The British Way In Warfare

First published in 1990, this title examines British defence policy from 1688 onwards; the year in which Britain was successfully invaded for the final time, and which marked a generation of warfare that lasted until 1714, during which Britain came to be known as a major European power. David French considers the strategic alliances that formed and changed throughout the period, and tests his hypotheses in light of the varying paradigms of war, and British wartime and peacetime practices. The ways in which the needs of both the army and the navy have been balanced over time are analysed, with particular attention paid to how parliament allotted money and resources to each. Wars under discussion include the American War of Independence, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. A detailed and critical title, this reissue will be of great value to history students studying Early Modern diplomacy, with a particular emphasis on the strategic development of British warfare and policy, and the place of Britain within the European power structure.

Presents the first full-length study of one of Britain's most important military thinkers, Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell.

How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in 1914—but shaped Britain’s success in the Second World War and beyond Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854–1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914–18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill’s conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett’s ideas continue to influence British thinking.

A major contribution to our understanding of contemporary warfare and strategy by one of the world's leading military historians.