The Papers Of Henry Laurens March 16 1778 July 6 1778

This biography attempts to set the record straight for a misunderstood military figure from the American Revolution. Historians and biographers of Charles Lee have treated him as either an enemy of George Washington or a defender of American liberty. Neither approach is accurate; objectivity is required to fully understand the war’s most complicated general. In George Washington’s Nemesis, author Christian McBurney uses original documents (some newly discovered) to combine two dramatic stories to create one balanced view of one of the Revolutionary War’s most fascinating personalities. General Lee, second in command in the Continental Army led by George Washington, was captured by the British in December, 1776. While imprisoned, he gave his captors a plan on how to defeat Washington’s army as quickly as possible. This extraordinary act of treason was not discovered during his lifetime. Less well known is that throughout his sixteen months of captivity and even after his release, Lee continued communicating with the enemy, offering to help negotiate an end to the rebellion. After Lee rejoined the Continental Army, he was given command of many of its best troops together with orders from Washington to attack British general Henry Clinton’s column near Monmouth, New Jersey. But things did not go as planned for Lee, leading to his court-martial for not attacking and for retreating in the face of the enemy. McBruney argues the evidence clearly shows Lee was unfairly convicted and had, in fact, done something beneficial. But Lee had insulted Washington, which made the matter a political contest between the army’s two top generals—only one of whom could prevail.

When the Revolutionary War began, Congress established a national army and appointed George Washington its commander in chief. Congress then took it upon itself to choose numerous subordinate generals to lead the army’s various departments, divisions, and brigades. How this worked out in the end is well known. Less familiar, however, is how well Congress’s choices worked out along the way. Although historians have examined many of Washington’s subordinates, Washington’s Revolutionary War Generals is the first book to look at these men in a collective, integrated manner. A thoroughgoing study of the Revolutionary War careers of the Continental Army’s generals—their experience, performance, and relationships with Washington and the Continental Congress—this book provides an overview of the politics of command, both within and outside the army, and a unique perspective on how it affected Washington’s prosecution of the war. It is impossible to understand the outcome of the War for Independence without first examining America’s military leadership, author Stephen R. Taaffe contends. His description of Washington’s generals—who they were, how they received their commissions, and how they performed—goes a long way toward explaining how these American officers, who were short on experience and military genius, prevailed over their professional British counterparts. Following these men through the war’s most important battles and campaigns as well as its biggest controversies, such as the Conway Cabal and the Newburgh Conspiracy, Taaffe weaves a narrative in the grand tradition of military history. Against this backdrop, his depiction of the complexities and particulars of character and politics of military command provides a new understanding of George Washington, the War for Independence, and the U.S. military’s earliest beginnings. A unique combination of biography and institutional history shot through with political analysis, this book is a thoughtful, deeply researched, and an eminently readable contribution to the literature of the Revolution.

This study explores the lives of Southern whites, Blacks, and Native Americans who stood with the British during the American Revolution. Challenging the traditional view that British efforts in the south were undermined by a lack of local support, Jim Piecuch demonstrates the breadth of loyal assistance provided by these three groups in South Carolina, Georgia, and East and West Florida. Piecuch shows that the Crown’s southern campaign failed due to the revolutionary force’s violent suppression of these Loyalists and Britain’s inability to capitalize on their support. Covering the period from 1775 to 1782, Piecuch surveys the roles of Loyalists, Indians, and slaves across the southernmost colonies to illustrate the investments each had in allying with the British and the high price they paid during and after the war. Piecuch investigates each group, making new discoveries in the histories of escaped or liberated slaves, of still-powerful Indian tribes, and of the bitter legacies of white loyalism. He then employs an integrated approach that advances our understanding of Britain’s long hold on the South and the hardships experienced by those groups who were in varying degrees abandoned by the Crown in defeat.