Rethinking Cyber Warfare

Rethinking Cyber Warfare provides a fresh understanding of the role that digital disruption plays in contemporary international security and proposes a new approach to more effectively restrain and manage cyberattacks.

Despite all the attention, cyberspace is far from secure. Why this is so reflects conceptual weaknesses more than imperfect technologies. Two questions highlight shortcomings in the discussion of cybersecurity. The first is why, after more than two decades, we have not seen anything like a cyber Pearl Harbor, cyber 9/11, or cyber catastrophe. The second is why, despite the increasing quantity of recommendations, there has been so little progress. This report explores these questions and assesses the accuracy of our perceptions of cybersecurity.

Cyber-attacks that cause physical consequences are considered to be in violation of the use of force prohibition should the effects reach a certain severity threshold. That premise does not extend to cyber-attacks that cause economic harm due to a dated distinction between kinetic and other effects. This article presents the argument that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter on the prohibition on the threat or use of force ought to apply to economic cyber-attacks. As a result, the right of self-defense could be triggered by the gravest of economic cyber-attacks, as well as the UN Security Council authority under Chapter VII in response to an economic cyber-attack. The underlying assumption is that the effects of economic cyber-attacks can be just as severe and threatening as the effects of kinetic cyber-attacks, and therefore, there is a need to reformulate the boundaries of the use of force paradigm to encompass the additional range of harmful cyber activities. This article proposes a framework consisting of a set of factors to assess economic cyber-attacks under the use of force paradigm.

Recent successful "hacks," allegedly carried out by professionals acting on behalf of, or in concert with nation-states have heightened concerns about cyber warfare and sovereignty in the context of cyberspace. To maintain the integrity of U.S. and allied sovereign borders, it is imperative that security measures and defenses are coordinated and choreographed at the policy, strategy, and operational levels in the cyber domain, as well as in the physical world. The determination of what constitutes cyber sovereignty will greatly influence identification and understanding of threats, Department of Defense (DoD) preparation of the battlefield, the development of capabilities, the identification of participants, and planning for cyberspace operations. Considering the stakes, U.S. leaders cannot afford the consequences of allowing the enemy to define the boundaries of cyber sovereignty and the rules of cyberspace engagement.

Cyber weapons and the possibility of cyber conflict—including interference in foreign political campaigns, industrial sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, and combined military campaigns—require policymakers, scholars, and citizens to rethink twenty-first-century warfare. Yet because cyber capabilities are so new and continually developing, there is little agreement about how they will be deployed, how effective they can be, and how they can be managed. Written by leading scholars, the fourteen case studies in this volume will help policymakers, scholars, and students make sense of contemporary cyber conflict through historical analogies to past military-technological problems. The chapters are divided into three groups. The first—What Are Cyber Weapons Like?—examines the characteristics of cyber capabilities and how their use for intelligence gathering, signaling, and precision striking compares with earlier technologies for such missions. The second section—What Might Cyber Wars Be Like?—explores how lessons from several wars since the early nineteenth century, including the World Wars, could apply—or not—to cyber conflict in the twenty-first century. The final section—What Is Preventing and/or Managing Cyber Conflict Like?—offers lessons from past cases of managing threatening actors and technologies.

"In 'Cyber Persistence Theory', Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that this current theory only works well in the cyber strategic space of armed conflict but it is completely misaligned for conflict outside of war - where most state-sponsored adversarial cyber activity occurs. As they show, the reigning paradigm of deterrence theory cannot fully explain what is taking place with respect to cyber conflict. Therefore, the authors develop a novel approach to national cyber security strategy and policy that realigns theory and practice."--

An essential, eye-opening book about cyberterrorism, cyber war, and the next great threat to our national security. “Cyber War may be the most important book about national security policy in the last several years.” –Slate Former presidential advisor and counter-terrorism expert Richard A. Clarke sounds a timely and chilling warning about America’s vulnerability in a terrifying new international conflict. Cyber War is a powerful book about technology, government, and military strategy; about criminals, spies, soldiers, and hackers. It explains clearly and convincingly what cyber war is, and how vulnerable we are as a nation and as individuals to the vast and looming web of cyber criminals. Every concerned American should read this startling and explosive book that offers an insider’s view of White House ‘Situation Room’ operations and carries the reader to the frontlines of our cyber defense. Cyber War exposes a virulent threat to our nation’s security.