The China Cambodia Vietnam Triangle

This book examines closely the origins, evolution, and prospect of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea from both historical and geopolitical perspectives, with particular attention to the interplay of the conflicting perceptions and security needs of the three countries involved.

This book reveals the nature of Sino-US strategic competition by examining the influence exerted by major secondary stakeholders, e.g. Japan, Russia, India, the Koreas, and ASEAN, on the two powers, USA and its rival China, who consider each other as a source of greatest challenges to their respective interests. By adopting “strategic triangles” as the analytical framework and assessing triangular relational dynamics, such as US-China-Japan or US-China-Russia, the author illustrates how secondary stakeholders advance their own interests by exploiting their respective linkages to the two rivals, thereby, shaping Sino-US completive dynamics. This work adds a regional and multivariable perspective to the understanding of the Indo-Pacific’s insecurity challenges.

Based on new archival research in many countries, this volume broadens the context of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Its primary focus is on relations between China and Vietnam in the mid-twentieth century; but the book also deals with China's relations with Cambodia, U.S. dealings with both China and Vietnam, French attitudes toward Vietnam and China, and Soviet views of Vietnam and China. Contributors from seven countries range from senior scholars and officials with decades of experience to young academics just finishing their dissertations. The general impact of this work is to internationalize the history of the Vietnam War, going well beyond the long-standing focus on the role of the United States.

According to the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference regarding Vietnam, general elections were to be held in July 1956 that would lead to the reunification of North and South Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement, however, was doomed from the start, as the South Vietnamese leaders did not suscribe to it and the leaders of the Communist North saw its value as primarily a propaganda tool. By 1956 it was obvious to all that reunification in accordance with the agreement was impossible, and the North Vietnamese looked to China for advice and assistance. Based on Vietnamese, Chinese, American and British sources--many only recently made available--this work examines Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early stages of the second Indochina conflict. The progression of the Vietnamese Communists' goals from primarily political to essentially military is traced. The book shows that the Hanoi government was remarkably in control of its own decision-making.