The Imf And Recent Capital Account Crises

This report evaluates the role of the IMF in three capital account crises, in Indonesia (1997-98), Korea (1997-98), and Brazil (1998-99), and the lessons to be drawn from the experience. It also recommends steps aimed at making the IMF’s surveillance and program design more effective in the prevention and management of future capital account crises. Annexes contain the three country case studies that form the basis for the judgments for the report.

This paper empirically investigates the monetary impact of banking crises in Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, and Uruguay during 1975–98. Cointegration analysis and error correction modeling are used to research two issues: (i) whether money demand stability is threatened by banking crises; and (ii) whether crises lead to structural breaks in the relation between monetary indicators and prices. Overall, no systematic evidence that banking crises cause money demand instability is found. The paper also analyzes inflation targeting in the context of the IMF-supported adjustment programs.

This paper examines the various roles of IMF financing in crisis prevention. Emerging market economies that experienced financial crises in the past have been subject to enormous economic and social costs, highlighting the importance of crisis prevention. While the main defense against a crisis lies in a country’s own policies and institutional framework, the IMF can contribute to these efforts through its surveillance activities, provision of technical assistance, and promotion of standards and codes. But the IMF may be able to contribute to crisis prevention more directly by providing contingent financial support. This paper explores the theoretical basis of, and empirical evidence for, possible “crisis prevention programs.”

Joyce traces the IMF's actions to promote international financial stability from the Bretton Woods era through the recent recession.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.

The Fund’s decisions to lend to member countries in amounts well above the access limits for Mexico (1995), and since then, have raised important questions about the role of the Fund in crisis resolution and the appropriate size of Fund access in capital account crises. This paper reviews past experience in exceptional access cases and considers strengthened conditions, procedures and safeguards for guiding decisions on Fund programs in these exceptional circumstances where Fund financing above normal access limits may be appropriate.

This paper examines the duration of capital account crises. We develop a new index to identify both the start and the end of these crises. Applying the index to a sample of 18 crisis episodes, we derive stylized facts on crisis duration and review the economic and financial circumstances that prevailed at the dusk of crises, a relatively unexplored area. We use the econometric technique of duration analysis to gauge the relative importance of various factors affecting the probability of exiting a crisis. We find that initial and external conditions are key determinants. But fiscal and monetary policies can also help shorten crisis duration.

The abruptness and virulence of the 1997 Asian crises have led many to claim that these crises are of a new breed and were thus unforecastable. This paper examines 102 financial crises in 20 countries and concludes that the Asian crises are not of a new variety. Overall, the 1997 Asian crises, as well as previous crises elsewhere, occur when economies are in distress, making the degree of fragility of the economy a useful indicator of future crises. Based on this idea, the paper proposes different composite leading indicators of crises, evaluated in terms of accuracy both in-sample and out-of-sample.