The United States Defend Forward Cyber Strategy

Defend Forward and persistent engagement / Gary P. Corn and Emily Goldman -- Scenarios for Defend Forward / Gary P. Corn and Peter Renals -- US Cyber Command's first decade / Michael Warner -- The domestic legal framework for US military cyber operations / Robert M. Chesney -- Cyberattacks and constitutional powers / Matthew C. Waxman -- Defend forward and the FBI / James Baker and Matt Morris -- Defend Forward and sovereignty / Jack Goldsmith and Alex Loomis -- Defend Forward and cyber countermeasures / Ashley Deeks -- Covert deception, strategic fraud, and the rule of prohibited intervention / Gary P. Corn -- Due diligence and Defend Forward / Eric Talbot Jensen and Sean Watts -- Defend Forward and attribution / Kristen E. Eichensehr -- Persistent aggrandizement and Israel's cyber defense architecture / Elena Chachko -- Adapting to the cyber domain : Comparing US and UK institutional, legal, and policy innovations / Robert M. Chesney.

In the 2010s, America's adversaries conducted numerous damaging cyber operations inside the United States: the Office of Personnel Management breach, attacks on banks, persistent intellectual property theft by China, and the Russian intervention in the 2016 election. The US-possessor of the world's most powerful cyber arsenal-responded in 2018 by unveiling a new Defend Forward strategy. This volume, edited by Jack Goldsmith and featuring a cast of leading scholars in the field, provides an authoritative overview of the origins and operation of Defend Forward, and a comprehensive assessment of its legality.

Over the past decade, numerous states have declared cyberspace as a new domain of warfare, sought to develop a military cyber strategy and establish a cyber command. These developments have led to much policy talk and concern about the future of warfare as well as the digital vulnerability of society. No Shortcuts provides a level-headed view of where we are in the militarization of cyberspace.In this book, Max Smeets bridges the divide between technology and policy to assess the necessary building blocks for states to develop a military cyber capacity. Smeets argues that for many states, the barriers to entry into conflict in cyberspace are currently too high. Accompanied by a wide range of empirical examples, Smeets shows why governments abilities to develop military cyber capabilities might change over time and explains the limits of capability transfer by states and private actors.

How rival states employ cyber strategy : disruption, espionage, and degradation -- The correlates of cyber strategy -- Cyber coercion as a combined strategy -- Commissars and crooks : Russian cyber coercion -- China and the technology gap : Chinese strategic behavior in cyberspace -- The United States : the cyber reconnaissance-strike complex

Why do nations break into one another's most important computer networks? There is an obvious answer: to steal valuable information or to attack. But this isn't the full story. This book draws on often-overlooked documents leaked by Edward Snowden, real-world case studies of cyber operations, and policymaker perspectives to show that intruding into other countries' networks has enormous defensive value as well. Two nations, neither of which seeks to harm the other but neither of which trusts the other, will often find it prudent to launch intrusions. This general problem, in which a nation's means of securing itself threatens the security of others and risks escalating tension, is a bedrock concept in international relations and is called the 'security dilemma'. This book shows not only that the security dilemma applies to cyber operations, but also that the particular characteristics of the digital domain mean that the effects are deeply pronounced. The cybersecurity dilemma is both a vital concern of modern statecraft and a means of accessibly understanding the essential components of cyber operations.