The Interpretation And Application Of Statutes

This book offers readers concise and user-friendly tools to help articulate the most powerful arguments to identify the legislative intent found in the statute. It provides: examples and illustrations from across Canada's federal and provincial jurisdictions; detailed analysis of the key judicial decisions and a table of cases that practitioners in particular will find extremely valuable, as well as a reproduction of both the Interpretation Act (Canada) and Interpretation Act (Quebec).

This work discusses the constitutional foundations that govern the relations between the legislature and the courts and the issues of separation of powers with respect to statutes. Concepts of legislative meaning, intent, purpose, and context are described in detail.

"The modern principle is the official approach to statutory interpretation in Canada and is the foundation for the structure of this text. The modern principle focuses on the language of a statutory provision in light of its purpose, intent and context, and Hutchison devotes separate chapters to each of these aspects of statutory interpretation. The Fundamentals of Statutory Interpretation also critiques the various facets of the modern principle with a view to help identify more convincing interpretations of legislative intent. In addition, it tackles complicated issues concerning both the temporal application of statutes, such as retroactivity and retrospectivity, and when legislation may interfere with "vested rights.""--Publisher's website.

Combining pragmatics, dialectics, analytics, and legal theory, this work translates interpretative canons into patterns of natural argument.

Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation analyzes statutory and common law interpretation, suggesting that multiple factors are important for each, and that the relation between them influences both. The book argues against any simple "textualism," claiming that even reader understanding of statutes depends partly on perceived intent. In respect to common law interpretation, use of reasoning by analogy is defended and any simple dichotomy of "holding" and "dictum" is resisted.