The Soviet Indian Phenomenon

The Soviet Union has invested in India a large volume of material resources and diplomatic energy; the available evidence on the Soviet-Indian relationship in recent years, however, leads to the conclusion that the return of this Soviet investment, in terms of observable political influence, has been small. Since 1967, there appear to have been only three cases in which Moscow was able to cause New Delhi to do something which it would not have done otherwise. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Soviet Union has been rebuffed in its efforts to influence Indian behavior. In some cases there is an evident and mutual disposition to discuss differences in private to limit the impact of disagreements on a relationship both sides value highly. Indian decision makers perceive a well-defined need for Soviet support in both military and economic spheres, but India's growing self-reliance places definite limits on her perceived need of the Soviet Union. For its part, Moscow perceives that the special relationship with India has brought diplomatic and commercial benefits which the Soviets are reluctant to jeopardize. The evolution of Indo-Soviet relations has resulted in a symbiosis, but one in which the balance of dependency has changed dramatically. Developments since 1971 suggest that Soviet importance to India and its ability to influence Indian decisions peaked during the Indo-Pakistan crisis and have subsequently declined, whereas the Indian ability to exert influence in Moscow may be growing.

Understanding the Soviet public's love of Indian popular film

This collection of essays inverts the way we see the Cold War by looking at the conflict from the perspective of the so-called developing world, rather than of the superpowers, through the birth and first decades of India's life as a postcolonial nation. Contributors draw on a wide array of new material, from recently opened archival sources to literature and film, and meld approaches from diplomatic history to development studies to explain the choices India made and to frame decisions by its policy makers. Together, the essays demonstrate how India became a powerful symbol of decolonization and an advocate of non-alignment, disarmament, and global governance as it stood between the United States and the Soviet Union, actively fostering dialogue and attempting to forge friendships without entering into formal alliances. Sweeping in its scope yet nuanced in its analysis, this is the authoritative account of India and the Cold War. Contributors: Priya Chacko, Anton Harder, Syed Akbar Hyder, Raminder Kaur, Rohan Mukherjee, Swapna Kona Nayudu, Pallavi Raghavan, Srinath Raghavan, Rahul Sagar, and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu.

What is the inside behind-the scenes story of Indian Casinos? More money than Las Vegas, more visitors than Disney World, and operating as sovereign nations exempt from all state civil law and many criminal laws; what is the“inside scoop”? This is the only authoritative exploration of these multi-billion dollar enterprises; written by a genuine insider: the casino “guru” who has developed, operated, managed, and marketed Indian casinos all over the country. With unprecedented access to and cooperation from Tribes, the casinos, the staffs, the regulators, the lawyers, and the financers, the author (see “About the Author”) is also an award-winning newspaper journalist with the writing credentials (and chops) to clearly present the subject. With insider information, clear explanations, participation from Tribal officials, and authoritative revelations, the book is presented in story-progression form of how Indian casinos collectively generated more revenue last year than Microsoft and Google combined.

This book is the first critical assessment of the likelihood and implications of such a contract. Linda Cook pursues the idea from Brezhnev's day to our own, and considers the constraining effect it may have had on Gorbachev's attempts to liberalize the Soviet economy.

Papers presented at a two-day interactive dialogue organized by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.