Strategy For Defeat

Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 200 maps, plans, and photos. This book is a comprehensive analysis of an air force, the Luftwaffe, in World War II. It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation. I urge every student of military science to read it carefully. The lessons of the nature of warfare and the application of airpower can provide the guidance to develop our fighting forces and employment concepts to meet the significant challenges we are certain to face in the future.

"Admiral Sharp draws a grim and frightening picture of what happened -- and could happen again." -- Union-Leader (Manchester, NH)

This book, first published in 1985, is an in-depth analysis of the Luftwaffe in the Second World War, using previously untapped German archives and newly-released ‘Ultra’ intelligence records. It looks at the Luftwaffe within the context of the overall political decision-making process within the Third Reich. It is especially valuable for its careful study of industrial production and pilot losses in the conduct of operations.

Dr. Murray's book provides a detailed analytical study of the development of the Luftwaffe. The author takes an in-depth look at the "easy war" (1939-40) and the turn toward Russia in Operation Barbarossa. Dr. Murray investigates the war of attrition from 1942 through early 1944 and the reasons for the final demise of the Luftwaffe from April through September 1944.

In early 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran marked its fortieth anniversary, despite decades of isolation, political pressure, sanctions and war. Observers of its security policies continue to try and make sense of this unlikely endurance. Some view the regime as a purely rational actor, whose national security decisions and military affairs are shaped by the same considerations as in other states. Others believe that it is ideology driving Tehran's strategy. Either way, virtually everyone agrees that the mullahs' policies are fundamentally different from those pursued by their monarchical predecessors. No Conquest, No Defeat offers a historically grounded overview of Iranian national security. Tabatabai argues that the Islamic Republic is neither completely rational nor purely ideological. Rather, its national security policy today is largely shaped by its strategic culture, a product of the country's historical experiences of war and peace. As a result, Iranian strategic thinking is perhaps best characterized by its dynamic yet resilient nature, one that is continually evolving. As the Islamic Republic enters its fifth decade, this book sheds new light on Iran's controversial nuclear and missile programs and its involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

Based on twenty years of research in formerly secret archives, this book reveals for the first time the full significance of War Plan Orange--the U.S. Navy's strategy to defeat Japan, formulated over the forty years prior to World War II.

In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan's defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military prematurely abandoned its original sound strategic plan—to secure the resources Japan needed and establish a viable defensible perimeter for the Empire—that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war in the Pacific that could have influenced the course and outcome of World War II. It is therefore a study both of Japanese defeat and of what was needed to achieve a potential Japanese victory, or at the very least, to avoid total ruin. Wood's argument does not depend on signal individual historical events or dramatic accidents. Instead it examines how familiar events could have b

The battle that unfolded at the Little Big Horn River on June 25, 1876, marked a watershed in the history of the Plains Indians. While a stunning victory for the Sioux and Cheyenne peoples, it initiated a new and vigorous effort by the U.S. government to rid the west of marauding tribes and to realize the ideal of “Manifest Destiny.” While thousands of books and articles have covered different aspects of the battle, few if any have analyzed the tactics and chronology to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of what befell George Armstrong Custer and the 209 men who died alongside him. This volume seeks to explain the circumstances culminating in the near-destruction of the 7th Cavalry Regiment by a close examination of timing, setting every event to a specific moment based on accounts of the battle’s participants.