Sword And Olive Branch

On May 14, 1846, the U.S. Congress declared that the country was at war with Mexico. Despite protestations to the contrary, the primary purpose of U.S. President James K. Polk in executing the war was the acquisition of California. In 1847, Nicholas P. Trist was sent on a diplomatic mission to deliver Polk's peace terms to the Mexican president, Santa Ana. Angered by the Mexican government's rejection of his terms, Polk issued a recall order in November which Trist chose to ignore. He eventually negotiated a settlement on February 2, 1848, that contained nearly everything that Polk had hoped for. This diplomatic history of America's first foreign war focuses on Trist's efforts and the policies of the Polk administration.

Oliver Otis Howard devoted his life to the service of his country, both as a distinguished army officer in two wars and as the founder of two universities. Oliver Otis Howard was a graduate of Bowdoin College and of West Point. Being reared in a pious New England (Maine) atmosphere gave him a deep sense of obligation to lead a Christian life, for the good of others and for the development of his own best self. He was often disturbed by the conflict presented him in his dual career in peace and war. General Howard's strong sense of duty to his country brought about his distinguished career of command during the Civil War -- at the Battle of Chancellorsville, itself a disappointing rout, and at Gettysburg, where he recovered any reputation the earlier defeat might have lost him. Under General Sherman, in the Atlanta campaign, and as a leader of the Army of the Tennessee he won special distinction. In total, Howard fought at the First Bull Run, Fair Oaks (where severe wounds forced the amputation of his right arm), Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. The same strong sense of duty made him accept the commission of the Freedmen's Bureau and the promotion of African-American education. Following his service in the Nez Perce Campaign of 1877 he was superintendent of West Point and the founder of Lincoln Memorial University. His greatest service to education, however, was as founder and president of Howard University, where his name and career are held in honor.

Dominated by the personalities of three towering figures of the nation's middle period -- Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and President Andrew Jackson -- Olive Branch and Sword: The Compromise of 1833 tells of the political and rhetorical dueling that brought about the Compromise of 1833, resolving the crisis of the Union caused by South Carolina's nullification of the protective tariff.In 1832 South Carolina's John C. Calhoun denounced the entire protectionist system as unconstitutional, unequal, and founded on selfish sectional interests. Opposing him was Henry Clay, the Kentucky senator and champion of the protectionists. Both Calhoun and Clay had presidential ambitions, and neither could agree on any issue save their common opposition to President Jackson, who seemed to favor a military solution to the South Carolina problem. It was only when Clay, after the most complicated maneuverings, produced the Compromise of 1833 that he, Calhoun, and Jackson could agree to coexist peaceably within the Union.The compromise consisted of two key parts. The Compromise Tariff, written by Clay and approved by Calhoun, provided for the gradual reduction of duties to the revenue level of 20 percent. The Force Bill, enacted at the request of President Jackson, authorized the use of military force, if necessary, to put down nullification in South Carolina. The two acts became, respectively, the olive branch and the sword of the compromise that preserved the peace, the Union, and the Constitution in 1833.A careful study of what has become a neglected event in American political history, Merrill D. Peterson's work spans a period of over thirty years -- sketching the background of national policy out of which nullification arose, detailing the explosive events of 1832 and 1833, and then tracing the consequences of the compromise through the dozen or so years that it remained in public controversy. Considering as well the larger question of decision making and policy making in the Jacksonian republic, Peterson nonetheless never loses sight of the crucial role played by the ambitions, whims, and passions of such men as Calhoun, Clay, and Jackson in determining the course of history.

Oliver Otis Howard devoted his life to the service of his country, both as a distinguished army officer in two wars and as the founder of two universities. Oliver Otis Howard was a graduate of Bowdoin College and of West Point. Being reared in a pious New England (Maine) atmosphere gave him a deep sense of obligation to lead a Christian life, for the good of others and for the development of his own best self. He was often disturbed by the conflict presented him in his dual career in peace and war. General Howard's strong sense of duty to his country brought about his distinguished career of command during the Civil War--at the Battle of Chancellorsville, itself a disappointing rout, and at Gettysburg, where he recovered any reputation the earlier defeat might have lost him. Under General Sherman, in the Atlanta campaign, and as a leader of the Army of the Tennessee he won special distinction. In total, Howard fought at the First Bull Run, Fair Oaks (where severe wounds forced the amputation of his right arm), Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. The same strong sense of duty made him accept the commission of the Freedmen's Bureau and the promotion of African-American education. Following his service in the Nez Perce Campaign of 1877 he was superintendent of West Point and the founder of Lincoln Memorial University. His greatest service to education, however, was as founder and president of Howard University, where his name and career are held in honor.

p.B. J. Whiting savors proverbial expressions and has devoted much of his lifetime to studying and collecting them; no one knows more about British and American proverbs than he. The present volume, based upon writings in British North America from the earliest settlements to approximately 1820, complements his and Archer Taylor's Dictionary of American Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases, 1820-1880. It differs from that work and from other standard collections, however, in that its sources are primarily not "literary" but instead workaday writings - letters, diaries, histories, travel books, political pamphlets, and the like. The authors represent a wide cross-section of the populace, from scholars and statesmen to farmers, shopkeepers, sailors, and hunters. Mr. Whiting has combed all the obvious sources and hundreds of out-of-the-way publications of local journals and historical societies. This body of material, "because it covers territory that has not been extracted and compiled in a scholarly way before, can justly be said to be the most valuable of all those that Whiting has brought together," according to Albert B. Friedman. "What makes the work important is Whiting's authority: a proverb or proverbial phrase is what BJW thinks is a proverb or proverbial phrase. There is no objective operative definition of any value, no divining rod; his tact, 'feel, ' experience, determine what's the real thing and what is spurious."

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations. Both contemporary and historic examples demonstrate that military intervention to end civil conflict differs radically from traditional peacekeeping. Ending a civil war requires the selective and limited use of force to stop the fighting, safeguard humanitarian aid work, and restore law and order. Since intrastate conflict resembles insurgency far more than it does any other type of war, counterinsurgency principles should form the basis of a new intervention model. A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.