Seduction By Contract

'Seduction by Contract' explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.

Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.

Consumers routinely enter into long-term contracts with providers of goods and services - from credit cards, mortgages, cell phones, insurance, TV, and internet services to household appliances, theatre and sports events, health clubs, magazine subscriptions, transportation, and more. Across these consumer markets certain design features of contracts are recurrent, and puzzling. Why do sellers design contracts to provide short-term benefits and impose long-term costs? Why are low introductory prices so common? Why are the contracts themselves so complex, with numerous fees and interest rates, tariffs and penalties? Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from the interaction between market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers are short-sighted and optimistic, so sellers compete to offer short-term benefits, while imposing long-term costs. Consumers are imperfectly rational, so sellers hide the true costs of products and services in complex contracts. Consumers are seduced by contracts that increase perceived benefits, without actually providing more benefits, and decrease perceived costs, without actually reducing the costs that consumers ultimately bear. Competition does not help this behavioural market failure. It may even exacerbate it. Sellers, operating in a competitive market, have no choice but to align contract design with the psychology of consumers. A high-road seller who offers what she knows to be the best contract will lose business to the low-road seller who offers what the consumer mistakenly believes to be the best contract. Put bluntly, competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their customers. Seduction by Contract argues that better legal policy can help consumers and enhance market efficiency. Disclosure mandates provide a promising avenue for regulatory intervention. Simple, aggregate disclosures can help consumers make better choices. Comprehensive disclosures can facilitate the work of intermediaries, enabling them to better advise consumers. Effective disclosure would expose the seductive nature of consumer contracts and, as a result, reduce sellers' incentives to write inefficient contracts. Developing its explanation through a general framework and detailed case studies of three major consumer markets (credit cards, mortgages, and cell phones), Seduction by Contract is an accessible introduction to the law and economics of consumer contracts, and a powerful critique of current regulatory policy.

To secure his legacy, a terminally ill billionaire makes a shocking proposal to his beautiful assistant in this contemporary medical romance. With six months to live, Charleston heir Jonathan Tarleton must set his affairs in order. He knows that his family’s business would be safe in the hands of his dedicated assistant, Lisette Stanhope. But the only way to leave her in charge is to marry her first. He tells himself that their contract marriage has nothing to do with his raw need to make Lisette his. Lisette has always been hopelessly in love with her boss. And though she knows their marriage will be in name only, the inevitable heartbreak will be just as real. But when their commitment is put to the ultimate test, “happily ever after” will take on a surprising new meaning for them both.

Contractual and fiduciary relationships are the two primary mechanisms through which the law facilitates coordinated pursuit of our personal interests. These fields are often represented in oppositional terms, and many accept the distinction that contract law allows an individual to pursue their interests independently, while fiduciary law allows an individual to pursue their interests in a dependent or interdependent way. Relying on this distinction, however, seems to suggest that the boundaries between the fields of contract and fiduciary law are fixed rather than fluid. Bringing together leading theorists to analyse critically important philosophical questions at the intersection of contract and fiduciary law, Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law demonstrates that popular characterizations of the relationship between contract and fiduciary law are overly simplistic. By considering how contract and fiduciary law interact, and not just how they differ, the contributors to this volume offer new insights into a range of topics, including: status relationships, voluntary undertakings, duties of loyalty, equity, employment law, tort law, the law of remedies, political theory, and the theory of the firm.

Written by one of the leading contributors to the relational theory of contract, Contractual Relations authoritatively explains the form of the existing law of contract by relating it to its economic, legal, and sociological foundations. This volume demonstrates that economic exchange and legal contract rest on a moral relationship by which each party legitimately pursues its self-interest through recognition of the self-interest of the other. This essential relationship of mutual recognition is in stark contrast to the pursuit of solipsistic self-interest that is central to the classical law of contract. Self-interest of this sort is not morally defensible, nor does it enhance economic welfare. It is for these reasons that the classical law is legally incoherent. The fundamental inadequacies of the classical law's treatment of agreement, consideration, and remedy have emerged as the doctrines of the positive law of contract have been progressively developed to give effect to the relationship of mutual recognition. The welfarist criticism of the classical law has, however, failed to develop a workable concept of self-interest, and so is at odds with what must be retained from the classical law's facilitation of economic exchange and the market economy. The relational law of contract restates self-interest in a morally, economically, and legally attractive manner as the foundation of the social market economy of liberal socialism. Contractual Relations is a fundamental critique of the classical law of contract and the welfarist response to the classical law, and a major statement of the relational theory of contract. This is an essential work for academics, advanced students, and others wishing to understand the fundamental law, economics and sociology of contract and exchange.

In the grand scale of lawsuits, actually crazy or bogus lawsuits constitute a tiny minority ; in fact, most anecdotes turn out to be misrepresentations of what actually happened. In In Praise of Litigation, Lahav argues that critics are blinded to the many benefits of lawsuits. The majority of lawsuits promote equality before the law, transparency, and accountability. Our ability to go to court is a sign of our strength as a society and enables us to both participate in and reinforce the rule of law. In addition, joining lawsuits gives citizens direct access to governmental officials-judges-who can hear their arguments about issues central to our democracy, including the proper extent of police power and the ability of all people to vote. It is at least arguable that lawsuits have helped spur major social changes in arenas like race relations and marriage rights, as well as made products safer and forced wrongdoers to answer for their conduct.