Southern Campaigns Of The American Revolution

This paper investigates the failure of British strategy during the southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War from 1780 to 1781. Following France’s entry into the war in 1778, the British Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain, believed that Great Britain could expand the war into the south with minimal cost. This research traces Lord Germain’s strategy from its origin in London in 1778 to its application in the American south by British Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis during 1780 and 1781. It also analyzes crucial British engagements with the southern patriot army at the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781, the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, and the final withdrawal of British forces from the southern interior following the Battle of Eutaw Springs in September 1781. This research identifies four factors that contributed to the failure of British strategy in the south: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene’s campaign against British forces.

A description of the events that led to the climax and eventual demise of the British campaigns in the Southern theater during the Revolutionary War. The introductory chapter presents the British and Hessian employment of the eighteenth century European method of warfare and the ways it contrasted with the colonial army's diverse and constantly changing fighting styles. The subsequent nine chapters detail the principal military efforts of the British in the South, their capture of seaports, movement in the backcountry, and the critical winter campaign of 1780-81. This almost forgotten campaign and its trilogy of intense clashes at Guilford Court House, Cowpens, and Kings Mountain proved pivotal to American independence. The leadership of the armies isolated in the backcountry and left to their own resources for survival is addressed. The British profiles include the admirably courageous direction of Lord Charles Cornwallis, his morally questionable but valorous cavalry commander Banastre Tarleton, as well as a cadre of impressive young officers such as Webster, Stuart, O'Hara, Hall, and Ewall. Swisher's profiles of the Southern colonial army details the genius strategies of Maj.Gen. Nathaneal Greene and the astute backwoods tactical abilities of Daniel Morgan at Cowpens.

A reexamination of major Southern battles and tactics in the American War of Independence A finalist for the 2005 Distinguished Writing Award of the Army Historical Foundation and the 2005 Thomas Fleming Book Award of the American Revolution Round Table of Philadelphia, The Southern Strategy shifts the traditional vantage point of the American Revolution from the Northern colonies to the South in this study of the critical period from 1775 to the spring of 1780. David K. Wilson suggests that the paradox of the British defeat in 1781--after Crown armies had crushed all organized resistance in South Carolina and Georgia--makes sense only if one understands the fundamental flaws in what modern historians label Britain's "Southern Strategy". In his assessment he closely examines battles and skirmishes to construct a comprehensive military history of the Revolution in the South through May 1780. A cartographer and student of battlefield geography, Wilson includes detailed, original battle maps and orders of battle for each engagement. Appraising the strategy and tactics of the most significant conflicts, he tests the thesis that the British could raise the manpower they needed to win in the South by tapping a vast reservoir of Southern Loyalists and finds their policy flawed in both conception and execution.

As the American Revolution in the North drew to a stalemate around New York, in the South the British finally came to terms with the reality of defeat. Southern sites like Kings Mountain, Cowpens, Charleston, the Chesapeake and Yorktown were vital to American independence. The origin of the five Southern colonies - Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia - their development, the role of patriot and loyalist Southerner, and critical battles are examined. Included is a discussion of the leadership of the British forces and of the colonial patriots who inspired common citizens to fight for the sake of American independence.

Relying principally on Ian Saberton's edition of The Cornwallis Papers: The Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Theatre of the American Revolutionary War, 6 vols (Uckfield UK: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2010), this work opens with an essay containing a groundbreaking critique of Cornwallis's decision in 1781 to march from Wilmington, North Carolina, into Virginia, a decision that was critical in a series of events that cost Britain the southern colonies and lost it the entire war. Together, this and the remaining essays comprise a comprehensive re-evaluation of the momentous and decisive campaigns that terminated in Cornwallis's capitulation at Yorktown and the consolidation of American independence.

An assessment of critical battles on the southern front that led to American independence An estimated one-third of all combat actions in the American Revolution took place in South Carolina. From the partisan clashes of the backcountry's war for the hearts and minds of settlers to bloody encounters with Native Americans on the frontier, more battles were fought in South Carolina than any other of the original thirteen states. The state also had more than its share of pitched battles between Continental troops and British regulars. In South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History, John W. Gordon illustrates how these encounters, fought between 1775 and 1783, were critical to winning the struggle that secured Americas independence from Great Britain. According to Gordon, when the war reached stalemate in other zones and the South became its final theater, South Carolina was the decisive battleground. Recounting the clashes in the state, Gordon identifies three sources of attack: the powerful British fleet and seaborne forces of the British regulars; the Cherokees in the west; and, internally, a loyalist population numerous enough to support British efforts towards reconquest. From the successful defense of Fort Sullivan (the palmetto-log fort at the mouth of Charleston harbor), capture and occupation of Charleston in 1780, to later battles at King's Mountain and Cowpens, this chronicle reveals how troops in South Carolina frustrated a campaign for restoration of royal authority and set British troops on the road to ultimate defeat at Yorktown. Despite their successes in 1780 and 1781, the British found themselves with a difficult military problem—having to wage a conventional war against American regular forces while also mounting a counterinsurgency against the partisan bands of Francis Marion, Andrew Pickens, and Thomas Sumter. In this comprehensive assessment of one southern state's battlegrounds, Gordon examines how military policy in its strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions set the stage for American success in the Revolution.