Supreme Courts And Judicial Law Making

"Here finally is a book that unveils the politics that infuse Canadian courts and their decisions ... and warns us of the effects of a judicialized politics on our democratic traditions." - Leslie A. Pal, Carleton University

This book gives a broad understanding of the Belgian Constitutional History including a General Introduction, the Sources of Constitutional Law, its Form of Government, The State & its Subdivisions, Citizenship & its Administration of Justice & Specific Problems. Added features of this publication include a list of abbreviations, an extensive glossary, maps, & charts. This book is an offprint of the International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Constitutional Law .

In Governing from the Bench, Emmett Macfarlane draws on interviews with current and former justices, law clerks, and other staff members of the court to shed light on the institution’s internal environment and decision-making processes. He explores the complex role of the Supreme Court as an institution; exposes the rules, conventions, and norms that shape and constrain its justices’ behavior; and situates the court in its broader governmental and societal context, as it relates to the elected branches of government, the media, and the public.

This book provides a comprehensive exploration of ideological patterns of judicial behaviour in the Supreme Court of Canada. Relying on an expansive database of Canadian Supreme Court rulings between 1984 and 2003, the authors present the most systematic discussion of the attitudinal model of decision making ever conducted outside the setting of the US Supreme Court. The groundbreaking discussion of the viability of this model as a unifying theory of judicial behaviour in high courts around the world will be essential reading for a wide range of legal scholars and court watchers.

Judicial decision-making may ideally be impartial, but in reality it is influenced by many different factors, including institutional context, ideological commitment, fellow justices on a panel, and personal preference. Empirical literature in this area increasingly analyzes this complex collection of factors in isolation, when a larger sample size of comparative institutional contexts can help assess the impact of the procedures, norms, and rules on key institutional decisions, such as how appeals are decided. Four basic institutional questions from a comparative perspective help address these studies regardless of institutional context or government framework. Who decides, or how is a justice appointed? How does an appeal reach the court; what processes occur? Who is before the court, or how do the characteristics of the litigants and third parties affect judicial decision-making? How does the court decide the appeal, or what institutional norms and strategic behaviors do the judges perform to obtain their preferred outcome? This book explains how the answers to these institutional questions largely determine the influence of political preferences of individual judges and the degree of cooperation among judges at a given point in time. The authors apply these four fundamental institutional questions to empirical work on the Supreme Courts of the US, UK, Canada, India, and the High Court of Australia. The ultimate purpose of this book is to promote a deeper understanding of how institutional differences affect judicial decision-making, using empirical studies of supreme courts in countries with similar basic structures but with sufficient differences to enable meaningful comparison.

This book addresses timely questions: What is judicial activism? Can judges simply read their own political preferences into the Charter? Does the Court have the last word over democratically elected legislatures? Are our judges captives of special interests? What can Canadians and their governments do if they think the Court has got it wrong?