The Control Of Natural Monopolies

Natural monopolies exist in those markets in which demand can be satisfied at lowest cost by the output of only one rather than several competing firms. Under such conditions, conventional wisdom suggests that government regulation must substitute for competition to discipline the behavior of firms. Thirty years ago a young professor named Richard Posner asked the provocative question of whether the existence of natural monopoly provides adequate justification for government intervention. His even more provocative answer was no. The evils of natural monopoly are exaggerated, the effectiveness of regulation in controlling them is highly questionable, and regulation costs a great deal. "The resources and energies of government should be directed to problems we know are substantial, that we think are traceable to government action, and that cannot be left to the private sector to work out. There are plenty of those problems, and it is doubtful that natural monopoly is among them." Thirty years after its initial publication, read the original insights of Richard Posner about the regulation of natural monopoly as well as a new preface in which Posner reflects on the deregulation of industries that has occurred since 1969 and the possibilities for more deregulation in the future."

Through three case studies, this book investigates whether digital industries are naturally monopolistic and evaluates policy approaches to market power.

Using data from the International Benchmarking NETwork database, the authors estimate measures of density and scale economies in the water industry in four countries (Brazil, Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam) that differ substantially in economic development, piped water and sewerage coverage, and characteristics of the utilities operating in the different countries. They find evidence of economies of scale in Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam, implying the existence of a natural monopoly. In Brazil the authors cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale. They also find evidence of economies of customer density in Moldova and Vietnam. The results of this study show that the cost structure of the water and wastewater sector varies significantly between countries and within countries, and over time, which has implications for how to regulate the sector.

Considered the cutting edge of microeconomic theory in the 1970s, natural monopoly research remains an active and fertile field. Policy makers and regulators have begun to implement entry and pricing policies that are based on theoretical and empirical analyses. This book develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing natural monopoly. The authors first present a historical overview of regulatory economics, followed by analyses of optimal pricing and investment for single- and multiproduct natural monopolies. Topics covered include cost and demand structures, efficiency impacts of linear and multipart pricing, peak-load pricing, capacity determination, and the sustainability of natural monopolies. After a survey and analysis of natural monopoly regulation in practice, the links between technological change and regulation are identified. The book concludes with a discussion of the alternatives to traditional regulation, including public ownership, franchise schemes, quality regulation, and new incentive systems. Throughout the book, issues from the telecommunications and energy industries are used to illustrate key points. Its integrated framework will make it useful to academic economists, regulatory analysts, business researchers, and advanced students of public utility economics.

"Law can be viewed as a body of rules and legal sanctions that channel behavior in socially desirable directions - for example, by encouraging individuals to take proper precautions to prevent accidents or by discouraging competitors from colluding to raise prices. The incentives created by the legal system are thus a natural subject of study by economists. Moreover, given the importance of law to the welfare of societies, the economic analysis of law merits prominent treatment as a subdiscipline of economics. This two volume Handbook is intended to foster the study of the legal system by economists. The two volumes form a comprehensive and accessible survey of the current state of the field. Chapters prepared by leading specialists of the area. Summarizes received results as well as new developments."--[Source inconnue].

This book provides a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the purpose and effects of the main forms of regulation from the standpoint of industrial economics. The focus is on industries where market conduct is potentially substantially different from competitive. The first chapter analyses the meaning and implications of the phenomenon known as natural monopoly, examining the cases for and against intervention to regulate pricing or entry behaviour. Other topics covered include the question of intra-firm efficiency; the major forms of regulation: state control, rate regulation and franchising schemes; and theoretical and empirical assessments of various relaxations in the regulatory regime.

In the 1980s and '90s many countries turned to the private sector to provide infrastructure and utilities, such as gas, telephones, and highways--with the idea that market-based incentives would control costs and improve the quality of essential services. But subsequent debacles including the collapse of California's wholesale electricity market and the bankruptcy of Britain's largest railroad company have raised troubling questions about privatization. This book addresses one of the most vexing of these: how can government fairly and effectively regulate "natural monopolies"--those infrastructure and utility services whose technologies make competition impractical? Rather than sticking to economics, José Gómez-Ibáñez draws on history, politics, and a wealth of examples to provide a road map for various approaches to regulation. He makes a strong case for favoring market-oriented and contractual approaches--including private contracts between infrastructure providers and customers as well as concession contracts with the government acting as an intermediary--over those that grant government regulators substantial discretion. Contracts can provide stronger protection for infrastructure customers and suppliers--and greater opportunities to tailor services to their mutual advantage. In some cases, however, the requirements of the firms and their customers are too unpredictable for contracts to work, and alternative schemes may be needed.