The Army After Next Exploring New Concepts And Technologies For The Light Battle Force

This document summarizes our initial year's work on the Army After Next project at RAND Arroyo Center. This project started about halfway into FY 97. The intent of the effort was to provide analytic, simulation-based support to the Army After Next (AAN) initiative. The effort focuses on use of high-resolution construction simulation to explore technology options and operational concepts for the light battle force component of AAN.

This document summarizes our initial year's work on the project Assessing Advanced Concepts and Technologies for the Army After Next (AAN). At the request of TRADOC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (DCSDOC), RAND Arroyo Center initiated this project about halfway into FY97. The overall intent of the effort was to provide force-on-force simulation-based analytic support to the AAN initiative and support the series of wargames. The effort involves the use of high-resolution constructive simulation to explore both operational concepts and technology options for the light battle force concept associated with the AAN initiative. One of the key capabilities required of the light battle force is an ability to hide and wait for the right opportunity and then create a virtual ambush, resulting in a shock or disintegration of the enemy. This kind of defeat, to some extent, is contrasted from more traditional attrition in that it greatly compresses the time in which

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

United States Army - Issues, Background, Bibliography

Although the United States plays a leading role in the development of technology, particularly that used by militaries around the world, the U.S. military nonetheless continues to find itself struggling against lower-tech foes that conduct warfare on a different scale. Emerging technology is indeed available and is regularly employed in American counterinsurgency efforts; however, since it is also constantly in flux, strategies for its use must continually evolve to ensure that available resources are put to best use against disparate enemies. Counterinsurgency operations are inherently political conflicts, and in The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare, Richard W. Rubright addresses the limits of constraints of technology in enhancing American military capability. Analyzing the confines and self-imposed restrictions on the use of technology as well as current military doctrine, he develops a new rubric for guiding the military in modern warfare. Drawing on textual analysis, personal interviews with international military professionals, and firsthand experience on the ground in Iraq, this book is the first to address the role of technology in counterinsurgency operations within operational, tactical, and strategic contexts.

Presents students with an anthology of published articles from diverse sources as well as contributions to the study of intelligence. This collection includes perspectives from the history of warfare, views on the evolution of US intelligence, and studies on the balance between the need for information-gathering and the values of a democracy." - publisher.

Clearly distinguishing the role of information in winning wars versus managing crises, this book extends existing models for how breakdowns occur in international bargaining. It incorporates case studies that range from Cold War Berlin to the War in Iraq and offers powerful arguments for a new direction in defence transformation.

This document summarizes research conducted in 1998 by the Rand Arroyo Center on an exploration and assessment of the ability to insert mechanzied forces in enemy-controlled terrain.