Institutional Structure Of Financial Regulation

In light of on-going global financial crises, the institutional structure of financial regulation is currently a subject of significant academic and practical interest. The financial crisis has called into question the adequacy of financial regulation at the national and supranational levels, and has instigated financial regulatory reforms in major markets overseas. This has included the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, and the programme to split the Financial Services Authority in the UK. This book examines the institutional structure reform of financial regulation from a comparative perspective, exploring both fundamental theories and international experiences. The book explores the three main institutional structures of financial regulation in the world; the sectors-based model, adopted in the US, Mainland China and Hong Kong; the twin-peaks model with Australia and the Netherlands as its pioneers; and the single-regulator model as represented by the former Financial Services Authority in the UK and the Financial Services Agency in Japan. The book contains contributions from renowned experts in the field of financial regulation including Douglas Arner, Jeffrey Carmichael, Robin Hui Huang, Dirk Schoenmaker, and Michael Taylor, and will be of interest to students and researchers of banking and finance law, and comparative economics.

This book examines the area of financial regulation in the banking sector. Editors Mayes and Wood bring together such acadmics as Charles Goodhart, Charles Calomiris and Kern Alexander whose expertise shines through this volume to provide a reference tool for researchers, students and bankers themselves which will prove invaluable.

This book brings outstanding expertise and provides insightful perspectives from nineteen authors with diverse backgrounds, including officials from international organizations, national regulators, and commercial banking, as well as academics in law, economics, political economy, and finance. The authors not only shed light on the causes of the financial turmoil, but also present thoughtful proposals that contribute to the future policy debate, and discuss opportunities that financial services can offer in funding activities which raise standards of living through initiatives in microfinance, renewable energy, and food distribution. The contributions to this volume tackle several of the thorniest issues of financial regulation in a post-crisis environment, such as: the mechanics of contagion within the financial system and the role of liquidity; moral hazard when large financial institutions are no longer subject to the disciplinary effects of bankruptcy; bank capital requirements; management compensation; design of bank resolution schemes; a function-centric versus institution-centric regulatory approach; subsidization and compatibility of stimulus packages with EU rules on state aid; trade finance and the role of the GATS prudential carve-out; and the role of financial services in promoting human rights or combating climate change.

The financial crisis of 2007-9 revealed serious failings in the regulation of financial institutions and markets, and prompted a fundamental reconsideration of the design of financial regulation. As the financial system has become ever-more complex and interconnected, the pace of evolution continues to accelerate. It is now clear that regulation must focus on the financial system as a whole, but this poses significant challenges for regulators. Principles of Financial Regulation describes how to address those challenges. Examining the subject from a holistic and multidisciplinary perspective, Principles of Financial Regulation considers the underlying policies and the objectives of regulation by drawing on economics, finance, and law methodologies. The volume examines regulation in a purposive and dynamic way by framing the book in terms of what the financial system does, rather than what financial regulation is. By analysing specific regulatory measures, the book provides readers to the opportunity to assess regulatory choices on specific policy issues and encourages critical reflection on the design of regulation.

The book sets forth the economic rationale for international financial regulation and what role, if any, international regulation can play in effectively managing systemic risk while providing accountability to all affected nations. The book suggests that a particular type of global governance structure is necessary to have more efficient regulation of the international financial system.

Aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics, banking, and finance, this is a core textbook for the financial markets, institutions, and regulation option of courses in financial economics. It integrates modern theories of asymmetric information into the analysis of financial institutions, relating the theory to current developments. The text begins with an analysis of adverse selection in retail financial products like life assurance before looking at open capital markets where trades and prices provide information. It then progresses to the more complex areas of corporate governance and financial intermediation in which information is concealed or confidential and moral hazard and verification problems become important. These chapters study the various mechanisms that the financial markets have developed to allow investors to delegate the management of their assets to others. This analysis is used to show how regulation can reduce the risk of financial failure and how legal, accounting, and regulatory mechanisms can help shape a country's corporate and financial architecture. These difficult theoretical concepts are conveyed through the careful use of numerical illustrations and topical case studies. Each chapter ends with a set of exercises to test and reinforce students' comprehension of the material. Worked solutions are provided for the numerical exercises.

The financial system and its regulation have undergone exponential growth and dramatic reform over the last thirty years. This period has witnessed major developments in the nature and intensity of financial markets, as well as repeated cycles of regulatory reform and development, often linked to crisis conditions. The recent financial crisis has led to unparalleled interest in financial regulation from policymakers, economists, legal practitioners, and the academic community, and has prompted large-scale regulatory reform. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is the first comprehensive, authoritative, and state of the art account of the nature of financial regulation. Written by an international team of leading scholars in the field, it takes a contextual and comparative approach to examine scholarly, policy, and regulatory developments in the past three decades. The first three parts of the Handbook address the underpinning horizontal themes which arise in financial regulation: financial systems and regulation; the organization of financial system regulation, including regional examples from the EU and the US; and the delivery of outcomes and regulatory techniques. The final three Parts address the perennial objectives of financial regulation, widely regarded as the anchors of financial regulation internationally: financial stability, market efficiency, integrity, and transparency; and consumer protection. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is an invaluable resource for scholars and students of financial regulation, economists, policy-makers and regulators.

Following the recent financial crisis, regulators have been preoccupied with the concept of systemic risk in financial markets, believing that such risk could cause the markets that they oversee to implode. At the same time, they have demonstrated a certain inability to develop and implement comprehensive policies to address systemic risk. This inability is due not only to the indeterminacy inherent in the term 'systemic risk' but also to existing institutional structures which, because of their existing legal mandates, ultimately make it difficult to monitor and regulate systemic risk across an entire economic system. Bringing together leading figures in the field of financial regulation, this collection of essays explores the related concepts of systemic risk and institutional design of financial markets, responding to a number of questions: In terms of systemic risk, what precisely is the problem and what can be done about it? How should systemic risk be regulated? What should be the role of the central bank, banking authorities, and securities regulators? Should countries implement a macroprudential regulator? If not, how is macroprudential regulation to be addressed within their respective legislative schemes? What policy mechanisms can be employed when developing regulation relating to financial markets? A significant and timely examination of one of the most intractable challenges posed to financial regulation.