The Banking Crisis

Explores the Origin of the Recent Banking Crisis and how to Preclude Future Crises Shedding new light on the recent worldwide banking debacle, The Banking Crisis Handbook presents possible remedies as to what should have been done prior, during, and after the crisis. With contributions from well-known academics and professionals, the book contains exclusive, new research that will undoubtedly assist bank executives, risk management departments, and other financial professionals to attain a clear picture of the banking crisis and prevent future banking collapses. The first part of the book explains how the crisis originated. It discusses the role of subprime mortgages, shadow banks, ineffective risk management, poor financial regulations, and hedge funds in causing the collapse of financial systems. The second section examines how the crisis affected the global market as well as individual countries and regions, such as Asia and Greece. In the final part, the book explores short- and long-term solutions, including government intervention, financial regulations, efficient bank default risk approaches, and methods to evaluate credit risk. It also looks at when government intervention in financial markets can be ethically justified.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

Why do banks collapse? Are financial systems more fragile in recent decades? Can policies to fix the banking system do more harm than good? What's the history of banking crises? With dozens of brief, non-technical articles by economists and other researchers, Banking Crises offers answers from diverse scholarly viewpoints.

A full account of the rise and fall of British banking stability which sheds new light on why banking systems crash.

This volume presents a clear and concise explanation of why the American banking crisis of 1933 occurred. The bulk of the book analyses the actual events of the final major panic which was ushered in by the closing down of the banks in the State of Michigan on February 14, 1933. The following three weeks made history and events happened so fast that years of banking history seemed to be compressed into as many days. The events are set within an historical context which enables the reader to see the panic in relation to what came before it.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers, the oldest and fourth-largest US investment bank, in September 2008 precipitated the global financial crisis. This deepened the contraction in economic activity that had already started in December 2007 and has become known as the Great Recession. Following a sluggish and uneven period of recovery, levels of private debt have recently been on the rise again making another financial crisis almost inevitable. This book answers the key question: can anything be done to prevent a new financial crisis or minimize its impact? The book opens with an analysis of the main elements responsible for the 2007/2009 financial crisis and assesses the extent to which they are still present in today ́s financial system. The responses to the financial crises - particularly the Dodd-Frank Act, the establishment of the Financial Stability Board, and attempts to regulate shadow banking – are evaluated for their effectiveness. It is found that there is a high risk of a new bubble developing, there remains a lack of transparency in the financial industry, and risk-taking continues to be incentivised among bankers and investors. Proposals are put forward to ameliorate the risks, arguing for the need for an international lender of last resort, recalling Keynes’ idea for an International Clearing Union. This book will be of significant interest to scholars and students of financial crises, financial stability, and alternative approaches to finance and economics.

This book presents a detailed account of Iceland’s recovery from the tumultuous banking collapse that overturned its financial industry in 2008. Early chapters recount how Iceland’s central bank was unable to follow the quantitative easing policies of the time to print money and save the banks, while serving the world ́s smallest currency area. The book goes on to explore how the government exercised force majeure rights to implement emergency legislation aimed at preventing the “socialization of losses”. Later chapters investigate how, eight years later, these policies have yielded renewed growth and reinvigorated liquidity streams for the financial system. The authors argue that Iceland, long-called the ‘canary in the coal mine’ of the developed world, offers important lessons for the future. This book will be useful to all readers interested in better understanding the unique history of Iceland’s banking crisis and the phenomena of its recovery.