The Foreign Office List And Diplomatic And Consular Year Book For 1942

The story of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia during the Second World War has generally been viewed as one of discord and hegemonic rivalry, a perspective reinforced by a tendency to consider Britain's decline and the ascent of US power as inevitable. In this engaging and timely study, Matthew Hinds calls into question such assumptions and reveals a relationship that, though hard-nosed, functioned through interdependence and strategic parity. Drawing upon an array of archives from both sides of the Atlantic, Hinds traces the flow of key events and policies as well as the leading figures who shaped events to show why, how and to what extent the allies and Saudi Arabia became 'mixed up together', in the words of Winston Churchill. Perhaps most fundamentally, Britain and the United States were enthralled by the promise of Saudi Arabia serving as an auxiliary to Allied strategy. Obtaining King Ibn Saud's tacit support or more specifically, his 'benevolent neutrality', meant having vital access, not only to the country's prospective oil reserves, but to its prized geographic location, its centrality within Islam and, as international politics increasingly followed an anti-colonial path, to its credentials as a sovereign and independent Arab state. Given what was at stake, London and Washington saw their engagement in Saudi Arabia as seminal; a genuine blueprint for how to forge a lasting 'Special Relationship' throughout the Middle East. Hinds' bold new interpretation is a vital work that enlarges our understanding of the Anglo-American wartime alliance.

When Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, Churchill called it the “largest capitulation in British history.” Till today, the myth persists that this was due to the British forces’ being caught off-guard, with their guns facing the wrong direction—towards the sea. This book offers an alternative insight into why Malaya and Singapore were captured by the Japanese. The question of the landward defence of Singapore and Malaya was first raised as early as 1918, eventually taking the form of Operation Matador, the elaborate planning and preparations for which amply demonstrate that the British fully expected the Japanese to attack Singapore from the rear, and had formulated a plan to stop the Japanese at the Kra Isthmus. Yet, when the Japanese forces landed, they found Malaya and Singapore defended by an emasculated fleet, obsolescent aircraft, inadequate artillery and no tanks. The battle for Malaya and Singapore was lost even before the first shot was fired—in the corridors of power at Whitehall. Churchill’s half-hearted support for Operation Matador meant that Malaya was starved of the necessary reinforcements, and the commanders on the spot were expected to “make bricks without straw.” The question that remains: If implemented, might Operation Matador have stopped the Japanese?