The Failure Of Presidential Democracy The Case Of Latin America

Preface p. ix Part I Introduction Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? Juan J. Linz p. 3 Part II The Experience of Latin American Presidentialism 6. Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government Arturo Valenzuela p. 91 7. Presidentialism and Democratic Stability in Uruguay Luis Eduardo Gonzalez and Charles Guy Gillespie p. 151 8. Brazil: Toward Parliamentarism? Bolivar Lamounier p. 179 9. Presidentialism and Colombian Politics Jonathan Hartlyn p. 220 10. Loose Parties, "Floating" Politicians, and Institutional Stress: Presidentialism in Ecuador, 1979-1988 Catherine M. Conaghan p. 254 11. Presidents, Messiahs, and Constitutional Breakdowns in Peru Cynthia Mcclintock p. 286 12. Venezuela: Democratic despite Presidentialism Michael Coppedge p. 322 Notes on Contributors p. 349 Index.

Brings together leading scholars to examine the question of whether presidentialism or parliamentarism offers the best hope for stable government and democratic continuity. This edition offers comparative perspectives.

This new textbook provides students with a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the presidents and presidential leadership in Latin America. Unlike other texts, Presidents and Democracy in Latin America integrates both political analysis and major theoretical perspectives with extensive country-specific material. Part One examines the developments in recent years in Latin American presidentialism and identifies different characteristics of society and politics which have influenced Latin American governments. The personalization of political life and of presidential government help to illustrate the character of Latin American politics, specifically on the type of political career of those who occupied the presidential office, the leadership style of these presidents and the type of government which they led. Part Two studies two presidents in each of six countries in the region which reflect the broad trends in the political and electoral life: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Each case study first provides the biographical background of the president; it outlines the political career of the president both inside and outside of a party, including at the local level; the popularity of the president at the time of the presidential election is given, as well as the mode of selection of the candidates (selection by party leaders only, by party members or by a primary). The relation of the president with the government or ministers, especially if there is a coalition government, is detailed. This textbook will be essential reading for all students of Latin American Politics and is highly recommended for those studying executive politics, political leadership, and the state of democratic governance in Latin America.

What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory. Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) alongside interviews with high-level figures in politics, the judiciary, the public administration, NGOs, and academia in Argentina and Chile, Berbecel argues that constitutional presidential power (formal power) is a very poor predictor of presidential power in practice (informal power). Given the poor predictive value of formal rules, he provides an explanation why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not in others. Berbecel attributes the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables (the strength of state institutions, the size of the president’s party in congress, and whether or not the country has a history of economic crises) which together determine how likely it is that a president will be able to concentrate power. Presidential Power in Latin America will be of key interest to scholars and students of executive politics, Latin American politics, and more broadly, comparative politics.

This volume is the first comprehensive analysis of a new type of executive instability without regime instability in Latin America referred to as "presidential breakdown." It includes a theoretical introduction framing the debate within the institutional literature on democracy and democratization, and the implications of this new type of executive instability for presidential democracies. Two comparative chapters analyze the causes, procedures, and outcomes of presidential breakdowns in a regional perspective, and country studies provide in-depth analyses of all countries in Latin America that have experienced one or several presidential breakdowns: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The book also includes an epilogue on the 2009 presidential crisis in Honduras.

The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.

This book addresses the current debate regarding the liabilities and merits of presidential government. Does presidentialism make it less likely that democratic governments will be able to manage political conflict? With the unprecedented wave of transitions to democracy since the 1970s, this question has been hotly contested in political and intellectual circles all over the globe. The contributors to this volume examine variations among different presidential systems and skeptically view claims that presidentialism has added significantly to the problems of democratic governance and stability.

Between 1978 and 2006, most Latin American countries joined the "third wave of democracy". However, as elected governments were set in place all over the region, authoritarian actors often managed to overshadow democratic procedures and preserve their authoritarian enclaves, hindering the transformation of the state and the advancement of citizens’ fundamental rights. This book analyzes the extent to which democratic and authoritarian forces are intertwined in political processes and institutional design and how they affect the inclusion of the citizenry in political decisions. This enables readers to understand how autocratization influences the different dimensions of representative democracy.