Tora Bora Revisited

In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush promised a grieving nation that the United States would capture or kill Osama Bin Laden, the mastermind behind the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil. Almost a decade later, the Al Qaeda leader is still alive and free, even after an occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops of more than eight years.In November 2009, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by John F. Kerry, issued a report on what could be characterized as one of the greatest joint military and intelligence failures of recent American history: Bin Laden's escape from his stronghold in the mountains of Tora Bora, and his subsequent flight to a location that remains unknown.Who was responsible for the decision to put too few troops on the ground, and what justification could there have been for such a decision? What alternative plans were available? What can we learn from the flaws of the Afghan occupation?Anyone interested in current affairs-and especially in the beginning of the Global War on Terror-will find this essential reading.

This report by the Committee majority staff is part of our continuing examination of the conflict in Afghanistan. When we went to war less than a month after the attacks of September 11, the objective was to destroy Al Qaeda and kill or capture its leader, Osama bin Laden, and other senior figures in the terrorist group and the Taliban, which had hosted them. Today, more than eight years later, we find ourselves fighting an increasingly lethal insurgency in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan that is led by many of those same extremists. Our inability to finish the job in late 2001 has contributed to a conflict today that endangers not just our troops and those of our allies, but the stability of a volatile and vital region. This report relies on new and existing information to explore the consequences of the failure to eliminate bin Laden and other extremist leaders in the hope that we can learn from the mistakes of the past.

FINALIST FOR THE PULITZER PRIZE For most living Americans, September 11, 2001, is the darkest date in the nation’s history. But what exactly happened on 9/11? Could it have been prevented? And what remains unresolved? Here is the first panoramic, authoritative account of that tragic day—from the first brutal actions of the hijackers to our government’s flawed response; from the untruths told afterward by U.S. officials to the “elephant in the room” of the 9/11 Commission’s report—the clues that point to foreign involvement. New York Times bestselling authors Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan write with access to thousands of recently released official documents, raw transcripts, fresh interviews, and the perspective that can come only from a decade of research and evaluation. Riveting, revelatory, and thoroughly sourced, The Eleventh Day is updated for this edition—with new reporting on a development that the former cochairman of Congress’s 9/11 probe calls the most important in years. This is the essential one-volume work, required reading for us all. “Essential.”—The Wall Street Journal “Meticulous, comprehensive . . . an extraordinary synthesis.”—John Farmer, 9/11 Commission senior counsel “This wide-angle look . . . examines the personalities behind the terror plot, U.S. intelligence blunders, the toxic environmental impact on first responders, the march to war, [and] gray areas in the 9/11 Commission Report.”—The Washington Post “The best available general account of 9/11—soberly written, judiciously weighed, meticulously sourced.”—The Sunday Times

Airpower can achieve military objectives—sometimes, in some circumstances It sounds simple: using airpower to intervene militarily in conflicts, thus minimizing the deaths of soldiers and civilians while achieving both tactical and strategic objectives. In reality, airpower alone sometimes does win battles, but the costs can be high and the long-term consequences may fall short of what decision-makers had in mind. This book by a long-time U.S. intelligence analyst assesses the military operations and post-conflict outcomes in five cases since the mid-1990s in which the United States and/or its allies used airpower to “solve” military problems: Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. In each of these cases, airpower helped achieve the immediate objective, but the long-term outcomes often diverged significantly from the original intent of policymakers. The author concludes that airpower sometimes can be effective when used to support indigenous ground forces, but decision-makers should carefully consider all the circumstances before sending planes, drones, or missiles aloft.

“The best new book on al Qaeda . . . and the best book on Yemen in years.”—Bruce Riedel, Daily Beast Far from the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and al-Qaeda are fighting a clandestine war of drones and suicide bombers in an unforgiving corner of Arabia. The Last Refuge charts the rise, fall, and resurrection of al-Qaeda in Yemen over the last thirty years, detailing how a group that the United States once defeated has now become one of the world’s most dangerous threats. An expert on Yemen who has spent years on the ground there, Gregory D. Johnsen uses al-Qaeda’s Arabic battle notes to reconstruct their world as they take aim at the United States and its allies. Johnsen brings readers in-side al-Qaeda’s training camps and safe houses as the terrorists plot poison attacks and debate how to bring down an airliner on Christmas Day. The Last Refuge is an eye-opening look at the successes and failures of fighting a new type of war in one of the most turbulent countries in the world.

Almost ten years before Osama bin Laden was killed, the United States had the opportunity of a decade to decapitate the organization that so ruthlessly enacted the deadliest foreign attack on American soil in the nationÆs history. Battles raged across Afghanistan in the 102 days following September 11, from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul to Tora Bora. Yet bin Laden escaped while al Qaeda and the Taliban endured the initial onslaught. In 102 Days of War, Yaniv Barzilai takes the reader from meetings in the White House to the most sensitive operations in Afghanistan to explain how AmericaÆs enemies survived 2001. Using a broad array of sources, including interviews with top-level U.S. officials at every level of the war effort, Barzilai concludes that the failure to kill bin Laden and destroy al Qaeda at the Battle of Tora Bora was not only the result of a failure in tactics but, more importantly, the product of failures in policy and leadership. 102 Days of War provides novel information and a new level of understanding about the opening campaign of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Informed citizens and military historians alike will find compelling this vivid and relevant narrative.