Troubled Asset Relief Program Tarp Results Of Housing Counselors Survey On Borrowers Experiences With The Home Affordable Modification Program

The sixth report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) focuses on the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) efforts to establish its Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). This 60-day report examines: (1) the design of HAMP's program features with respect to maximizing assistance to struggling homeowners; (2) the analytical basis for Treasury's estimate of the number of loans that are likely to be successfully modified using TARP funds under HAMP; and (3) the status of Treasury's efforts to implement operational procedures and internal controls for HAMP. Charts and tables.

The Department of the Treasury has allocated $37.5 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds to help struggling homeowners avoid potential foreclosure since 2009. Between February 2009 and May 2015, Treasury disbursed approximately $16.3 billion of these funds. The number of new borrowers with permanent modifications added to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), the key component of these programs, began to decline in late 2013 but has stabilized at between 9,000 and 15,000 additions per month. This report examines the status of TARP-funded housing programs in June 2015; and (2) the extent to which Treasury's analytic framework for considering recent program changes was consistent with federal guidance and best practices. Tables and figures. This is a print on demand report.

Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to, among other things, preserve homeownership and protect home values. In March 2009, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) announced the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) as its cornerstone effort to achieve these goals. This report examines: (1) the extent to which HAMP servicers have treated borrowers consistently; and (2) the actions that Treasury has taken to address the challenges of trial modification conversions, negative equity, redefaults, and program stability. The report obtained information from 10 servicers that account for 71 percent of HAMP funds and spoke with Treasury, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac officials. Includes recommendations. Illus.