Responsive Authoritarianism In China

How can protests influence policymaking in a repressive dictatorship? Responsive Authoritarianism in China sheds light on this important question through case studies of land takings and demolitions - two of the most explosive issues in contemporary China. In the early 2000s, landless farmers and evictees unleashed waves of disruptive protests. Surprisingly, the Chinese government responded by adopting wide-ranging policy changes that addressed many of the protesters' grievances. Heurlin traces policy changes from local protests in the provinces to the halls of the National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing. In doing so, he highlights the interplay between local protests, state institutions, and elite politics. He shows that the much-maligned petitioning system actually plays an important role in elevating protesters' concerns to the policymaking agenda. Delving deep into the policymaking process, the book illustrates how the State Council and NPC have become battlegrounds for conflicts between ministries and local governments over state policies.

Challenging the notion of China as merely a repressive dictatorship, Heurlin shows that policymaking has been surprisingly responsive to protests.

In Populist Authoritarianism Wenfang Tang develops a theory of why Chinese citizens support an authoritarian regime, employing a wealth of data taken from more than two decades' worth of national and cross national surveys. Although China has changed considerably on the surface in the post-Mao era, Tang points to notable continuity from the Chinese Communist Party's revolutionary experiences to its current governing style. He proposes a theoretical framework of "populist authoritarianism" which is characterized by Mass Line ideology accumulation of social capital, public political activism and contentious politics, a paranoid and hyper-responsive government, weak political and civic institutions and a high level of regime trust. The CCP currently enjoys strong public support but such a system is inherently vulnerable. Because drastic changes in public opinion cannot be filtered through political institutions such as elections and the rule of law, these changes can result in system wide political earthquakes. How is it, then that the Communist Party once led by Mao-which still adheres to the Marxist-Leninist and nationalist rhetoric of yore-continues to rule with little serious dissent? Marshaling the best evidence that is currently available populist Authoritarianism will reshape our understanding of why the Chinese regime persists despite decades of predictions of its demise.

Can meaningful representation emerge in an authoritarian setting? If so, how, when, and why? Making Autocracy Work identifies the trade-offs associated with representation in authoritarian environments and then tests the theory through a detailed inquiry into the dynamics of China's National People's Congress (NPC, the country's highest formal government institution). Rory Truex argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is engineering a system of 'representation within bounds' in the NPC, encouraging deputies to reflect the needs of their constituents, but only for non-sensitive issues. This allows the regime to address citizen grievances while avoiding incendiary political activism. Data on NPC deputy backgrounds and behaviors is used to explore the nature of representation and incentives in this constrained system. The book challenges existing conceptions of representation, authoritarianism, and the future of the Chinese state. Consultative institutions like the NPC are key to making autocracy work. --

Maria Repnikova offers an innovative analysis of the media oversight role in China by examining how a volatile partnership is sustained between critical journalists and the state.

Stockmann argues that the consequences of introducing market forces to the media depend on the institutional design of the state.

China, like many authoritarian regimes, struggles with the tension between the need to foster economic development by empowering local officials and the regime's imperative to control them politically. Landry explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages local officials in order to meet these goals and perpetuate an unusually decentralized authoritarian regime. Using unique data collected at the municipal, county, and village level, Landry examines in detail how the promotion mechanisms for local cadres have allowed the CCP to reward officials for the development of their localities without weakening political control. His research shows that the CCP's personnel management system is a key factor in explaining China's enduring authoritarianism and proves convincingly that decentralization and authoritarianism can work hand in hand.

This book uses original data from China's National People's Congress to challenge conceptions of representation, authoritarianism, and the political system.