Strategies For Effective Improvements To The Biowatch System

BioWatch is the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) system for detecting an aerosolized biological attack using collectors that are positioned strategically across the country to continuously monitor the air for biological threats. As currently deployed, BioWatch collectors draw air through filters that field technicians collect daily and transport to laboratories, where professional technicians analyze the material collected on the filter for evidence of biological threats. As part of the BioWatch program's efforts to enhance its effectiveness and capabilities, particularly with regard to detecting biological threats in challenging indoor environments, DHS requested the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine hold a workshop to explore alternative and effective biodetection systems for aerosolized biological agents that would meet BioWatch's technical and operational requirements, integrate into the existing system architecture and public health infrastructure, and be deployable by 2027. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax letters, the ability to detect biological threats as quickly as possible became a top priority. In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced the BioWatch program-a federal monitoring system intended to speed detection of specific biological agents that could be released in aerosolized form during a biological attack. The present volume evaluates the costs and merits of both the current BioWatch program and the plans for a new generation of BioWatch devices. BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance also examines infectious disease surveillance through hospitals and public health agencies in the United States, and considers whether BioWatch and traditional infectious disease surveillance are redundant or complementary.

BioWatch is the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) system for detecting an aerosolized biological attack using collectors that are positioned strategically across the country to continuously monitor the air for biological threats. As currently deployed, BioWatch collectors draw air through filters that field technicians collect daily and transport to laboratories, where professional technicians analyze the material collected on the filter for evidence of biological threats. As part of the BioWatch program's efforts to enhance its effectiveness and capabilities, particularly with regard to detecting biological threats in challenging indoor environments, DHS requested the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine hold a workshop to explore alternative and effective biodetection systems for aerosolized biological agents that would meet BioWatch's technical and operational requirements, integrate into the existing system architecture and public health infrastructure, and be deployable by 2027. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) BioWatch program aims to provide an early indication of an aerosolized biological weapon attack. The first generation of BioWatch air samplers were deployed in 2003. The current version of this technology, referred to as Generation 2 (Gen-2), uses daily manual collection and testing of air filters from each monitor, a process that can take 12 to 36 hours to detect the presence of biological pathogens. Until April 2014, DHS pursued a next-generation autonomous detection technology that aimed to shorten the time from sample collection to detection to less than 6 hours, reduce the cost of analysis, and increase the number of detectable biological pathogens. Because of concerns about the cost and effectiveness of the proposed Generation 3 system (Gen-3), DHS cancelled its acquisition plans for the next-generation surveillance system. In response to the cancellation announcement, Congress asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a review of the program and the proposed system enhancements that would have been incorporated in BioWatch Gen-3. However, Mike Walter, BioWatch Program manager, Office of Health Affairs, DHS, said that DHS did not agree with all of GAO's characterizations of the BioWatch program efforts described in this review. In response to this, DHS requested that the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine conduct a workshop to further explore the findings of the 2015 GAO report and discuss the impact these findings may have with regard to the future development of the technical capabilities of the BioWatch program. Workshop participants also discussed existing and possible collaborations between BioWatch, public health laboratories, and other stakeholders that could contribute to the enhancement of biosurveillance capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

Early detection is essential to the control of emerging, reemerging, and novel infectious diseases, whether naturally occurring or intentionally introduced. Containing the spread of such diseases in a profoundly interconnected world requires active vigilance for signs of an outbreak, rapid recognition of its presence, and diagnosis of its microbial cause, in addition to strategies and resources for an appropriate and efficient response. Although these actions are often viewed in terms of human public health, they also challenge the plant and animal health communities. Surveillance, defined as "the continual scrutiny of all aspects of occurrence and spread of a disease that are pertinent to effective control", involves the "systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of health data." Disease detection and diagnosis is the act of discovering a novel, emerging, or reemerging disease or disease event and identifying its cause. Diagnosis is "the cornerstone of effective disease control and prevention efforts, including surveillance." Disease surveillance and detection relies heavily on the astute individual: the clinician, veterinarian, plant pathologist, farmer, livestock manager, or agricultural extension agent who notices something unusual, atypical, or suspicious and brings this discovery in a timely way to the attention of an appropriate representative of human public health, veterinary medicine, or agriculture. Most developed countries have the ability to detect and diagnose human, animal, and plant diseases. Global Infectious Disease Surveillance and Detection: Assessing the Challenges-Finding Solutions, Workshop Summary is part of a 10 book series and summarizes the recommendations and presentations of the workshop.

Scientific advances over the past several decades have accelerated the ability to engineer existing organisms and to potentially create novel ones not found in nature. Synthetic biology, which collectively refers to concepts, approaches, and tools that enable the modification or creation of biological organisms, is being pursued overwhelmingly for beneficial purposes ranging from reducing the burden of disease to improving agricultural yields to remediating pollution. Although the contributions synthetic biology can make in these and other areas hold great promise, it is also possible to imagine malicious uses that could threaten U.S. citizens and military personnel. Making informed decisions about how to address such concerns requires a realistic assessment of the capabilities that could be misused. Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology explores and envisions potential misuses of synthetic biology. This report develops a framework to guide an assessment of the security concerns related to advances in synthetic biology, assesses the levels of concern warranted for such advances, and identifies options that could help mitigate those concerns.

Perhaps the most frightening apparition of our times is the possibility that a biological agent (bacterim, virus, or toxin) will be used to attack our unprotected civilian population and inflict mass casualties. Until the Fall of 2001, anthrax attacks delivered through the mail to various U.S. senators, to the Governor of New York, and to various media offices, the previously expected use of a weapon of mass destruction against the United States has been a nuclear device that explodes or a chemical cloud that is set adrift. However, today, of all the weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), the biological weapons are the most feared by many defense experts but these are the ones that our country is least prepared to deal with Like the concept of a "nuclear winter," the potential destructiveness of a biological attack can come in many forms and is presently very hard to detect and control, and its results could be catastrophic. The unleashing of biological agents against an unprotected civilian population also, in some cases, constitutes the ultimate medical disaster with the capability to completely overwhelm the present health care system. Patients might go to health facilities in unprecedented numbers and demands for intensive care could well exceed available medical resources. Discerning the threat of bioweapons and appropriate responses to them are critical if we are to prevent the devastating effects of bioterrorism.

The confirmed case of "mad cow" disease (BSE) in June 2005 illustrates the economic impact of disease outbreaks, as additional countries closed their markets to U.S. beef and beef products. Emerging diseases also threaten public health-11 out of 12 of the major global disease outbreaks over the last decade were from zoonotic agents (that spread from animals to humans). Animal Health at the Crossroads: Preventing, Detecting, and Diagnosing Animal Diseases finds that, in general, the U.S. animal health framework has been slow to take advantage of state-of-the-art technologies being used now to protect public health; better diagnostic tests for identifying all animal diseases should be made a priority. The report also recommends that the nation establish a high-level, authoritative, and accountable coordinating mechanism to engage and enhance partnerships among local, state, and federal agencies, and the private sector.