The Logic Of Accidental Nuclear War

The end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union has not eliminated the threat posed to international security by nuclear weapons. The Soviet breakup actually created a new set of dangers: the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and the illicit transfer of nuclear warheads, technology, or expertise to the Third World. The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War analyzes the danger of nuclear inadvertence lurking in the command and control systems of the nuclear superpowers. Foreign policy expert Bruce G. Blair identifies the cold war roots of the contemporary risks and outlines a comprehensive policy agenda to strengthen control over nuclear forces. Based on discussions with numerous U.S. and Russian experts, including Russian launch officers who served in the strategic rocket forces and ballistic missile submarines, this book reveals a wealth of new facts about the hidden history of U.S. and Soviet nuclear crisis alerts and exercises. It is a richly detailed, rigorous, and authoritative account of nuclear operations and overturns much conventional wisdom on the subject.

Since the dramatic end of the Pacific War in 1945 the threat of nuclear war has exercised the minds of many. Initial fears concerned the risk that a political crisis between the Superpowers would escalate through miltary confrontation into a 'calculated' nuclear war. Another scenario pictured a new Hitler commanding a nuclear-capable state prepared to use such weapons 'irrationally', possibly sparking a 'catalytic' nuclear war between the major Powers. More recently attention has shifted towards the risk of the 'accidental' release of nuclear weapons. While the risk of intentional conflict between the major Powers has lessened, the arsenals have only been marginally reduced, leaving the possibility of accidental release as perhaps the most threatening case. Inadvertent Nuclear War presents the risk in terms of the reliability and instability of the human and technical systems governing release, with contributions ranging from the engineering of computer software to the psychology of the chain of command. As Dr Wiberg states in his introduction, "No known technical construction, human being or social organization is absolutely failsafe."

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence.

Bruce Blair examines operational safety hazards for nuclear forces deployed on combat alert in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere. He provides new information on command and control procedures and deficiencies that affect the risks of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, particularly those in the former Soviet Union. Blair proposes changes in nuclear operations that would reduce these risks. Remedies range from eliminating targets from missiles to taking all nuclear forces off alert ("zero alert") so that no weapons are poised for immediate launch. In the "zero alert" scenario, missiles and bombers lack nuclear warheads or other vital components and require extensive preparations for redeployment. Blair assesses the effects of such measures on strategic deterrence and crisis stability in the event of a revival of nuclear confrontation between the United States and Russia. He also describes the burdens of verification that his remedies impose. This book is the first in a series devoted to aspects of operational safety and nuclear weapons. Other topics in the series include joint U.S.-Russian missile attack early warning, ensuring the security of dismantled warheads and bomb materials, and command-control problems in the emerging nuclear states.

The book brings together cutting-edge scholarship from the United States and Europe to address political and cultural responses to the arms race of the 1980s.

This book constitutes the Proceedings of a meeting held in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 18-20 July 1989, which was the eighteenth in a series of Workshops on Nuclear Forces held in the framework of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. This particular series of Workshops was initiated in January 1980, that is, immediately after the NATO double-track decision of December 1979 that in the short run led to the deployment in Europe of new US nuclear-armed missiles – ground launched cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles (Pershing II) – but that was also instrumental in setting into motion the process that led to the total elimination of all US and Soviet ground-based missiles having ranges from 500 to 5500km.