Social Choice Theory And Soviet National Security Decisionmaking

This unique analysis of Soviet and Russian defense affairs provides an authoritative and thoroughly documented assessment from a former Soviet foreign policy insider. As an active and informed participant, Sokov's discussion of the evolution of the Soviet and Russian strategic posture offers fascinating and illuminating firsthand insights into Soviet weapons systems, elite decisionmaking, and bureaucratic politics during both the Soviet and Russian periods. The book thus casts light not merely on the development of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs, but on a much broader spectrum of issues linked to Soviet and Russian security policy formulation. With its combination of informed analysis and use of new documentation, this work will be invaluable for all concerned with U.S.-Russian strategic relations.

Current thinking on arms control and disarmament has been dominated by the analysis of such "objective" factors as the number of weapons, their characteristics, technological developments and nuclear weapons deployment policies. Yet arms control negotiations have had little success so far. In this volume, Daniel Frei asserts that while such objective analysis is indeed indispensable, it needs to be supplemented by a careful, document-based description of Soviet and U.S. perceptions of one another and of the kind of assumptions that have thus far compelled their leaders to seek security in growing numbers of sophisticated weapons at ever-increasing cost.

In February 2019, Donald Trump announced the United States withdrew from the landmark Cold War-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia sparking worldwide concerns over the specter of a new nuclear arms race. The rational-actor and game-theoretic models dominating international relations literature failed to predict or explain this strategic choice. Rationalist, normative, and materialist models of strategic choice saturate the study of international relations. Scholars continue to expose the shortfalls in these approaches in explaining or predicting outcomes of strategic interactions. In this timely study, John P. DeRosa advances a new model of strategic choice through a narrative lens. This narrative turn reframes the logic to emphasize the propositions of motives, perceptions, preferences, and the reflexive interaction of strategic choices. Case studies of American and Russian nuclear arms control treaties from the negotiations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 to the crisis of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019 support building a theory of “narrativized” strategic choice.

This book, first published in 1984, analyses the critically important Cold War issue of the Soviet national security decision-making process dealing with weapons acquisition, arms control and the application of military force. It conceptualises Soviet decision-making for national security from Stalinist antecedents to 1980s modes, and examines the problems of decision-making concerning weapons development, defence research and development and SALT negotiations. It also focuses on the decision-making processes which led to the use or threatened use of military force in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Middle East (1973) and Afghanistan (1979).