Review Of The Policy Coordination Instrument And Proposal To Eliminate The Policy Support Instrument

The Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) is a non-financial instrument designed to help countries demonstrate commitment to a reform agenda and unlock financing from other sources. Established in 2017, the PCI aims to support countries in designing and implementing a full-fledged macroeconomic program of policies to address imbalances, prevent crises, build buffers, and enhance stability. The PCI enables closer cooperation with the Fund in cases where countries commit to upper-credit tranche (UCT) quality policies and more intensive monitoring. However, at the time of requesting a PCI, such countries must not be seeking financial assistance from the General Resources Account (GRA) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). The design, request, and review process of the PCI are structured based on Fund arrangements, with several design features drawing on the Policy Support Instrument (PSI). Similar to the PSI, the PCI is a form of technical assistance. However, unlike the PSI, which is restricted to PRGT-eligible members, the PCI is available to all member countries.

The global financial safety net (GFSN) has become larger and more decentralized, creating a need for greater coordination. The expanded GFSN has created multiple sources of official financing for countries in need of support to address balance of payments shocks. Enhanced coordination among these layers would facilitate a more efficient use of global resources and provide better incentives for implementing sound policies. A new non-financing Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) would address gaps in the GFSN and the Fund’s toolkit. The new Policy Coordination Instrument is designed for countries that are seeking to unlock financing from multiple sources and/or to demonstrate a commitment to a reform agenda. It would enable a closer policy dialogue between the Fund and countries, more regular monitoring of economic developments and policies, as well as Board endorsement of those policies. It would be available for all member countries. The key design features draw on Fund financing arrangements and the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), with some important differences. These include no qualification criteria, a review-based approach for monitoring of conditionality, and a more flexible review schedule. The PCI is part of a broader set of Fund policy proposals to improve coordination with RFAs, enhance liquidity provision for members, and ensure the cohesion of the Fund’s toolkit. The IMFC and the G20 called for further work to strengthen the GFSN and to improve cooperation between the Fund and regional financing arrangements (RFAs). In response, the Fund has produced a diagnostic of the GFSN and the Fund’s toolkit and identified important gaps. Introduction of the PCI, when considered together with the other proposals, will help to move towards a GFSN with improved coverage, more reliable support, and better coordination between the various layers.

This note provides updated general guidance on the use of the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI). The PCI is a non-financing instrument designed for countries that, at the time of the PCI request, are seeking to unlock financing from sources other than the Fund and/or to demonstrate a commitment to a reform agenda. Since its establishment in 2017 as part of the Fund’s work on the Global Financial Safety Net, the PCI has been used by several members. These experiences helped establish and refine best practices, which are reflected in this updated operational guidance note together with changes to the PCI policy approved by the Executive Board on October 4, 2023. The note covers operational issues in a broad range of areas such as purpose, objectives, eligibility, modalities, applicability of UFR-related and other relevant policies, design of a PCI-supported program, conditionality framework, review schedule , and a comparison with other lending instruments. The note is an aid to the implementation of the PCI policy and its underlying principles. If there is any instance in which a provision of the guidance note or its implementation conflicts with the policy approved by the Board, the PCI policy shall prevail.

This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.

The challenges from the pandemic, spillovers from geopolitical shocks, and long-standing structural problems pose an enormous impediment for balance of payments stability and resilient and sustainable growth, especially for low-income and vulnerable middle-income countries. The $650 billion SDR allocation in August 2021 has helped support economic stability by supplementing members’ reserves. There is scope to amplify the effect of these SDRs by channeling them from countries with strong external positions to countries where the needs are the greatest.

This paper proposes an amendment to the policy on Staff-Monitored Programs (SMPs) that would allow for limited Executive Board involvement in opining on the robustness of a member’s policies to meet their stated objectives under an SMP and monitoring its implementation. To differentiate from regular SMPs, such SMPs would be called “Program Monitoring with Board Involvement” or “PMBs”. Their use would be only available to those (requesting) members who, in addition to seeking to build or rebuild a track record for Upper Credit Tranche (UCT) Use of Fund Resources (UFR), would benefit from targeted Executive Board involvement because of either (i) an ongoing concerted international effort by creditors or donors to provide substantial new financing or debt relief to the member or (ii) significant outstanding Fund credit under emergency financing instruments at the time new emergency financing is received. Members meeting criterion (i) or (ii) above would be strongly encouraged to request such a PMB. The PMB would support members in designing, implementing, and monitoring policies under often complex circumstances.

protracted global uncertainty combined with frequent episodes of capital flow volatility have intensified demand for liquidity support. In response to calls from the IMFC and the G20, the Fund has identified gaps in the global financial safety net (GFSN) and the Fund’s lending toolkit for crisis prevention, including insufficient coverage against liquidity pressures resulting from volatile capital flows. The proposals in this paper draw on the previous Fund work on the adequacy of the GFSN, the review of the Fund’s current toolkit for crisis prevention, and extensive consultations with the membership. The review of the FCL concludes that the FCL has been effective in providing precautionary support against external tail risks. Successor FCL arrangements and associated access levels have been in line with the assessment of external risks and potential balance of payments needs. However, there is scope to strengthen the transparency and predictability of the qualification framework by adding indicator-based thresholds to complement and inform judgment. To enhance crisis resilience while improving the Fund’s toolkit coherence and resource use, the paper proposes three complementary reforms: The establishment of a Short-term Liquidity Swap to provide renewable and reliable liquidity support against potential short-term moderate volatility of capital flows. The proposed instrument is for members with very strong fundamentals and economic policies, and tailored to improve reliability and appeal to users. The use of a core set of indicators with thresholds to guide judgment in FCL qualification. This will improve predictability and transparency while keeping the standards unchanged. The elimination of the PLL to maintain a streamlined and coherent toolkit, given the low use of the PLL, likely reflecting issues of tiering with the FCL. The paper also discusses possible reforms of the current commitment fee policy to promote a more balanced use of Fund resources. Possible options include increasing the commitment fee at high access levels or introducing a new time-based commitment fee.

Rwanda’s medium-term outlook is positive, supported by the authorities’ large policy package to respond to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic and their continued commitment to the PCI in a challenging environment. Economic recovery is underway with easing of restrictions supported by faster vaccination rates since July. GDP growth is projected at 10.2 percent in 2021 and inflation remained subdued. But Rwanda’s remarkable economic and social progress over the last two decades faces a significant setback, with poverty, unemployment, and gender inequalities on the rise. These pandemic scars, if not addressed, risk reversing hard-won economic and social gains. With a large share of the population still unvaccinated and the emergence of new variants, risks to the outlook remain elevated.