious realism, which preserves the reality of God without committing the theist to a host of additional religious beliefs.

First Published in 2004. In Arguing for Atheism, Robin Le Poidevin addresses the question of whether theism-the view that there is a personal, transcendent creator of the universe - solves the deepest mysteries of existence. Philosophical defences of theism have often been based on the idea that it explains things which atheistic approaches cannot: for example, why the universe exists, and how there can be objective moral values. The main contention of Arguing for Atheism is that the reverse is true: that in fact theism fails to explain many things it claims to, while atheism can explain some of the things it supposedly leaves mysterious. It is also argued that religion need not depend on belief in God. Designed as a text for university courses in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this book’s accessible style and numerous explanations of important philosophical concepts and positions will also make it attractive to the general reader.