The Political Economy Of Trust

Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about trust's relationship to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - and in particular informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, and in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, one in Emilia Romagna, Italy, and the other in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust too among Sicilian Mafiosi.

Trust has been the subject of empirical and theoretical inquiry in a range of disciplines, including sociology, economics, psychology, philosophy, public policy and political theory. The book approaches trust from a multi-disciplinary scope of inquiry. It explains why most existing definitions and theories of trust are inadequate. The book examines how trust evolved from a quality of personal relationships into a critical factor in political institutions and representation, and to an abstract and impersonal factor that applies now to complex systems, including monetary systems. It makes a distinctive contribution by recasting trust conceptually in dialectical and pragmatic terms, and reapplying the concept to our understanding of critical issues in politics and political economy.

A lot of recent attention has been given to one of the central paradoxes of trust: namely how people can restrict self-interest in order to trust. Existing perspectives, theories, and models offer partial explanations, but this volume presents a novel framework that expands on the findings of recent studies of trust and exchange. This book offers a new angle for the understanding of exchange and trust in an interactive context, describes the interactive characteristics of trust in exchange systems, and develops a theory explaining the co-evolution of trust and exchange systems. A new framework is used to incorporate the theory of systems of trust and evolutionary game-theoretical approach to investigate four important questions: How can trust emerge in exchange when people pursue self-interest? After its emergence, how does exchange affect trust in a dynamic process? When are dynamics of trust stable? Do interactive trust phenomena differ under different exchange systems? This book concludes with a discussion of the implications of the theoretical findings for three areas: the improvement of trust, potential economic growth, and mechanism design in exchange systems. This volume makes a significant contribution to the literature on evolutionary and institutional economics and is suitable for those who have an interest in political economy, economy theory and philosophy as well as economic psychology.

Emphasizes how trust can turn a coercive tax state into a modern, legitimate one. This title is also available as Open Access.

Trust is the foundation for strong working relationships, but the way people from different cultures search for and decide to trust varies. Searching for Trust in the Global Economy describes these cultural differences from the perspective of 82 managers from 33 different countries in four regions of the world. It addresses the current global business climate with insights from managers describing how the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the process of searching for and deciding to trust new business partners. Jeanne M. Brett and Tyree D. Mitchell propose a simple framework that explains the cultural differences in deciding to trust new business partners. They suggest that the key to understanding cultural differences in the process lies in the interplay between cultural levels of trust and "tightness-looseness," or the degree to which a culture strongly enforces its norms. They explain how searching for and deciding to trust is different in the high-trust, loose cultures of the West, the high-trust, tight cultures in East Asia, the low-trust, tight cultures in the Middle East/South Asia, and the low-trust, loose cultures in Latin America. Searching for Trust in the Global Economy is based on managers’ experiences building new business relationships around the world, but its practical advice for searching for and deciding to trust is useful not only for business leaders but also for government, not-for-profit, and other leaders who are responsible for building new relationships in the global economy.

This volume explores the foundations of trust, and whether social and political trust have common roots. Contributions by noted scholars examine how we measure trust, the cultural and social psychological roots of trust, the foundations of political trust, and how trust concerns the law, the economy, elections, international relations, corruption, and cooperation, among myriad societal factors. The rich assortment of essays on these themes addresses questions such as: How does national identity shape trust, and how does trust form in developing countries and in new democracies? Are minority groups less trusting than the dominant group in a society? Do immigrants adapt to the trust levels of their host countries? Does group interaction build trust? Does the welfare state promote trust and, in turn, does trust lead to greater well-being and to better health outcomes? The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust considers these and other questions of critical importance for current scholarly investigations of trust.

This book presents the evolution of the international monetary system from the gold standard to the monetary system in force today. It adopts a political economy approach, emphasizing the economic and political conditions under which an international monetary system can come into existence and be maintained over time. This approach highlights how the gradual transition in the international context from commodity money to fiat money has been led by the need for greater elasticity of money supply and smooth adjustments. This transition, however, raises the issue of how to guarantee, over time, the value of a money devoid of intrinsic value. By presenting a historical evolution, the book explains how the existence of an international monetary system based on money without intrinsic value can only occur when a particular balance of power exists at the international level that allows for the production of trust in a fiat money. The book is a must-read for scholars, researchers, and students in the fields of economic history and international monetary economics, interested in better understanding the evolution of the international monetary system.