Strong Evaluation Without Moral Sources

Charles Taylor (1931- ) is one of the leading living philosophers. This is the first extended study on the key notions of his views in philosophical anthropology and ethical theory. Firstly, Laitinen clarifies, qualifies and defends Taylor's thesis that transcendental arguments show that personal understandings concerning ethical and other values (so called "strong evaluation") is necessary, in different ways, for human agency, selfhood, identity and personhood. Secondly, Laitinen defends and develops in various ways Taylor's value realism. Finally, the book criticizes Taylor's view that it is necessary to identify and locate a constitutive source of value, such as God, Nature or Human Reason. Taylor relies heavily on this claim in his accounts of moral life, modern identity and, most recently, secularisation. Laitinen argues that the whole notion of constitutive moral source should be dropped – Taylor's views concerning strong evaluation and value realism are distorted by the question of constitutive "moral sources".

This book provides a comprehensive critical account of Taylor’s writings, and argues that a close examination of his central concept of “strong evaluation” reveals both the potential of and the tensions in his entire thinking.

Groundless Gods: The Theological Prospects of Post-Metaphysical Thought deals with possible interpretations of an emerging interest in contemporary theology: postmetaphysical theology. This book attempts to openly come to grips, not only with what metaphysics and postmetaphysics imply, but also with what it could mean to do or not do theology from the standpoint of the nonmetaphysician. The book asks, for instance, whether this world has any singular definition, and whether God is some being standing apart from the world or an experience within the world.

This book wishes to talk about two main topics: the Canadian political philosopher Charles Taylor and faith. Taylor, in his philosophical arguments on religion and secularity, has adopted what I call the great prejudice on religion and secularity: the two belong to utterly different spheres of human mind and sociality. In this prejudice, faith is used as a synonym of religion, or belief, and is understood as something that does not belong to the sphere of secularity. My argument contradicts precisely this common belief. Is faith more of an anthropological attitude towards reality than a religious one? Can we criticize Taylor’s philosophy on these grounds? To develop my argument, I will attempt to develop a dialogue between continental and Anglo-American philosophers and theologians, in the hope of convincing the readers that we should change radically the way we discuss faith, religion, and secularism.

Human beings have the unique ability to consciously reflect on the nature of the self. But reflection has its costs. We can ask what the self is, but as David Hume pointed out, the self, once reflected upon, may be nowhere to be found. The favored view is that we are material beings living in the material world. But if so, a host of destabilizing questions surface. If persons are just a sophisticated sort of animal, then what sense is there to the idea that we are free agents who control our own destinies? What makes the life of any animal, even one as sophisticated as Homo sapiens, worth anything? What place is there in a material world for God? And if there is no place for a God, then what hold can morality possibly have on us--why isn't everything allowed? Flanagan's collection of essays takes on these questions and more. He continues the old philosophical project of reconciling a scientific view of ourselves with a view of ourselves as agents of free will and meaning-makers. But to this project he brings the latest insights of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychiatry, exploring topics such as whether the conscious mind can be explained scientifically, whether dreams are self-expressive or just noise, the moral socialization of children, and the nature of psychological phenomena such as multiple personality disorder and false memory syndrome. What emerges from these explorations is a liberating vision which can make sense of the self, agency, character transformation, and the value and worth of human life. Flanagan concludes that nothing about a scientific view of persons must lead to nihilism.

Charles Taylor is one of the most influential and prolific philosophers in the English-speaking world. The breadth of his writings is unique, ranging from reflections on artificial intelligence to analyses of contemporary multicultural societies and the role of religion in modern western societies. In this thought-provoking introduction to Taylor's work, Ruth Abbey outlines his ideas in a coherent and accessible way without unduly reducing their richness and depth. Taylor's reflections on the topics of epistemology, language, moral theory, selfhood, political theory, and religion form the core six chapters within the book. Retaining the thematic approach of the first edition, this second edition has been thoroughly revised, rewritten, and restructured. An ideal companion to Taylor's ideas and arguments, Charles Taylor is essential reading for students of philosophy, religion, and political theory, and will be welcomed by the non-specialist looking for an authoritative guide to Taylor's large and challenging body of work.

The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor is a key figure in contemporary debates about the self and the problems of modernity. This book provides a comprehensive, critical account of Taylor's work. It succinctly reconstructs the ambitious philosophical project that unifies Taylor's diverse writings. And it examines in detail Taylor's specific claims about the structure of the human sciences; the link between identity, language, and moral values; democracy and multiculturalism; and the conflict between secular and non-secular spirituality. The book also includes the first sustained account of Taylor's career as a social critic and political activist. Clearly written and authoritative, this book will be welcomed by students and researchers in a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, politics, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies and theology.

In "I that is We, We that is I" leading scholars analyze the many facets of Hegel’s formula for the intersubjective structure of human life and explores its relevance for debates on social ontology, recognition, action theory, constructivism, and naturalism.