The Institutional Structure Of Macroprudential Policy In The Uk

Macroprudential policy (MPP) has been one of the major initiatives in the post-2008 crisis restructuring of financial regulation. Under the macroprudential mandate, the regulator monitors and judiciously controls systemic risk in the financial system, in an attempt to minimise the probability and severity of a future financial crisis. The book reveals why MPP authorities are rightfully at the centre of a highly sensitive policy debate, as MPP necessitates the allocation of significant regulatory power to technocrats, while the highly technical nature of MPP makes policy evaluation challenging. Specific issues examined include: the importance of financial stability as a public policy goal; the political economy issues stemming from the delegation of MPP to an independent authority; and the definition of accountability in the context of MPP. Focusing on a case study on the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England, the macroprudential authority in the UK, the book develops the normative grounds to justify the need for accountability in the conduct of MPP, while also formulating the necessary institutional framework to ensure the accountability of MPP authorities.

Macroprudential policy focuses on the financial system as a whole, as distinct from individual institutions, and its objective is to limit the costs to the real economy from system-wide distress of the financial sector. This book helps readers discover and decipher the multi-faceted and fascinating area of macroprudential policy through taking a theoretical, interdisciplinary and legal-focused approach.

This paper reviews the institutional framework for the conduct of macroprudential policy in the United Kingdom and the steps taken by the authorities to make the macroprudential framework operational. An effective macroprudential framework is crucial for the U.K. financial system to remain a global public good, given its size and systemic nature. The paper reviews how the institutional setup promotes the willingness to act, ability to act, effective cooperation, and accountability. A strong institutional framework is essential to ensure that macroprudential policy can work effectively. This review is also focused on the authorities’ processes for monitoring systemic risk (including beyond the core financial system), data gaps, and the U.K. macroprudential toolkit.

A number of countries are reviewing their institutional arrangements for financial stability to support the development of a macroprudential policy function. In some cases, this involves a rethink of the appropriate institutional boundaries between central banks and financial regulatory agencies, or the setting up of dedicated policymaking committees. In others, efforts are underway to enhance cooperation within the existing institutional structure. Against this background, this paper provides basic guidance for the design of effective arrangements, in a manner that can provide a framework for country-specific advice. After reviewing briefly the main institutional elements of existing and emerging macroprudential policy frameworks across countries, the paper identifies stylized institutional models based on key features that distinguish institutional arrangements. It develops criteria to assess the effectiveness of models, examines the strengths and weaknesses of models against these criteria, and explores ways to improve existing setups. The paper finally distills lessons and sets out desired principles for effective macroprudential policy arrangements.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

Macroprudential policy (MPP) has been one of the major initiatives in the post-2008 crisis restructuring of financial regulation. Under the macroprudential mandate, the regulator monitors and judiciously controls systemic risk in the financial system, in an attempt to minimise the probability and severity of a future financial crisis. The book reveals why MPP authorities are rightfully at the centre of a highly sensitive policy debate, as MPP necessitates the allocation of significant regulatory power to technocrats, while the highly technical nature of MPP makes policy evaluation challenging. Specific issues examined include: the importance of financial stability as a public policy goal; the political economy issues stemming from the delegation of MPP to an independent authority; and the definition of accountability in the context of MPP. Focusing on a case study on the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England, the macroprudential authority in the UK, the book develops the normative grounds to justify the need for accountability in the conduct of MPP, while also formulating the necessary institutional framework to ensure the accountability of MPP authorities.

In light of on-going global financial crises, the institutional structure of financial regulation is currently a subject of significant academic and practical interest. The financial crisis has called into question the adequacy of financial regulation at the national and supranational levels, and has instigated financial regulatory reforms in major markets overseas. This has included the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, and the programme to split the Financial Services Authority in the UK. This book examines the institutional structure reform of financial regulation from a comparative perspective, exploring both fundamental theories and international experiences. The book explores the three main institutional structures of financial regulation in the world; the sectors-based model, adopted in the US, Mainland China and Hong Kong; the twin-peaks model with Australia and the Netherlands as its pioneers; and the single-regulator model as represented by the former Financial Services Authority in the UK and the Financial Services Agency in Japan. The book contains contributions from renowned experts in the field of financial regulation including Douglas Arner, Jeffrey Carmichael, Robin Hui Huang, Dirk Schoenmaker, and Michael Taylor, and will be of interest to students and researchers of banking and finance law, and comparative economics.