State Cartels And Growth

Research Paper (postgraduate) from the year 2007 in the subject Business economics - Economic and Social History, grade: 1,0, University of Massachusetts - Amherst (Department of Economics), course: European Economic History, 64 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: This paper provides an analysis of the German chemical industry during the "Second Industrial Revolution" of the late 19th and the early 20th century. It is modeled after Steven Webb's (1980) article on the iron and steel industry. Here it is argued that the exceptional growth and success of the industry - chemicals were the fastest growing industry in Germany and by 1890 German firms held 85% world market share in dyestuff production - was supported by a high degree of market con-centration and cartelization. This enabled the firms to gain large economies of scale and scope through backward integra-tion and product diversification. Dynamic efficiency gains were mainly achieved by relaxing credit constraints, reducing uncertainty, and allocate investment more efficiently. It is further argued that state action played a crucial role in setting up and stabilizing cartels. This analysis is in line with a Schumpeterian view of welfare-enhancing effects of imperfect competi-tion. While these findings obviously do not question anti-trust policy per se, they do question a mechanical view on market structure that is common in much mainstream economic thinking.

This book reviews progress in the fight against hard core cartels. It quantifies the harm caused by cartels and identifies improved methods of investigation. It also examines progress in strengthening sanctions against businesses and individuals.

When widespread state-criminal collusion persists in transitions from autocracy to democracy, electoral competition becomes a catalyst of large-scale criminal violence.

This book contributes to the existing knowledge about the extent of cartels' overcharges and other harm to businesses and consumers worldwide, and sheds light on new and effective "leniency programmes", as well as on optimal sanctions in cartel cases.

"In modern times, international borders reflect discontinuous changes in political authority, no matter what the inconveniences are for the individuals that they separate. What explains this fact? Why are the citizens of neighboring regions that happen to lie across an international border often subject to very different governance systems? We argue that the defining feature of the modern territorial state system is the local, bounded, monopoly that states have in governing their citizens. States refuse to violate each other's monopolies, even when they could do so easily. We examine what makes this system stable, when and how it emerged, how it spread, how it has been challenged, what led it to be so resilient over time, and how might it change in the future"--

This text explains the punitive trend in Mexican anti-drug policies as a political imperative, an out-growth of the perceived need both to counter the growth of the illegal drug market and to prevent US police and judicial authorities from acting as a surrogate justice system in Mexico.

What drug lords learned from big business How does a budding cartel boss succeed (and survive) in the 300 billion illegal drug business? By learning from the best, of course. From creating brand value to fine-tuning customer service, the folks running cartels have been attentive students of the strategy and tactics used by corporations such as Walmart, McDonald's, and Coca-Cola. And what can government learn to combat this scourge? By analyzing the cartels as companies, law enforcers might better understand how they work—and stop throwing away 100 billion a year in a futile effort to win the “war” against this global, highly organized business. Your intrepid guide to the most exotic and brutal industry on earth is Tom Wainwright. Picking his way through Andean cocaine fields, Central American prisons, Colorado pot shops, and the online drug dens of the Dark Web, Wainwright provides a fresh, innovative look into the drug trade and its 250 million customers. The cast of characters includes “Bin Laden,” the Bolivian coca guide; “Old Lin,” the Salvadoran gang leader; “Starboy,” the millionaire New Zealand pill maker; and a cozy Mexican grandmother who cooks blueberry pancakes while plotting murder. Along with presidents, cops, and teenage hitmen, they explain such matters as the business purpose for head-to-toe tattoos, how gangs decide whether to compete or collude, and why cartels care a surprising amount about corporate social responsibility. More than just an investigation of how drug cartels do business, Narconomics is also a blueprint for how to defeat them.

This book addresses the lack of binding multi-lateral international agreement on cartels, through analysis of trials and failures. It also suggests strategic approaches to overcome current standstills. In addition, the book contrasts international agreement on cartels with inter-governmental commodity agreement which has been developed separately through international law. Through this project, the author puts forth that successful international law on cartels needs to reflect the interests and arguments of developing countries.