Social Science Concepts

Scepticism about the `science' of social science is as widespread now as it has ever been. Sartori and his colleagues attribute this lack of progress to the neglect of concept analysis. Using the analytic procedure established by Sartori in the opening chapters, the distinguished contributors to this book attempt to build a common, consistent, and communicable set of social scientific concepts.

To develop theories and research designs requires concepts. Gary Goertz provides advice on the construction and use of social science concepts and their use in case selection and theories. He also cites examples from political science and sociology to illustrate the theoretical and practical issues of concept construction and use.

To develop theories and research designs requires concepts. Gary Goertz provides advice on the construction and use of social science concepts and their use in case selection and theories. He also cites examples from political science and sociology to illustrate the theoretical and practical issues of concept construction and use.

Revised edition of the author's Social science concepts, c2006.

Concepts have always been foundational to the social science enterprise. This book is a guide to working with them. Against the positivist project of concept "reconstruction"—the formulation of a technical, purportedly neutral vocabulary for measuring, comparing, and generalizing—Schaffer adopts an interpretivist approach that he calls "elucidation." Elucidation includes both a reflexive examination of social science technical language and an investigation into the language of daily life. It is intended to produce a clear view of both types of language, the relationship between them, and the practices of life and power that they evoke and sustain. After an initial chapter explaining what elucidation is and how it differs from reconstruction, the book lays out practical elucidative strategies—grounding, locating, and exposing—that help situate concepts in particular language games, times and tongues, and structures of power. It also explores the uses to which elucidation can be put and the moral dilemmas that attend such uses. By illustrating his arguments with lively analyses of such concepts as "person," "family," and "democracy," Schaffer shows rather than tells, making the book both highly readable and an essential guide for social science research.

It is argued that the conception of social science emerging today is one that involves a synthesis of radical constructivism and critical realism. The crucial challenge facing social science is a question of its public role: growing reflexivity in society has implications for the social production of knowledge and is bringing into question the separation of expert systems from other forms of knowledge.

This book consists of three major sections. In the first, which includes chapters 1 to 7, the basic concepts of the methodology of the social social sciences are discussed. In the second, chapters 8 and 9, the most important concepts of part one are integrated in discussions on the writing of research proposals and research reports. The third section (appendices) consists of three "case studies" in which the most important methodological principles which were discussed in the preceding sections are illustrated.

The depth, intensity, and long-standing nature of the disagreements between differing schools of social thought renders more critical than ever the treatment of dialectical reasoning and its relationship to the social sciences. The nature of these disagreements are deeply rooted in fundamentally differing beliefs regarding, among many things: (1) the nature of man, (2) the role of theory versus data in constructing social theories, (3) the place and function of values versus facts in inquiry, etc. It has become more and more apparent that such fundamental differences cannot be resolved by surface appeals to rationality or to consensus. Such for it is precisely the definitions of appeals are doomed to failure 'rationality' and 'consensus' that are at odds. That is, different schools not only have different definitions of rationality and consensus but different notions regarding their place and function within a total system of inquiry. A dialectical treatment of conflicts is called for because such conflicts demand a method which is capable of recognizing first of all how deep they lie. Secondly, a method is demanded which is capable of appreciating that the various sides of the conflict fundamentally depend on one another for their very existence; they depend, in other words, on one another not 'in spite of' their opposition but precisely 'because of' it.