War S Logic

Surveys how American strategic theorists have understood the nature and character of war in the twentieth century.

By analytically decoupling war and violence, this book explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war. Against the prevailing view that such violence is an instance of impenetrable madness, the book demonstrates that there is logic to it and that it has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than currently believed. Kalyvas specifies a novel theory of selective violence: it is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them. Violence, he finds, is never a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly interactive character defeats simple maximization logics while producing surprising outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the 'frontlines' of civil war.

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” “A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive.” “The worst road may be the best route to battle.” Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows—they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict.In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of “post-heroic” war in Kosovo in 1999—an American war in which not a single American soldier was killed.In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world’s foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.

This is a systematic and well-paced introduction to mathematical logic. Excellent as a course text, the book presupposes only elementary background and can be used also for self-study by more ambitious students.Starting with the basics of set theory, induction and computability, it covers propositional and first order logic — their syntax, reasoning systems and semantics. Soundness and completeness results for Hilbert's and Gentzen's systems are presented, along with simple decidability arguments. The general applicability of various concepts and techniques is demonstrated by highlighting their consistent reuse in different contexts.Unlike in most comparable texts, presentation of syntactic reasoning systems precedes the semantic explanations. The simplicity of syntactic constructions and rules — of a high, though often neglected, pedagogical value — aids students in approaching more complex semantic issues. This order of presentation also brings forth the relative independence of syntax from the semantics, helping to appreciate the importance of the purely symbolic systems, like those underlying computers.An overview of the history of logic precedes the main text, while informal analogies precede introduction of most central concepts. These informal aspects are kept clearly apart from the technical ones. Together, they form a unique text which may be appreciated equally by lecturers and students occupied with mathematical precision, as well as those interested in the relations of logical formalisms to the problems of computability and the philosophy of logic.This revised edition contains also, besides many new exercises, a new chapter on semantic paradoxes. An equivalence of logical and graphical representations allows us to see vicious circularity as the odd cycles in the graphical representation and can be used as a simple tool for diagnosing paradoxes in natural discourse.

Is logic a good tool for making decisions? Can it make us better listeners and help us find coherence in views that we disagree with? Is Sherlock Holmes actually good at logic? Patrick Girard addresses these and other questions by presenting logic as the guardian of coherence. Logic, Girard argues, finds coherence in the patterns of reasoning across science, religion, and everyday decision making. It helps communities engage safely by replacing contentious debates with shared, constructive reasoning – logic provides neutral ground for the healthy pursuit of common goals and interests. Logic in the Wild employs common sense language, eschewing technical jargon, symbols, and equations. Girard’s attention focuses on logic’s power to find what unites the complex and the simple, the abstract and the concrete, the theoretical and the practical. In treating logic not as a passive subject to learn but as an active discipline to engage with, Logic in the Wild teaches us to identify patterns in our own reasoning, which inevitably helps us better confront questions central to everyday life.

Most wars between countries end quickly and at relatively low cost. The few in which high-intensity fighting continues for years bring about a disproportionate amount of death and suffering. What separates these few unusually long and intense wars from the many conflicts that are far less destructive? In Logics of War, Alex Weisiger tests three explanations for a nation's decision to go to war and continue fighting regardless of the costs. He combines sharp statistical analysis of interstate wars over the past two centuries with nine narrative case studies. He examines both well-known conflicts like World War II and the Persian Gulf War, as well as unfamiliar ones such as the 1864-1870 Paraguayan War (or the War of the Triple Alliance), which proportionally caused more deaths than any other war in modern history. When leaders go to war expecting easy victory, events usually correct their misperceptions quickly and with fairly low casualties, thereby setting the stage for a negotiated agreement. A second explanation involves motives born of domestic politics; as war becomes more intense, however, leaders are increasingly constrained in their ability to continue the fighting. Particularly destructive wars instead arise from mistrust of an opponent's intentions. Countries that launch preventive wars to forestall expected decline tend to have particularly ambitious war aims that they hold to even when fighting goes poorly. Moreover, in some cases, their opponents interpret the preventive attack as evidence of a dispositional commitment to aggression, resulting in the rejection of any form of negotiation and a demand for unconditional surrender. Weisiger's treatment of a topic of central concern to scholars of major wars will also be read with great interest by military historians, political psychologists, and sociologists.

Through the use of logic, simulation, and empirical data, Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr develop and demonstrate a nuanced and more appropriate conceptualization of explanation in international relations and foreign policy in Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics. They demonstrate that a concern with the logical underpinnings of research raises a series of theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological issues that must be addressed if theory and research design are to meet the challenges of cumulation in the study of international relations (or any area of social science). The authors argue for understanding the critical, yet subtle, interplay of the elements with a research triad composed of theory, logic, and method.