Virtue Ethics And Contemporary Aristotelianism

This compelling and distinctive volume advances Aristotelianism by bringing its traditional virtue ethics to bear upon characteristically modern issues, such as the politics of economic power and egalitarian dispute. This volume bridges the gap between Aristotle's philosophy and the multitude of contemporary Aristotelian theories that have been formulated in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Part I draws on Aristotle's texts and Thomas Aquinas' Aristotelianism to examine the Aristotelian tradition of virtues, with a chapter by Alasdair MacIntyre contextualising the different readings of Aristotle's philosophy. Part II offers a critical engagement with MacIntyrean Aristotelianism, while Part III demonstrates the ongoing influence of Aristotelianism in contemporary theoretical debates on governance and politics. Extensive in its historical scope, this is a valuable collection relating the tradition of virtue to modernity, which will be of interest to all working in virtue ethics and contemporary Aristotelian politics.

By bringing together influential critics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and some of the strongest defenders of an Aristotelian approach, this collection provides a fresh assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Aristotelian virtue ethics and its contemporary interpretations. Contributors critically discuss and re-assess the neo-Aristotelian paradigm which has been predominant in the philosophical discourse on virtue for the past 30 years.

After 25 centuries, Aristotle's influence on our society's moral thinking remains profound even when subterranean. Typical members of our society can often be made to see that their moral thought and action are, in crucial ways, unwittingly Aristotelian. No one in contemporary philosophical ethics can afford to ignore Aristotle. Much of the finest work in recent moral philosophy has been overtly and professedly Aristotelian in inspiration. And many writers who would officiallydistance themselves from Aristotle and his contemporary followers are nonetheless indebted to him, sometimes in ways that they do not realise.Values and Virtues provides a platform for some notable writers in the area to present and discuss their new ideas about Aristotelian ethics in a way that will advance the academic debate and engage the interest of a broad range of philosophical readers.

After 25 centuries, Aristotle's influence on our society's moral thinking remains profound even when subterranean. Typical members of our society can often be made to see that their moral thought and action are, in crucial ways, unwittingly Aristotelian. No one in contemporary philosophical ethics can afford to ignore Aristotle. Much of the finest work in recent moral philosophy has been overtly and professedly Aristotelian in inspiration. And many writers who would officially distance themselves from Aristotle and his contemporary followers are nonetheless indebted to him, sometimes in ways that they do not realise. Values and Virtues provides a platform for some notable writers in the area to present and discuss their new ideas about Aristotelian ethics in a way that will advance the academic debate and engage the interest of a broad range of philosophical readers.

Thirty-five years ago Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue established virtue ethics as a major challenger to competing visions of morality, but there is still considerable disagreement concerning which version of virtue ethics provides the best approach. The Supremacy of Love describes and advocates an agape-centered vision of Aristotelian virtue ethics that portrays love as the most important moral virtue, and the goals of love as a partial constituent of every genuine virtue. This structural improvement to Aristotelian virtue ethics—found originally in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas—enables this account to address several controversial topics in contemporary virtue ethics, including why the virtues cannot be used badly, in what sense is there a unity between the virtues, how the virtues benefit the virtuous person, and how virtues provide action guidance. Eric J. Silverman demonstrates how and why a distinctly love-centered approach to virtue ethics should make the view widely attractive in comparison to alternative accounts of virtue ethics, duty based deontological theories, as well as results-based consequentialist views.

Jonathan Sanford finds that despite the common origins of contemporary virtue ethics in Anscombe, the literature varies widely not just in its scope but in its basic commitments. What exactly is contemporary virtue ethics? In Before Virtue, Sanford develops strategies for describing contemporary virtue ethics accurately. He then assesses contemporary virtue approaches by the Anscombean dual standard which inspired them: the degree to which they avoid the pitfalls of modern moral philosophy and the extent to which they exemplify a successful recovery of an Aristotelian approach to ethics.

This volume provides a clear and accessible overview of central concepts, positions, and arguments in virtue ethics today. While it focuses primarily on Aristotelian virtue ethics, it also includes discussion of alternative forms of virtue ethics (sentimentalism and pluralism) and competing normative theories (consequentialism and deontology). The first six chapters are organized around central questions in normative ethics that are of particular concern to virtue ethicists and their critics: What is virtue ethics? What makes a trait a virtue? Is there a link between virtue and happiness? What is involved in being well-motivated? What is practical wisdom? What makes an action right? The last four chapters focus on important challenges or objections to virtue ethics: Can virtue ethics be applied to particular moral problems? Does virtue ethics ultimately rely on moral principles? Can it withstand the situationist critique? What are the prospects for an environmental virtue ethics? ?

Argues that any adequate neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic must account for our distinctive nature as the meaning-seeking animal.