The Russian Officer Corps In The Revolutionary And Napoleonic Wars

Presented here for the first time in this important and ground breaking work are more than 600 detailed biographies of the senior Russian officers who commanded troops in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

The Russian Officer Corps of The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1795–1815 features more than 800 detailed biographies of the commanders of that era. Foreword by Professor Donald H. Horward, Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution, Florida State University Based upon years of research in Russian archives, historian Alexander Mikaberidze’s biographies include the subject’s place of birth, family history, educational background, a detailed description of his military service, his awards and promotions, wounds, transfers, commands, and other related information, including the date and place of his death and internment, if known. In addition, an introductory chapter presents in meticulous detail the organization of the Russian military, how it was trained, the educational and cultural background of the officer corps, its awards and their history and meaning, and much more. This outstanding overview is supported and enhanced by three dozen charts, tables, and graphics that illustrate the rich history of the Russian officer corps. This study also includes an annotated bibliography to help guide students of the period through the available Russian sources. Stunning in its scope and depth of coverage, The Russian Officer Corps is essential reading for historians, scholars, genealogists, hobbyists, war gamers, and anyone working or studying late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century European history. Every student of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, as well as every academic library, will find this impressive reference work of this momentous period of history absolutely indispensable.

The full story of Napoleon’s legendary escape from Russia under seemingly impossible odds is recounted in this thrillingly vivid military history. In the winter of 1812, Napoleon's army retreated from Moscow under appalling conditions, hunted by three separate Russian armies. By late November, Napoleon had reached the banks of the River Berezina—the last natural obstacle between his army and the safety of the Polish frontier. But instead of finding the river frozen solid enough to march his men across, an unseasonable thaw had turned the Berezina into an icy torrent. Having already ordered the burning of his bridging equipment, Napoleon's predicament was serious enough: but with the army of Admiral Chichagov holding the opposite bank, and those of Kutusov and Wittgenstein closing fast, it was critical. In a gripping narrative that draws on contemporary sources—including letters, diaries and memoirs—Alexander Mikaberidze describes how Napoleon rose from the pit of despair to execute one of the greatest escapes in military history.

With the invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s Russia seems to have stepped out of time, reverting to an imperial era of conquest and expansion. But as Roger Reese points out in this comprehensive new history, Russia’s way of war has changed little from one century to the next, one regime to another, from the army of the tsar to the army of today. Russia’s Army reveals how the Imperial Russian Army and its successors, the Soviet Army and the army of the Russian Federation, confronted the state’s foreign policy challenges—projecting power and defending the empire—and the domestic challenge of containing internal unrest generated by nationalism, competing ethnic and religious identities, and political discontent. These twin challenges, in turn, drove defense policy and the planning and conduct of war. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the development of the army was driven by shifts in the European balance of power and changes in global diplomacy, politics, economics, and society. Reese identifies themes that weave their way through this military history: the adoption of a strategy to maintain a defensive posture in the West, an offensive strategy in the Balkans, and an expansionist policy in the East; maintenance of a large standing army; and a consistent unease about the army’s and non-Russian minorities’ loyalty to the state. These themes, he shows, have emerged in times of peace and war, as heads of state have made operational and strategic military decisions while managing civil-military relations—from the times of tsarist Russia through the collapse of the Soviet empire, when Putin sought to restore authoritarian rule and hegemony over the former Soviet states of the USSR. A comprehensive account of the history of the Russian army from 1801 to 2022, Reese’s is the first book to link Russian military history across three distinct eras and to situate this history within the context of military strategy and doctrine, as reflected in specific campaigns, issues of manning and maintaining an army, and relations between army and society, at home and in the “near abroad.”

Some 12 years ago it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. Therefore, it might be reasonably argued that there is little room for another volume. Nonetheless, this vast outpouring of literature has usually dealt with major leaders, specific battles or campaigns, and with certain branches of the service. Moreover, at least in English, the literature tends to concentrate primarily on the French or British armies. There appears to be a lack of works combining a description of the major changes and trends in the art of war, especially at the cutting edge of events, with a discussion of the French military establishment and the armies of the major opponents, British as well as continental. And while this book is only a brief survey, I do believe that it may serve as a contribution towards filling this gap in our historical knowledge of military institutions and fighting men.

A military history and reassessment of Napoleon's Russian campaign.

This book recounts the development of a standing Russian army from the END of the 16th century to the million strong force that resisted Napoleon. The Russians were heavily defeated at the battle of Austerliz but in the Armistice period that followed the Russians regrouped and several improvements were made. In1812 when Napoleon invaded this new army was protected at the cost of Moscow . The Russians faced Napoleon for the last time at the Battle of Leizig where together with their allies they inflicted a severe defeat. These battles are discussed in full and are accompanied by several contemporary illustrations. Eight colour plates accompany the text to show the uniforms and equipment used by the Rusian soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars.

In December 1917, nine months after the disintegration of the Russian monarchy, the army officer corps, one of the dynasty’s prime pillars, finally fell—a collapse that, in light of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, historians often treat as inevitable. The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856–1917 contests this assumption. By expanding our view of the Imperial Russian Army to include the experience of the enlisted ranks, Roger R. Reese reveals that the soldier’s revolt in 1917 was more social revolution than anti-war movement—and a revolution based on social distinctions within the officer corps as well as between the ranks. Reese’s account begins in the aftermath of the Crimean War, when the emancipation of the serfs and consequent introduction of universal military service altered the composition of the officer corps as well as the relationship between officers and soldiers. More catalyst than cause, World War I exacerbated a pervasive discontent among soldiers at their ill treatment by officers, a condition that reached all the way back to the founding of the Russian army by Peter I. It was the officers’ refusal to change their behavior toward the soldiers and each other over a fifty-year period, Reese argues, capped by their attack on the Provisional Government in 1917, that fatally weakened the officer corps in advance of the Bolshevik seizure of power. As he details the evolution of Russian Imperial Army over that period, Reese explains its concrete workings—from the conscription and discipline of soldiers to the recruitment and education of officers to the operation of unit economies, honor courts, and wartime reserves. Marshaling newly available materials, his book corrects distortions in both Soviet and Western views of the events of 1917 and adds welcome nuance and depth to our understanding of a critical turning point in Russian history.