The Constitutional Theory Of The Federation And The European Union

From the start of the European integration process, one question has puzzled scholars: what type of political association is the European Union? In absence of an agreed upon response, most scholars have suggested that the European Union is 'sui generis'. This book challenges the sui generis thesis by demonstrating that the EU is not a unique form of association, but rather a federal union of states, or what this book calls a federation. This is a discrete form of political association on par with, though differentiated from, political modernity's two other main forms, namely the state and the empire. The federation cannot be understood on the basis of the general theory of the state or its concept of sovereignty. The 'statist' imaginary still dominates both the debates on federalism and the EU, meaning that all federal policies are either seen as 'confederal' associations of sovereign states or sovereign federal states. This book challenges this binary by demonstrating that the federation is not a 'super state' but a discrete political form with its own constitutional theory. It is characterized by a double political existence, a lack of internal hierarchy, and the internal absence, contestation, or repression of sovereignty. This book details the key aspects of federal constitutional theory and how this theory accounts for the EU's constitutional form as well as the crises it has faced in recent years. This book is broken into five chapters that cover the introduction to federalism, origins of the EU, state transformation and teleology, unity in diversity, and emergency rule without a sovereign. This book draws on a variety of literatures and historical material to help the reader develop a critical understanding of 'constitutional myths' and the theory of federalism.

This authoritative study considers all aspects of the European Union's distinctive constitution since its inception. A unique political animal, the EU has given rise to important constitutional conundrums and paradoxes that the authors explore in detail. Their analysis illuminates the distinctive features of the Union's pluralist constitutional construct and provides the tools to understand the Union's development, especially during the Laeken (2001–2005) and Lisbon (2007–2009) processes of constitutional reform and spells out the parallels between the European and the Canadian constitutional experiences. Offering the first history of European constitutional law that is both theoretically informed and normatively grounded, the authors have developed an original theory of constitutional synthesis that will be essential reading for all readers interested in the process and theory of European integration.

European integration confronts us with the limits of current constitutional and democratic language. The way out of this impasse will only appear through a refinement of what we consider the European Union to be as a political entity and of our concepts of democracy. In this challenging and thoughtful new book Professor Verhoeven recognizes the continuity of this project with social contract theory and the federal ideal --and uncovers the specific aspects of democracy and constitutionalism the EU has already embraced -- while showing how the terms and presuppositions of those persistent conceptual frameworks must be fundamentally revised. At the root of these necessary revisions lies the irreversible onset of multiculturalism and globalisation, twin challenges that force us to reconsider issues of sovereignty and self-governance. rofessor Verhoeven does not neglect the much-debated issues at the centre of her topic. Her analysis extends to such critiques as the view of the European constitution as a Court-led process of vertical integration, the meaning of EU citizenship, variability in EU decision-making procedures, the concept of institutional balance, territorial differences in the application of EU law, the whole area of delegated rule-making and the relationship between the European and national legal orders. As a thorough investigation of how democracy and constitutionalism can be reconceptualised in order to meet the challenge of European integration, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory will greatly reward the attention of lawyers, policymakers, and scholars in the field.

Addresses why, when, and how sovereign states give up some of their sovereignity to form a larger union Starting from the premise that the system of independent, sovereign, territorial states, which was the subject of political science and international relations studies in the twentieth century, has entered a transition toward something new, noted political scientist Leslie F. Goldstein examines the development of the European Union by blending comparative and historical institutionalist approaches. She argues that the most useful framework for understanding the kinds of "supra-state" formations that are increasingly apparent in the beginning of the third millennium is comparative analysis of the formative epochs of federations of the past that formed voluntarily from previously independent states. In Constituting Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context Goldstein identifies three significant predecessors to today's European Union: the Dutch Union of the 17th century, the United States of America from the 1787 Constitution to the Civil War, and the first half-century of the modern Swiss federation, beginning in 1848. She examines the processes by which federalization took place, what made for its success, and what contributed to its problems. She explains why resistance to federal authority, although similar in kind, varied significantly in degree in the cases examined. And she explores the crucial roles played by such factors as sovereignty-honoring elements within the institutional structure of the federation, the circumstances of its formation (revolt against distant empire versus aftermath of war among member states), and notably, the internal culture of respect for the rule of law in the member states.

Through a critical appraisal of the European Union and its legal system, this book evaluates the extent to which constitutionalism as an empirical idea and normative ideal can be adapted to institutions beyond the state.

Based on a variety of contemporary debates on federal theory Understanding Federalism and Federation honours Michael Burgess’ contribution to the study of these topics through a selection of approaches, theories, debates and interpretations. Gathering contributors from diverse subfields to synthesize current debates it offers a snapshot of the immense range of current research on federalism and federation. Leading authors debate key issues such as American federalism, Canada and the role of Quebec, the latest insights into comparative federalism and federation, the European Union as a federal project and the analysis of constitutional courts in federal systems. Different theoretical and empirical fields and perspectives are brought together, synthesizing major findings and addressing emerging issues and these topics are analysed through multiple lenses to provide new insights, original approaches and much-needed theoretical and empirical data on federalism and federation.

In June 2003, the Convention on the Future of Europe released what may become the Constitution of the European Union. This timely volume provides one of the first critical assessments of the draft Constitution from the vantage point of political theory. The work combines detailed institutional analysis with normative political theory, bringing theoretical analysis to bear on the pressing issues of institutional design answered - or bypassed - by the draft Constitution. It addresses several themes that play out differently in federal arrangements than in unitary political orders: * European values, especially the legitimate role of alleged common values * liberty and powers - how does the draft Constitution address competing normative preferences? * the European interest: the noble words regarding common European objectives and values are often muddled or conflated, different actors intending quite different things. Several chapters contribute to clarifying the different senses of these terms.

Europe is in crisis. With rising unrest among citizens of EU member states exemplified by the UK's decision to leave the EU, and the growing popularity of anti-EU political parties, Dieter Grimm presents the argument that Europe has to change its method of further integration or risks failure. This book, containing essays many of which have not been published in the English language to date, explores how the EU has become over-constitutionalized. Grimm argues that this has left the EU with a democratic deficit leading to the alienation of citizens. This book highlights Europe's democracy problem. The most prominent argument running throughout is that the EU and its decision-making processes have become over-constitutionalized. This is due to the constitutionalization of European treaties, which has occurred by raising them to the eminence of a constitution as a result of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. However, the treaties contain provisions that would be ordinary law in member states. The fact that they enjoy constitutional status in Europe detaches them from the democratic processes in the member states and the EU itself, and contributes to the growing independence of the EU's executive and judicial institutions. The book also asserts that currently the EU does not have enough sources of legitimation to uphold itself, surviving solely on the legitimation provided by member states. One popular remedy is the suggestion of 'parliamentarization' of the EU, giving the European Parliament the powers typically possessed by national parliaments as a means of heightening its legitimation. This is criticized by Grimm as expanding the Parliament's powers would not change the effects of over-constiutionalization as the Parliament is inferior to the constitution. In order to reduce the EU's legitimacy deficit, Grimm makes several recommendations. The repoliticization of the decision-making processes, which can be achieved by reducing treaties to the capacity necessary for their constitutional function; the reinvigoration of European Parliament elections, by having 'Europeanized' parties to increase engagement with European society and give voters the opportunity to more immediately influence European politics; and a new division of powers based on subject matter to restrain European expansionism, reserving particular areas of policy to the responsibility of member states even if this affects the common market.