The Institutional Theory Of The Firm

The Institutional Theory of the Firm examines recent and previous organization theory literature to advocate what Evans (1995) refers to as the "embedded autonomy" of the firm, as well as its role in being simultaneously anchored in, for example, corporate legislation and regulatory practices on the national, regional (i.e., within the European Union) and transnational levels, while at the same time being granted the right to operate with significant degrees of freedom within this legal-regulatory model. Seen in this view, the embedded autonomy of the corporation represents a theoretical view of the corporation that complements the market-based image of the corporation in economic theory. When advocating the institutional theory model, three forms of embedded autonomy are examined. First, the corporation is enacted as a legal entity sui juris—as a freestanding "legal person" in corporate law and within the regulatory framework that serves to enforce legislation in everyday life settings. Second, the corporation is embedded within what social theorists refer to as moral economies, the norms and values that regulate what are the socially acceptable and legitimate means for conducting business. Third and finally, the corporation is embedded in governance, a relatively complex economic concept that denotes legal and regulatory control on the societal and economic system levels, and on the level of the individual corporation. By combining the three forms of embeddedness, sanctioned by law, norms, and governance, the embedded autonomy of the firm is secured on the basis of a variety of social practices and resources. This book brings together a diverse literature including management studies, economic sociology, legal theory, finance theory, and mainstream economic theory to advance the argument that the corporation is best understood as what is embedded in a social and economic context, yet best serving its defined and stipulated ends by assuming considerable degrees of freedom to operate in isolation from various stakeholders. It will be of relevance for a variety of readers, including graduate students, management scholars, policy-makers, and management consultants interested in organization theory and management studies.

Part of "Advances in International Management" series, this title presents contemporary research by leading and emerging scholars working on institutional theory. It also presents theoretical frameworks of institutions and proposes interesting ideas that provide the foundation for doctoral dissertations and research projects.

Traditonal western forms of corporate organization have been called into question by the success of Japanese keiretsu. Firms, Markets and Economic Change draws on industrial economics, business strategy, and economic history to develop an evolutionary model to show when innovation is best undertaken. The authors argue that innovation is a complex p

This unique Handbook explores both the economics of the firm and the theory of the firm, two areas which are traditionally treated separately in the literature. On the one hand, the former refers to the structure, organization and boundaries of the firm, while the latter is devoted to the analysis of behaviours and strategies in particular market contexts. the novel concept underpinning this authoritative volume is that these two areas closely interact, and that a framework must be articulated in order to illustrate how linkages can be created. This interpretative framework is comprehensively developed in the editors' introduction, and the expert contributors – more than fifty academics of renowned authority – further elaborate on the linkages in the seven comprehensive sections that follow, encompassing: background; equilibrium and new institutional theories; the multinational firm; dynamic approaches to the firm; modern issues; firms' strategies; and economic policy and the firm. Bridging economics and theory of the firm, and providing both technical and institutional perspectives on real corporations, this path-breaking Handbook will prove an invaluable resource for academics, researchers and students in the fields of economics, heterodox economics, business and management, and industrial organization.

The Theory of the Firm presents an innovative general analysis of the economics of the firm.

The nine contributions in this volume attempt to demonstrate the applications of institutional theory to business history and show how the wider study of the institutional environment is inseparable from the study of business. Contributions include an evaluation of community structure and competitive advantage within the Yorkshire woolen industry; a comparative view of financial reconstruction and industrial reorganization in British and Swedish institutions during the Inter-War period; and post- war strategic capitalism in Norway. Paper edition (unseen), $19.50. Distributed by ISBS. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

This second edition assesses some of the major refinements, extensions, and useful applications that have developed in neoinstitutionalist thought in recent years. More attention is given to the overlap between the New Institutional Economics and developments in economic history and political science. In addition to updated references, new material includes analysis of parallel developments in the field of economic sociology and its attacks on representatives of the NIE as well as an explanation of the institution-as-an-equilibrium-of-game approach. Already an international best seller, Institutions and Economic Theory is essential reading for economists and students attracted to the NIE approach. Scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance. A useful glossary for students is included. Eirik Furubotn is Honorary Professor of Economics, Co-Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany and Research Fellow, Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University. Rudolph Richter is Professor Emeritus of Economics and Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany.

This collection examines the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth. Corporations vest control rights in shareholders, the author argues, because they are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incentives to maximize corporate value. Assigning control to any other group would be tantamount to allowing that group to play poker with someone else's money, and would create inefficiencies. The implicit denial of this proposition is the fallacy of the so-called stakeholder theory of the corporation, which argues that corporations should be run in the interests of all stakeholders. This theory offers no account of how conflicts between different stakeholders are to be resolved, and gives managers no principle on which to base decisions, except to follow their own preferences. In practice, shareholders delegate their control rights to a board of directors, who hire, fire, and set the compensation of the chief officers of the firm. However, because agents have different incentives than the principals they represent, they can destroy corporate value unless closely monitored. This happened in the 1960s and led to hostile takeovers in the market for corporate control in the 1970s and 1980s. The author argues that the takeover movement generated increases in corporate efficiency that exceeded $1.5 trillion and helped to lay the foundation for the great economic boom of the 1990s.