The Russia Sanctions

The first in-depth scholarly analysis of the effects of Western sanctions, and Russia's response on the Russian economy.

Nations and international organizations are increasingly using sanctions as a means to achieve their foreign policy aims. However, sanctions are ineffective if they are executed without a clear strategy responsive to the nature and changing behavior of the target. In The Art of Sanctions, Richard Nephew offers a much-needed practical framework for planning and applying sanctions that focuses not just on the initial sanctions strategy but also, crucially, on how to calibrate along the way and how to decide when sanctions have achieved maximum effectiveness. Nephew—a leader in the design and implementation of sanctions on Iran—develops guidelines for interpreting targets’ responses to sanctions based on two critical factors: pain and resolve. The efficacy of sanctions lies in the application of pain against a target, but targets may have significant resolve to resist, tolerate, or overcome this pain. Understanding the interplay of pain and resolve is central to using sanctions both successfully and humanely. With attention to these two key variables, and to how they change over the course of a sanctions regime, policy makers can pinpoint when diplomatic intervention is likely to succeed or when escalation is necessary. Focusing on lessons learned from sanctions on both Iran and Iraq, Nephew provides policymakers with practical guidance on how to measure and respond to pain and resolve in the service of strong and successful sanctions regimes.

In The Russia Sanctions, Christine Abely examines the international trade measures and sanctions deployed against Russia in response to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abely situates contemporary sanctions within their larger historical and economic backgrounds and provides a uniquely accessible analysis of the historic export controls and import restrictions enacted since 2022. She argues that these sanctions have affected, and will continue to affect, global trading patterns, financial integration, and foreign policy in novel ways. In particular, she examines the effects of sanctions on energy, food, fertilizer, the financial system, and the global use of the US dollar, including trends of de-dollarization. Coverage includes sanctions against oligarchs, the freezing and seizure of assets, and steps taken to make sanctions more effective by promoting financial transparency worldwide.

Tracing the history of economic sanctions from the blockades of World War I to the policing of colonial empires and the interwar confrontation with fascism, Nicholas Mulder combines political, economic, legal, and military history to reveal how a coercive wartime tool was adopted as an instrument of peacekeeping by the League of Nations.This timely study casts an overdue light on why sanctions are widely considered a form of war, and why their unintended consequences are so tremendous.

This book is required reading to grasp the dynamics of economic sanctions. Drawing on recent Western sanctions imposed on the Russian economy, it provides a persuasive corrective to the dominant perspective that sanctions undermine target countries. -Immanuel Ness, Chairperson and Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College, NY. This is an outstanding contribution to the literature. It provides a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the role of sanctions in the contemporary era. -Alan W. Cafruny, Henry Bristol Professor of International Affairs, Department of Government, Hamilton College, USA. This important study shows how Russia has survived being the most sanctioned country in the world by reorienting its trade towards the East and creating import-substitution policies and investment in local industries. -Jeremy Kuzmarov, author of The Russians are Coming, Again: The First Cold War as Tragedy, the Second as Farce. A timely contribution to the growing sanctions literature that urges policy adjustment to new geopolitical realities. -Dr. Ksenia Kirkham, Lecturer in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. This book analyses the goals of Western sanctions imposed on Russia from 2014 to 2023. It explores the effects of sanctions on the Russian economy and its political course, as well as the repercussions of the sanctions to the senders and third parties, including spillover effects on neighboring countries and boomerang effects on the senders. While sanctions can be considered relatively effective in terms of economic consequences, the Russian economy is far from being crushed. Importantly, sanctions proved to be ineffective as an instrument of foreign policy. They have failed to alter Moscow's resolve to continue its military operation and are unlikely to change it in the near future. Dr. Angela Borozna is Adjunct Professor at California State University, Fullerton. Dr. Lada V. Kochtcheeva is Professor of Political Science in the School of Public and International Affairs at the North Carolina State University.

This report studies the impact of Western sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 over the crisis in Ukraine. Providing a European point of view, the report also makes recommendations as to how sanctions could be used effectively and efficiently to produce a diplomatic settlement of the crisis.

For a year and a half, Russia has been living under sanctions. The restrictive measures were imposed as a response to its continued violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. The sanctions were crafted by an informal coalition of states politically and economically representing the West. Despite the Western nature of the sanctions, Russian and non-Russian companies (including Chinese) involved in Western markets tacitly respected the sanctions as well. Although the sanctions were designed to have a cumulative effect in the mid to long term, they still have taken a heavy toll on Russia in the short term. As part of Russia's adaptation to the sanctions regime, the country's governing elites embarked on both an open and covert campaign to undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions, prevent new restrictions by the West, and remove ones already in place. To support the economy and its defence projects, Russia pushed for import substitution programmes, which face an uncertain investment climate, a shortage of qualified workforce, a lack of private investment capital and knowhow. As the West ruled out "lethal protection" of Ukraine, the sanctions came to represent an efficient, low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and constrain Russia's power. The sanctions will remain an important element of Western strategy towards Russia. However, sanctions are not a universal answer and should be supported by other tools. As this report suggests, a creative approach to reach out to the Russian population, which is misinformed about the West and kept in the dark about the country's domestic problems, should be part of Western strategy on Russia. Certainly, the door for engagement with Russia should remain open, too. But, this engagement should be a principled one so that the threshold for spheres-of-influence deals is hermetically closed.

Sanctions are considered by many to be a central element of U.S. policy to counter Russian malign behavior. Most Russia-related sanctions have been in response to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to human rights abuses, election interference and cyberattacks, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, support to Syria, and use of a chemical weapon. The United States also employs sanctions to deter further objectionable activities. Most Members of Congress support a robust use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia's international behavior and geostrategic intentions. Ukraine-related sanctions are mainly based on four executive orders (EOs) the President introduced in 2014. In addition, Congress passed and the President signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272). In 2017, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II). This legislation codifies Ukraine-related and cyberrelated EOs, strengthens existing Russia-related sanctions authorities, and identifies several new targets for sanctions. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. Additional sanctions on Russia may be forthcoming. On August 6, 2018, the United States determined that in March 2018 the Russian government used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in contravention of international law. In response, the United States launched an initial round of sanctions on Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; P.L. 102-182, Title III). The law requires a second, more severe round of sanctions in the absence of Russia's reliable commitment to no longer use such weapons. The United States has imposed most Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in coordination with the European Union (EU). Since 2017, the efforts of Congress and the Trump Administration to tighten U.S. sanctions on Russia have prompted some degree of concern in the EU about U.S. commitment to sanctions coordination and U.S.-EU cooperation on Russia and Ukraine more broadly. The EU, in addition, continues to consider its response to Russia's use of a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom. Debates about the effectiveness of U.S. and other sanctions on Russia continue in Congress, in the Administration, and among other stakeholders. Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. With respect to other malign activities, the relationship between sanctions and Russian behavior is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, many observers argue that sanctions help to restrain Russia or that their imposition is an appropriate foreign policy response regardless of immediate effect. In the 115th Congress, several bills have been introduced to increase the use of sanctions in response to Russia's malign activities. The 116th Congress is likely to continue to debate the role of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.