The Political Economy Of Monetary Solidarity

Creating the European monetary union between diverse and unequal nation states is arguably one of the biggest social experiments in history. This book offers an explanation of how the euro experiment came about and was sustained despite a severe crisis, and provides a comparison with the monetary-financial history of the US. The euro experiment can be understood as risk-sharing through a currency that is issued by a supranational central bank. A single currency shares liquidity risks by creating larger markets for all financial assets. A single monetary policy responds to business cycles in the currency area as a whole rather than managing the path of one dominant economy. Mechanisms of risk-sharing become institutions of monetary solidarity if they are consciously maintained, but they will periodically face opposition in member states. This book argues that diversity of membership is not an economic obstacle to the success of the euro, as diversity increases the potential gains from risk sharing. But political cooperation is needed to realize this potential, and such cooperation is up against collective action problems which become more intractable as the parties become more diverse. Hence, risk-sharing usually comes about as a collective by-product of national incentives. This political-economic tension can explain why the gains from risk-sharing are not more fully exploited, both in the euro area and in the US dollar area. This approach to monetary integration is based on the theory of collective action when hierarchy is not available as a solution to inter-state cooperation. The theory originates with Keohane and Ostrom (1995) and it is applied in this book, taking into account the latest research on the inherent instability of financial market integration.

This collection brings together both classic articles which have laid the foundations for the theory of optimum currency and the resulting empirical literature. Articles are presented in sections on the theory of optimum currency areas, empirical analysis of optimum currency areas, fiscal policies in a monetary union, the central bank in a monetary union, and issues of transition to monetary union. Most articles were originally published in the 1990s. The editor teaches international economics at the University of Leuven, Belgium. c. Book News Inc.

The currency question, Disreali is reported to have said, has made even more persons mad than love. A quantitative test of the accuracy of this comparison is, in the present deplorable state of medical statistics, scarcely possible, But Disraeli may well have been right.

Assessments of the politics of European integration in general, and monetary union in particular, are many. In fact, the study of the European Union has become an academic growth industry. This book contributes to the debate a specific theoretical focus and practical perspective. The volume provides a critique of the political economy of European integration and its unique focus and scholarly analysis make it an indispensable contribution to a renewal of the Marxist critique of European integration.

Central banks are among the most powerful government economic institutions in the world. This volume explores the economic and political contours of the struggle for influence over the policies of central banks such as the Federal Reserve, and the implications of this struggle for economic performance and the distribution of wealth and power in society.

Traces the history of European monetary negotiations from the 1960s to the 1990s.