The Myth Of Mob Rule

Scholars and lay persons alike routinely express concern about the capacity of democratic publics to respond rationally to emotionally charged issues such as crime, particularly when race and class biases are invoked. This is especially true in the United States, which has the highest imprisonment rate in the developed world, the result, many argue, of too many opportunities for elected officials to be highly responsive to public opinion. Limiting the power of democratic publics, in this view, is an essential component of modern governance precisely because of the risk that broad democratic participation can encourage impulsive, irrational and even murderous demands. These claims about panic-prone mass publics--about the dangers of 'mob rule'--are widespread and are the central focus of Lisa L. Miller's The Myth of Mob Rule. Are democratic majorities easily drawn to crime as a political issue, even when risk of violence is low? Do they support 'rational alternatives' to wholly repressive practices, or are they essentially the bellua multorum capitum, the "many-headed beast," winnowing problems of crime and violence down to inexorably harsh retributive justice? Drawing on a comparative case study of three countries--the U.S., the U.K. and the Netherlands--The Myth of Mob Rule explores when and with what consequences crime becomes a politically salient issue. Using extensive data from multiple sources, the analyses reverses many of the accepted causal claims in the literature and finds that: serious violence is an important underlying condition for sustained public and political attention to crime; the United States has high levels of both crime and punishment in part because it has failed, in racially stratified ways, to produce fundamental collective goods that insulate modern democratic citizens from risk of violence, a consequence of a democratic deficit, not a democratic surplus; and finally, countries with multi-party parliamentary systems are more responsive to mass publics than the U.S. on crime and that such responsiveness promotes protection from a range of social risks, including from excessive violence and state repression.

Scholars and lay persons alike routinely express concern about the capacity of democratic publics to respond rationally to emotionally charged issues such as crime, particularly when race and class biases are invoked. This is especially true in the United States, which has the highest imprisonment rate in the developed world, the result, many argue, of too many opportunities for elected officials to be highly responsive to public opinion. Limiting the power of democratic publics, in this view, is an essential component of modern governance precisely because of the risk that broad democratic participation can encourage impulsive, irrational and even murderous demands. These claims about panic-prone mass publics--about the dangers of 'mob rule'--are widespread and are the central focus of Lisa L. Miller's The Myth of Mob Rule. Are democratic majorities easily drawn to crime as a political issue, even when risk of violence is low? Do they support 'rational alternatives' to wholly repressive practices, or are they essentially the bellua multorum capitum, the "many-headed beast," winnowing problems of crime and violence down to inexorably harsh retributive justice? Drawing on a comparative case study of three countries--the U.S., the U.K. and the Netherlands--The Myth of Mob Rule explores when and with what consequences crime becomes a politically salient issue. Using extensive data from multiple sources, the analyses reverses many of the accepted causal claims in the literature and finds that: serious violence is an important underlying condition for sustained public and political attention to crime; the United States has high levels of both crime and punishment in part because it has failed, in racially stratified ways, to produce fundamental collective goods that insulate modern democratic citizens from risk of violence, a consequence of a democratic deficit, not a democratic surplus; and finally, countries with multi-party parliamentary systems are more responsive to mass publics than the U.S. on crime and that such responsiveness promotes protection from a range of social risks, including from excessive violence and state repression.

Drawing on a comparative analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, this book explores when and with what consequences crime becomes a politically salient issue. Reversing much of the conventional wisdom, the analysis finds that serious violence and public and political attention to it are highly correlated and that the United States has high levels of both crime and punishment, in part, because it suffers from a democratic deficit, rather than a surplus, in the production of fundamental collective goods, including risk of violence.

The average Mafia don knows more about effective leadership than a trunkful of Fortune 500 CEOs. For all the mob's well-deserved reputation for violence and immorality, its most successful members have always been remarkably astute businessmen. Former mobster Louis Ferrante reveals their surprisingly effective management techniques and explains how to apply them in any legitimate business.As an associate of the Gambino Family, Ferrante pulled off some of the biggest heists in U.S. history before the age of twenty-one, netting millions of dollars. His natural talent for management led bosses like John Gotti to rely on him. Now he offers time-tested Mafia wisdom, such as:* Three can keep a secret (if two are dead): Build trust with your colleagues.* You don't always need a gun to hit a target: Lead people without force.* It's never personal: When circumstances demand it, never hesitate to pull the trigger.Ferrante brings his real-life experience to the book, offering fascinating insights into Mafia behavior and sharing behind-the-scenes episodes almost as outrageous as those occurring on Wall Street every day.Louis Ferrante is a former Mafia associate and heist expert who served eight and a half years in prison after refusing to incriminate members of the Gambino family. He now lectures around the country to at-risk teens and other groups, and hosts an American TV series called Inside the Gangsters' Code.

An often-amusing look at often-confusing national issues and at the grand game of politics, blending history, common sense, and controversy in a thought-provoking, convention-challenging analysis for ordinary Americans.

Ending Mass Incarceration explores why mass incarceration is a failed public safety strategy and what should be done to bring about truly transformative change. Although policymakers on both the left and right now recognize mass incarceration as a problem rather than a solution, and many states have taken steps to reduce prison populations, the criminal legal response to crime is harsher than ever. This book identifies three key dynamics that are bolsteringmass incarceration. It also identifies three broad changes that would limit the power and reach of the criminal legal system while also addressing the social problems to which it is a misguided response.

The United States incarcerates more people per capita than any other industrialized nation in the world—about 1 in 100 adults, or more than 2 million people—while national spending on prisons has catapulted 400 percent. Given the vast racial disparities in incarceration, the prison system also reinforces race and class divisions. How and why did we become the world’s leading jailer? And what can we, as a society, do about it? Reframing the story of mass incarceration, Heather Schoenfeld illustrates how the unfinished task of full equality for African Americans led to a series of policy choices that expanded the government’s power to punish, even as they were designed to protect individuals from arbitrary state violence. Examining civil rights protests, prison condition lawsuits, sentencing reforms, the War on Drugs, and the rise of conservative Tea Party politics, Schoenfeld explains why politicians veered from skepticism of prisons to an embrace of incarceration as the appropriate response to crime. To reduce the number of people behind bars, Schoenfeld argues that we must transform the political incentives for imprisonment and develop a new ideological basis for punishment.

For over thirty years, Hegel scholars have known that many of the views of Hegel rife in the Anglo-Saxon world are higly inaccurate. The essays collected in this volume show the myths and legends to be just that. The author has selected a set of essays that treat and effectively debunk the various Hegel myths and legends. Divided into sections addressing the various myths and augmented by Stewart's informative introduction and a bibliography, this collection should be of interest to scholars and nonspecialists alike.