South Asian Security And International Nuclear Order

Mario Carranza studies in depth the linkages between Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations and the International Nuclear Order. He critically analyzes the de facto recognition by the United States of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states and looks at the impact of that recognition on the International Nuclear Order and its linchpin, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The book provides a critical analysis of the New International Nuclear Order sponsored by the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the place of India and Pakistan in that order. The author considers the survival of India and Pakistan in relation to a strategy of nuclear deterrence and debates the possibility of establishing a robust nuclear arms control regime in South Asia as part of a broader effort to revive global nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations.

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics. Unlike other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how they are employed by India and Pakistan in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape.

Analyzing regional challenges and their implications for U.S. foreign policy This book is an impressive overview of security and governance issues in South Asia and their implications for U.S. foreign policy in the region. The focus is on major enduring issues that include India-Pakistan relations, India-China relations, conventional forces, and nuclear weapons. The book's contributors also tackle a number of often underexplored issues, including democratic backsliding in India, authoritarian hardening in China, and the international ramifications of both. The impact of Pakistan's political culture on democracy, and the insurgency in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, along with examinations of the internal security challenges in Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Maldives provide lessons for other states on how to counterviolent extremism and insurgencies related to identity and marginalization. Anyone interested in South Asian security and U.S. policy toward the region will be rewarded with new insights on these topics, written by academics and analysts specializing in the issues. The chapter authors were close colleagues or advisees of long-time Brookings Institution senior fellow Stephen Philip Cohen. Cohen was the first American scholar to work on South Asian security studies. He largely defined the field, trained and mentored many of its leading analysts, and was himself its most experienced and insightful scholar-practitioner until his death in 2019. This book is dedicated to Cohen in recognition of his contributions to scholarship and policymaking on South Asia.

The South Asian security complex refers to security interdependencies between the states in the region, and also includes the effect that powerful external actors, such as China, the US and Russia, and geopolitical interests have on regional dynamics. This book focuses on the national securities of a number of South Asian countries in order to discuss a range of issues related to South Asian security. The book makes a distinction between traditional and non-traditional security. While state-centric approaches such as bilateral relations between India and Pakistan are considered to be traditional realist approaches to security, the promotion of economic, environmental and human security reflect global concerns, liberal theories and cosmopolitan values. The book goes beyond traditional security issues to reflect the changing security agenda in South Asia in the twenty-first century, and is a useful contribution to studies on South Asian Politics and Security Studies.

Using a constructivist model, this study brings nuclear arms control and disarmament back into the debates on the future of Indo-Pakistani relations. Constructivism recognizes the independent impact of international norms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norm (NNPN), on India and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. Even though the NNPN does not legally bind them, it is reinforced at the global level, and may lead the South Asian rivals to move in the direction of nuclear arms control and disarmament, thus reducing the costs, dangers, and risks of an eternal strategic rivalry. After examining the main tenets of constructivism in international relations, the works delves into the proliferation debate, discussing nuclear reversal and U.S. policy toward the subcontinent since the G. W. Bush administration. It looks at the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia after the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2008, and the nuclear abolitionist wave during the first Obama administration. It concludes with the contribution of social constructivism to understanding how changes in the India-Pakistan nuclear status quo can happen.