Responsibility To Understand

Few topics have received broader attention within contemporary philosophy than that of responsibility. Theodore George makes a novel case for a distinctive sense of responsibility at stake in the hermeneutical experiences of understanding and interpretation.He argues for the significance of this hermeneutical responsibility in the context of our relations with things, animals and others, as well as political solidarity and the formation of solidarities through the arts, literature and translation.

Noting the pervasiveness of the adoption of "responsibility" as a core ideal of neoliberal governance, the contributors to Competing Responsibilities challenge contemporary understandings and critiques of that concept in political, social, and ethical life. They reveal that neoliberalism's reification of the responsible subject masks the myriad forms of individual and collective responsibility that people engage with in their everyday lives, from accountability, self-sufficiency, and prudence to care, obligation, and culpability. The essays—which combine social theory with ethnographic research from Europe, North America, Africa, and New Zealand—address a wide range of topics, including critiques of corporate social responsibility practices; the relationships between public and private responsibilities in the context of state violence; the tension between calls on individuals and imperatives to groups to prevent the transmission of HIV; audit culture; and how health is cast as a citizenship issue. Competing Responsibilities allows for the examination of modes of responsibility that extend, challenge, or coexist with the neoliberal focus on the individual cultivation of the self. Contributors Barry D. Adam, Elizabeth Anne Davis, Filippa Lentzos, Jessica Robbins-Ruszkowski, Nikolas Rose, Rosalind Shaw, Cris Shore, Jessica M. Smith, Susanna Trnka, Catherine Trundle, Jarrett Zigon

Explains what responsibility is and ways to be responsible.

In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we have both – that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are neither determined nor undetermined but rather fully self-determined. By contrast, most philosophers understand just how difficult it is to defend this "metaphysical libertarian" position. So they tend to opt for two other theories: "responsibility skepticism" (which denies the very possibility of free will and responsibility) and "compatibilism" (which reduces free will and responsibility to properties that are compatible with determinism). In opposition to both of these theories, Levy explains how free will and responsibility are indeed metaphysically possible. But he also cautions against the dogma that metaphysical libertarianism is actually true, a widespread belief that continues to cause serious social, political, and legal harms. Levy’s book presents a crisp, tight, historically informed discussion, with fresh clarity, insight, and originality. It will become one of the definitive resources for students, academics, and general readers in this critical intersection among metaphysics, ethics, and criminal law. Key features: Presents a unique, qualified defense of "metaphysical libertarianism," the idea that our choices, decisions, and actions can be fully self-determined. Written clearly, accessibly, and with minimal jargon – rare for a book on the very difficult issues of free will and responsibility. Seamlessly connects philosophical, legal, psychological, and political issues. Will be provocative and insightful for professional philosophers, students, and non-philosophers.

The first book-length treatment of a central concept in Hegel's practical philosophy - the theory of responsibility. This theory is both original and radical in its emphasis on the role and importance of social and historical conditions as a context for our actions.

This book critically examines arguments about ‘obligation’ and ‘responsibility’ in relation to the responsibility to protect (R2P) and situates it within wider moral argumentation concerning the role of culpability, answerability, and human rights in international affairs. It discusses the ways in which R2P has been imagined and contested in order to illuminate some possible trajectories through which its potential might be actualized. Crucial to the development of a more ‘responsible’ world politics will be the recognition that formal inter-state ‘regimes’ of responsibility will need to be embedded within wider social ‘fields’ of responsibility constituted by the participation of attentive and mobilized global citizens ready to hold elites accountable. This book provides novel ideas to better understand the role of rhetoric and moral argumentation in international relations. Much of the novel contribution comes in the form of its conceptual breakdown of the ambiguous concept of ‘responsibility,' which often clouds clear understanding not only in international relations, but also in the specific debates over the ethics and practice of the international responsibility to protect regime. This book will be of much interest to students of the responsibility to protect, human rights, global governance, and international relations in general.

Having adequate knowledge of the world is not just a matter of survival but also one of obligation. This obligation to "know well" is what philosophers have termed "epistemic responsibility." In this innovative and eclectic study, Lorraine Code explores the possibilities inherent in this concept as a basis for understanding human attempts to know and understand the world and for discerning the nature of intellectual virtue. By focusing on the idea that knowing is a creative process guided by imperatives of epistemic responsibility, Code provides a fresh perspective on the theory of knowledge. From this new perspective, Code poses questions about knowledge that have a different focus from those traditionally raised in the two leading epistemological theories, foundationalism and coherentism. While not rejecting these approaches, this new position moves away from a primary concentration on determinate products and towards an examination of ever-changing processes. Arguing that knowledge never exists as an ungrounded abstraction but rather emerges through dialogue between variously authoritative "knowers" situated within particular social and historical contexts, she draws extensively on examples from lived social experience to illustrate the ways in which human beings have long tried to recognize and meet their epistemic responsibilities. This edition of Epistemic Responsibility includes a new preface from Lorraine Code.

Wilmot argues that the participation of white progressives in anti-racist movements and organizations in Canada badly needs an overhaul. With this thesis, she begins her assessment of anti-racist movements in Canada by guiding the reader through a summary of the ugly history and legacy of Canada's racist colonial past, and reveals that racism remains an urgent problem today, despite the passing of centuries. Racism in Canada is inextricably linked with capitalism, class, and sexism, and the state promotes it with its laws that systemically exploit Aboriginals and people of colour, and privilege whites, despite its claim that Canada is a multicultural and democratic nation. Using concrete examples from her extensive activist experiences, Wilmot illustrates her argument that white progressives who aim to unite with people of colour against racist oppression must examine and possibly challenge their personal, political, and theoretical ideologies and acknowledge their privileged societal position, if they are to translate anti-racist ideas into effective action, and furthermore, help educate other "white folks" into taking up the cause in an informed manner. White leftists must cast aside political sectarianism and engage with Aboriginals and people of colour as equals when they assist with organizing constructive anti-racist organizations and movements. The balance between taking responsibility and taking direction is oftentimes tenuous at best, Wilmot suggests, but it is essential that in the fight against white oppression, white leftists come to the table in solidarity, rather than come as silent aides, or the opposite -- come and paternalistically and patronizingly appropriate theorganization. Wilmot devotes a significant section of her book to highlighting and evaluating various anti-racist organizations and anti-rac