The Supreme Court And The Idea Of Constitutionalism

From Brown v. Board of Education to Roe v. Wade to Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court has, over the past fifty years, assumed an increasingly controversial place in American national political life. As the recurring struggles over nominations to the Court illustrate, few questions today divide our political community more profoundly than those concerning the Court's proper role as protector of liberties and guardian of the Constitution. If the nation is today in the midst of a "culture war," the contest over the Supreme Court is certainly one of its principal battlefields. In this volume, distinguished constitutional scholars aim to move debate beyond the sound bites that divide the opposing parties to more fundamental discussions about the nature of constitutionalism. Toward this end, the volume includes chapters on the philosophical and historical origins of the idea of constitutionalism; on theories of constitutionalism in American history in particular; on the practices of constitutionalism around the globe; and on the parallel emergence of—and the persistent tensions between—constitutionalism and democracy throughout the modern world. In democracies, the primary point of having a constitution is to place some matters beyond politics and partisan contest. And yet it seems equally clear that constitutionalism of this kind results in a struggle over the meaning or proper interpretation of the constitution, a struggle that is itself deeply political. Although the volume represents a variety of viewpoints and approaches, this struggle, which is the central paradox of constitutionalism, is the ultimate theme of all the essays.

In The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy John Agresto traces the development of American judicial power, paying close attention to what he views as the very real threat of judicial supremacy. Agresto examines the role of the judiciary in a democratic society and discusses the proper place of congressional power in constitutional issues. Agresto argues that while the separation of congressional and judicial functions is a fundamental tenet of American government, the present system is not effective in maintaining an appropriate balance of power. He shows that continued judicial expansion, especially into the realm of public policy, might have severe consequences for America's national life and direction, and offers practical recommendations for safeguarding against an increasingly powerful Supreme Court. John Agresto's controversial argument, set in the context of a historical and theoretical inquiry, will be of great interest to scholars and students in political science and law, especially American constitutional law and political theory.

Miller proposes that we focus our energies on the question of how the Constitution is to function in an era of rapid and fundamental social change. He introduces this provocative collection of essays with the observation that American constitutional theory has arrived at a dead-end, largely because it has been perceived as constitutional law rather than a form of political theory. He puts this view into sharp perspective by looking at what are in effect, three constitutions--the political, the economic, and the emergent corporate instrument. He analyzes important issues that confront the Supreme Court, policymakers, and theorists, such as the expansion of government control, the Court as a political mechanism, the power of corporations, politics and the First Amendment, the challenge of nuclear weapons, and questions relating to social justice, including equal protection and the right to employment.

Why do self-proclaimed constitutional “originalists” so regularly reach decisions with a politically conservative valence? Do “living constitutionalists” claim a license to reach whatever results they prefer, without regard to the Constitution’s language and history? In confronting these questions, Richard H. Fallon reframes and ultimately transcends familiar debates about constitutional law, constitutional theory, and judicial legitimacy. Drawing from ideas in legal scholarship, philosophy, and political science, Fallon presents a theory of judicial legitimacy based on an ideal of good faith in constitutional argumentation. Good faith demands that the Justices base their decisions only on legal arguments that they genuinely believe to be valid and are prepared to apply to similar future cases. Originalists are correct about this much. But good faith does not forbid the Justices to refine and adjust their interpretive theories in response to the novel challenges that new cases present. Fallon argues that theories of constitutional interpretation should be works in progress, not rigid formulas laid down in advance of the unforeseeable challenges that life and experience generate. Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court offers theories of constitutional law and judicial legitimacy that accept many tenets of legal realism but reject its corrosive cynicism. Fallon’s account both illuminates current practice and prescribes urgently needed responses to a legitimacy crisis in which the Supreme Court is increasingly enmeshed.

In this collection the authors challenge the "myth of the sacred" - the idea that certain aspects of the constitutional process - judicial political behaviour, interest group politics, and centralization of power - are untouchable politically. They suggest that certain actors and institutions have contributed to a myth about the normative basis of Canadian constitutional politics, a myth perpetuated through the popular media as well as much of the scholarly literature. Such actors often disguise their overtly political behavior with a cloak of impartiality, presenting their actions as furthering the public good and therefore immune to challenge. The Myth of the Sacred seeks to challenge this ideal. At its core this myth embodies the Trudeauian ideal of Canadian society - one that features a constitution that empowers impartial judges at the expense of politically motivated legislators; one that allows each individual to enjoy a uniform range of rights, freedoms, and means of belonging to the larger Canadian society; and one that seeks to ensure the primacy of the national government rather than the provincial. Trudeau called his vision the Just Society. But justice is an illusive and amorphous concept. Defining it, much less institutionalizing it, is fraught with risk. In modern liberal democracies, justice is typically understood as the product of some mix of liberty and equality, process and substance, with the amount of each component varying according to taste. It is not unusual for political actors to seek to institutionalize their own formulas for justice, but it is also not reasonable to expect these formulas to go unchallenged. Such a challenge represents the dominant theme of this volume. Contributors include Donald E. Abelson, Tom Flanagan (University of Calgary), Patrick James, James B. Kelly (Brock University), Michael Lusztig, Christopher P. Manfredi (McGill University), Hudson Meadwell (McGill University), Anthony A. Peacock (Utah State University), Mark Rush (Washington and Lee University), and Shannon I. Smithey (Kent State University).

Examines the distinct difference between how the people and the founding fathers viewed the new Constitution and how it is interpreted over two hundred years later and maintains that originally the people were the ones responsible for seeing that its concepts were properly implemented.

With quiet eloquence, Lane Sunderland argues that we must reclaim the fundamental principles of the Constitution if we are to restore democratic government to its proper role in American life. For far too long, he contends, the popular will has been held in check by an overly powerful Supreme Court using non-constitutional principles to make policy and promote its own political agendas. His work shows why this has diminished American democracy and what we can do to revive it. Sunderland presents a strong, thoughtful challenge to the constitutional theories promoted by Ronald Dworkin, Archibald Cox, Richard Epstein, Michael Perry, John Hart Ely, Robert Bork, Philip Kurland, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Catharine MacKinnon—an enormously diverse group united by an apparent belief in judicial supremacy. Their theories, he demonstrates, undermine the democratic foundations of the Constitution and the power of the majority to resolve for itself important questions of justice. Central to this enterprise is Sunderland's reconsideration of The Federalist as the first, most reliable, and most profound commentary on the Constitution. "The Federalist," he states, "is crucial because it explains the underlying theory of the Constitution as a whole, a theory that gives meaning to its particular provisions." In addition, Sunderland reexamines the Declaration of Independence and the work of Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, in order to better define the nature and limits of their influence on the Framers. His reading of these works in conjunction with The Federalist shows just how far afield contemporary commentators have strayed. Sunderland deliberately echoes and amplifies Madison's wisdom in Federalist No. 10 that the object of the Constitution is "to secure the public good and private rights . . . and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government." To attain that object, he persuasively argues, requires that the judiciary acknowledge and enforce the constitutional limitations upon its own powers. In an era loudly proclaiming the return of popular government, majority rule, and the "will of the people," that argument is especially relevant and appealing.