Towards A Phenomenological Axiology

This book attempts to open up a path towards a phenomenological theory of values (more technically, a phenomenological axiology). By drawing on everyday experience, and dissociating the notion of value from that of tradition, it shows how emotional sensibility can be integrated to practical reason. This project was prompted by the persuasion that the fragility of democracy, and the current public irrelevance of the ideal principles which support it, largely depend on the inability of modern philosophy to overcome the well-entrenched skepticism about the power of practical reason. The book begins with a phenomenology of cynical consciousness, continues with a survey of still influential theories of value rooted in 20th century philosophy, and finally offers an outline of a bottom-up axiology that revives the anti-skeptical legacy of phenomenology, without ignoring the standards set by contemporary metaethics.

This book provides a framework for phenomenological axiology. It offers a novel account of the existence and nature of values as they appear in conscious experience. By building on previous approaches, including those of Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann, the author develops a unique account of what values really are. After explicating and defending this account, he applies it to several of the most difficult questions in axiology: for example, how our experiences of value can differ from those of others without reducing values to subjective judgments or how the values we experience are connected to the volitional acts that they inspire. This provides satisfactory answers to certain fundamental questions concerning the basic structure of value-experiences. Accordingly, this book represents a novel step forward in phenomenological axiology. Towards a Phenomenology of Values will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology and value theory.

Andrea Cimino, Dermot Moran, Andrea Staiti, Introduction Ingrid Vendrell Ferran, Emotions and Sentiments: Two Distinct Forms of Affective Intentionality Nicola Spano, The Foundation of Evaluation and Volition on Cognition: A New Contribution to the Debate over Husserl’s Account of Objectifying and Non-objectifying Acts Alexis Delamare, Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered Veniero Venier, Husserl and Non-Formal Ethics Emanuele Caminada, Things, Goods, and Values: The Operative Function of Husserl’s Unitary Foundation in Scheler’s Axiology Cristiano Vidali, The Experience of Value. The Influence of Scheler on Sartre’s Early Ethics Paola Premoli De Marchi, The Axiology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. From Phenomenology to Metaphysics Roberta Guccinelli,„Schatten der Irresponsivität“: Pathos ohne Response/Response ohne Pathos. Trauma, Widerstand und Schelers Begriff der seelischen Kausalität REVIEW Eugene Kelly, Review of Roberta de Monticelli’s Towards a Phenomenological Axiology

Although a key aspect of the phenomenological movement is its contribution to value theory (axiology) and value perception (almost all the major figures devoted a great part of their labors to these topics), there has been relatively little attention paid to these themes. This volume in part makes up for this lacuna by being the first anthology on value-theory in the phenomenological movement. It indicates the scope of the issues by discussing, e.g., the distinctive acts of valuing, openness to value, the objectivity of values, the summation and combination of values, the deconstruction of values, the value of absence, and the value of nature. It also contains discussions of most of the major representative figures not only in their own right but also in relationship to one another: Von Ehrenfels, Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, and Derrida.

This study of axiology explores the axiocentricity of being human. Human beings dwell in the realm of value. Values are not simply what persons have; values in large part are what persons are. The mystique of values is analyzed here in terms of their cultural, phenomenological, and ontological status. The relationship between science and values is debated. Values should not be submitted to reductionism. Postmodernism raises new problems for the future of a philosophy of values. Yet, we may direct our hopes toward happiness, universalism, and humanism as inseparable from value-life.

This book proposes a new interpretative key for reading and overcoming the binary of idealism and realism. It takes as its central issue for exploration the way in which human consciousness unfolds, i.e., through the relationship between the I and the world—a field of phenomenological investigation that cannot and must not remain closed within the limits of its own disciplinary borders. The book focuses on the question of realism in contemporary debates, ultimately dismantling prejudices and automatisms that one finds therein. It shows that at the root of the controversy between realism and idealism there often lie equivocations of a semantic nature and by going back to the origins of modern phenomenology it puts into play a discussion of the Husserlian concept of transcendental idealism. Following this path and neutralizing the extreme positions of a critical idealism and a naïve realism, the book proposes a “transcendental realism”: the horizon of a dynamic unity that embraces the process of cognition and that grounds the relation, and not the subordination, of subject and object. The investigation of this reciprocity allows the surpassing of the limits of the domain of knowing, leading to fundamental questions surrounding the ultimate sense of things and their origin.

This edited collection marks a new wave of international and philosophical scholarship on “the heart”- that rich dimension of our emotional being in the world. This text addresses the relation between feeling and knowing and investigates whether or not the heart has its own way of cognition and critique. This book takes up the emotional turn in philosophy in general, and phenomenology in particular, advancing this field through innovative and original perspectives. The contributions come from philosophers working in distinctive, yet overlapping areas of research.

Phenomenology has primarily been concerned with questions about knowledge and ontology. However, in recent years the rise of interest and research in phenomenology and embodiment, the emotions and cognitive science has seen the concept of agency move to a central place in the study of phenomenology generally. The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency is an outstanding reference source to this topic and the first volume of its kind. It comprises twenty-seven chapters written by leading international contributors. Organised into two parts, the following key topics are covered: • major figures • the metaphysics of agency • rationality • voluntary and involuntary action • moral experience • deliberation and choice • phenomenology of agency and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology of freedom • embodied agency Essential reading for students and researchers in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of cognitive science The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency will also be of interest to those in closely related subjects such as sociology and psychology.