The Creation Of The Modern German Army

Civil-military relations have been a consistent theme of the history of the Weimar Republic. This study focuses on the career of General Walther Reinhardt, the last Prussian Minister of War and the First Head of the Army Command in the Weimar Republic. Though less well known than his great rival, Hans von Seeckt, Reinhardt's role in forming the young Reichswehr and his writings on warfare made him one of the most important and influential military figures in interwar Germany. Contrary to the conventional view that civil-military relations were fraught from the outset, the author argues, Reinhardt's contribution to the military politics of the Weimar Republic shows that opportunities for reform and co-operation with civilian leaders existed. However, although he is primarily seen as a liberal General, this study demonstrates that he was motivated by professional military considerations and by the specter of a future war. His ideas on modern warfare were amongst the most radical of the time.

The period 1866–1920 saw the rise and ruin of imperial Germany, and Hans Delbrück (1848–1929) reported on the events of those years from a uniquely privileged position. A professor of history at the University of Berlin, editor of the Prussian Annals—the most famous journal of political commentary of his day—and a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, he also moved among political, cultural, and military elites. Delbrück pioneered the techniques of modern military history, studying tactics and technology as well as the social, political, and economic context of military operations. His four-volume History of the Art of War is a classic of German and military history. This volume reveals the tension between Delbrück’s patriotism and his scholarship, which helped him to recognize German military failings. The twenty-four readings, comprising letters written to his mother while he served in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and essays, reviews, commentaries, and speeches on military figures, historians, and events through World War I, show his talents as a historian and political commentator. Arden Bucholz’s introduction and headnotes illuminate the context of Delbrück’s life and work.

"By the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, the victorious German Army was one of the world's most feared and respected military forces. Despite its formidable reputation throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the army was vanquished by the Allied powers during World War I. How did his renowned army come to suffer such a surprising defeat? What political, social, and military forces left the German army vulnerable in 1914? Challenging previous scholarship on the topic, author Eric Dorn Brose offers here a provocative new interpretation of this fascinating period in German history. He argues that conservatism became deeply embedded in the army's philosophy and prevented the army from modernizing in time for World War I." "In detail, Brose describes the slow and arduous process of overcoming entrenched traditions. In August 1914, as the army strove for western victory, its shortcomings became obvious. The campaign planned by military leaders had a reasonable chance of success despite the risky provocation of Belgium and England. It failed, however, due largely to the residual effects of decades of pride and stubborn adherence to the old ways." "Combining military, social, and political history, The Kaiser's Army provides a fascinating look at the modern German army and its evolution. It is a book for anyone interested in German history, military history, and World War I." --Résumé de l'éditeur.

This series of studies illuminates the nature of the Nazi system and its impact on Germany and the world.

This is a new release of the original 1956 edition.

“A fine survey of how a nation came to be recognized for its military supremacy—despite losing two world wars.” —Midwest Book Review In the decades leading up to World War II, the world was in awe of the Prussian-German military, seeking to emulate what esteemed German military history scholar Robert M. Citino has termed “the German Way of War.” Military professionals around the globe became fluent in the tactical jargon: bewegungskrieg, schwerpunckt, auftragstaktik, fingerspitzengefuhl, and of course, blitzkrieg. At the same time, German warfare would become closely associated with the bloodiest and cruelest era in the history of mankind. The German Wars: A Concise History, 1859–1945 outlines the history of European warfare from the Wars of German Unification to the end of World War II. Author Michael A. Palmer looks at political, social, economic, and military developments across Europe and the United States during this crucial period in world history in order to demonstrate the lasting impact of the German Wars on the modern age. “Palmer has succeeded in creating an outstanding short history of the German wars that influenced the development of Europe and the world in the 19th and 20th centuries. It’s a terrific introduction and overview of the subject.” —Armchair General “A provocative look at the methods that Germany used to wage war, and why ultimately they failed.” —Military Heritage “This is an excellent book . . . highly readable. It would be an excellent addition to the library of any military historian, public library, university library as well as personal collection of persons with interest in European or Trans-Atlantic History.” —Kepler’s Military History Book Reviews

This book offers a unique perspective for understanding how and why the Second World War in Europe ended as it did—and why Germany, in attacking the Soviet Union, came far closer to winning the war than is often perceived. Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe challenges this conventional wisdom in highlighting how the re-establishment of the traditional German art of war—updated to accommodate new weapons systems—paved the way for Germany to forge a considerable military edge over its much larger potential rivals by playing to its qualitative strengths as a continental power. Ironically, these methodologies also created and exacerbated internal contradictions that undermined the same war machine and left it vulnerable to enemies with the capacity to adapt and build on potent military traditions of their own. The book begins by examining topics such as the methods by which the German economy and military prepared for war, the German military establishment's formidable strengths, and its weaknesses. The book then takes an entirely new perspective on explaining the Second World War in Europe. It demonstrates how Germany, through its invasion of the Soviet Union, came within a whisker of cementing a European-based empire that would have allowed the Third Reich to challenge the Anglo-American alliance for global hegemony—an outcome that by commonly cited measures of military potential Germany never should have had even a remote chance of accomplishing. The book's last section explores the final year of the war and addresses how Germany was able to hang on against the world's most powerful nations working in concert to engineer its defeat.

Deals with the military activities of the German Reichswehr in the interwar period. Traces the path by which the army not only managed to survive, but to lay the groundwork for its rebirth by preparing a veritable military revolution. Tells how the army reassessed its methods of making war, developed a new doctrine stressing the war of movement, and devised a realistic operation doctrine for tanks and other mechanized vehicles. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR