The United States And Iraq Since 1990

This book offers a concise history of US policy in Iraq since 1990 and how it has evolved over two decades. Examines US relations with Iraq from both a regional and international perspective Argues that the only way to clearly understand US policy toward Iraq is to see it in its proper historical context and within a transnational framework Uses recently declassified documents at the end of each chapter to illustrate US decision-making in the wars for Iraq Addresses the importance of the changing domestic climate surrounding two decades

Author Peter L. Hahn is the first to synthesize the entire complicated, power-driven relationship between the United States and Iraq over the last ninety years. This book takes a straightforward, chronological approach, emphasizing the formulation of U.S. policy toward Iraq in its political, strategic, and military dimensions. Hahn boldly identifies the key players in Washington and Baghdad, evaluating the successes of every policymaker and each mission in the history of the United States-Iraq relationship.

For most Americans, the war against Iraq lingers in memory as a vast morality play, a drama offering ready made heroes and villains: a glowering dictator in military uniform, hapless Kuwaiti refugees with tales of persecution, plucky pilots with high-tech wizardry, and a defiant American president, ringing Churchillian as he drew a line in the sand. But this characterization of the war is greatly oversimplified, a one-dimensional portrait, lacking in context and nuance. In War in the Gulf, 1990 91, eminent scholars Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb paint a very different picture, one that brings historical depth to the portrait, and displays the actions of many of the participants in a new and revealing light. Khadduri and Ghareeb offer a far more accurate and complex portrait of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, providing a wealth of background information not readily available before. They made a distinction between the differences between Iraq and Kuwait over frontiers, territory, and sovereignty and the method pursued by Iraqi leaders to resolve those differences. They explore, for instance, the history of relations between Iraq and Kuwait, revealing that Kuwait had once been a part of Basra (in southern Iraq) during the Ottoman rule, and only became a separate country while under British control (it was the British in fact who drew the much-disputed boundary line between Iraq and Kuwait). Khadduri and Ghareeb describe the many decades of struggle to resolve the boundary issue, examining the repeated attempts by other Arab states to mediate according to Islamic traditions of consultation and peaceful resolution within the faith. The authors also show how Saddam Husayn's war with Iran exacerbated the boundary tensions. Because of the decade-long war, Iraq badly needed oil revenue to repay wartime loans and to rebuild, but Kuwait persisted in pumping far beyond its OPEC quota, driving down prices, and costing Iraq billions of dollars of revenue. The book reveals how Kuwait spurned Arab attempts to mediate this clash over oil prices as well as the longstanding boundary dispute, frustrating efforts to resolve this crisis by peaceful means. In one particularly interesting section, the book examines the diplomatic talks during the early summer of 1990, both among various Arab nations (most notably, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait), and with Saddam Husayn and the United States (they show how messages from Washington and a visit by a congressional delegation lead by Senator Dole convinced the Iraqi leaders that they would be allowed to settle their problems with Kuwait without outside interference). Khadduri and Ghareeb carry us through to the present, exploring the war and its aftermath, from the uprisings against Baghdad, to the continuing U.N. sanctions, to the recent defections from Saddam's inner circle. War in the Gulf is a balanced, eye-opening account of one of the central events of recent years. It corrects the Western views of most reporting, explaining the frame of mind of the participants as no one has done before and causing us to examine anew such questions as who was responsible for the conflict, and what might have happened if the United States had not intervened so rapidly.

From Storm to Freedom analyzes and assesses the strategic interaction between Iraq and the United States from 1990 to 2009, from the perspective of a single, if discontinuous conflict. With this longer-term perspective, covering both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the book clarifies the long road of war against Iraq. This work recounts presents the evolution of counterinsurgency operations from 2003 to 2009, explains the misunderstanding and miscommunication between government leaders in Iraq and the United States throughout the period and describes the ineffective nature of the UN sanctions, the inefficient efforts of the Clinton Administration and the impact of the preemptive strategy of the Bush Administration that led to conflict in 2002. The book first identifies the influence of the Vietnam era on the use of U.S. military power and the decision for war in 1990. The book then outlines the important factors of Iraqi history and culture which dominated relations between the two nations during the 1980s and 1990s. In subsequent chapters, the 1991 campaign of Desert Storm is analyzed from both the U.S. and Iraqi perspectives; then the military, economic and diplomatic actions of the period between the two more conventional, military parts of the conflict are assessed. The final chapters analyze the highly successful, 2003 conventional campaign from both perspectives; the ineffective post-war stabilization operations in Iraq which began with the failure to transition under the Coalition Provisional Authority; and the eventual development and implementation of a more effective strategy in Iraq – combining new doctrine and a “Surge” of forces to protect the population in a renewed counterinsurgency campaign. In a concluding chapter, the key lessons for the future are reviewed, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.

This study examines the foreign policy-making process of the Iraqi leadership during the 1990-1991 Second Gulf War. It analyzes and explains the sequence of decisions that the Baathist regime in Iraq enacted during the crisis and the conflict that followed its invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. A state-centric framework for the analysis of foreign policy behavior is devised and an investigation is made of the events leading up to the war. Iraq and the Second Gulf War provides the scholar, the policy-maker, and the student with a summary of research on the Gulf conflict and on the states of foreign policy analysis at the same time that it pinpoints alternative perspectives. A detailed day-to-day chronology of the Gulf war enhances the book's research value as does an extensive bibliography and index.

The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 were the most comprehensive and devastating of any established in the name of international governance. In a sharp indictment of U.S. policy, Gordon examines the key role the nation played in shaping the sanctions.

Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.

This volume represents an early attempt at assessing the Long War, now in its 14th year. Forged in the fires of the 9/11 attacks, the war includes campaigns against al Qaeda, major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and operations in the Horn of Africa, the Republic of the Philippines, and globally, in the air and on the sea. The authors herein treat only the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the largest U.S. efforts. It is intended for future senior officers, their advisors, and other national security decisionmakers. By derivation, it is also a book for students in joint professional military education courses, which will qualify them to work in the field of strategy. While the book tends to focus on strategic decisions and developments of land wars among the people, it acknowledges that the status of the United States as a great power and the strength of its ground forces depend in large measure on the dominance of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force in their respective domains.